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This thesis studies the formation of the early modern colonial state in Asia. Through 
an exploration of the English East India Company, it examines the dynamics which 
shaped political authority, colonial governance and the performance of state power in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Specifically, the following research argues 
that a process of political decentralisation took place within the Company. This was 
driven by the pursuit of ‘private interests’ on behalf of the Company’s servants in 
Asia, who, as a result neglected, resisted or subverted the ‘public interests’ of their 
masters in London. Key to this reconfiguration of power were the family networks 
established by Company servants between Europe and Asia, and across Asia itself in 
this period. As constructs of exchange, circulation and movement, family networks 
allowed Company servants to exercise considerable political agency, distinct from 
metropolitan authorities. In so doing, they transformed the political landscape around 
them, laying the foundations of the early modern colonial state through a process of 
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A Confederacy of Little Platoons 
 
 
In his Reflections on the French Revolution published in 1790, the British statesman, 
political theorist and philosopher Edmund Burke wrote that ‘To be attached to the 
subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle (the 
germ as it were) of public affections. It is the first link in the series by which we 
proceed towards a love to our country, and to mankind.’1 Burke was not merely 
concerned with expressions of public or national devotion or fealty. Rather, he was 
commenting on the crucial role played by non-state actors in the larger processes of 
state formation. When Burke spoke at the impeachment trial of Warren Hastings, the 
English East India Company’s first governor-general of India between 1772 and 1785, 
he further articulated his idea of ‘the little platoon’. He used the intensely public trial to 
attack what he perceived to have been Hastings’ disenfranchisement of those ‘little 
platoons’ which had for so long comprised the Company’s political foundations in Asia. 
Burke argued that to remove the individual, the personal and the intimate from colonial 
governance and replace them with the disinterested, the impersonal and the autocratic, 
as Hastings allegedly had done during his governor-generalship, was to see ‘Nature 
violated in its strongest principles.’2 In other words, by subverting the private with the 
public and replacing traditional forms of governance with modern, bureaucratic ones, 
Hastings had brought ruin upon the Company, evidenced in the political and financial 
troubles which had engulfed it during his government.3 
 
                                                 
1 Edmund Burke, ed., The Works of Edmund Burke (London, 1887, 12 vols.), vol. 1, p. 534.  
2 Burke, Works, vol. 11, pp. 422-3. 
3 Ibid. 
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This thesis is an exploration of the early modern colonial state in Asia before the 
time of Hastings, Burke and the theatrical politics of the English East India Company 
which played out before London high-society in the later eighteenth century. It aims to 
uncover a more traditional process of state formation that was subtly but dynamically 
underway far beyond the courts of the Company’s metropolitan headquarters in East 
India House and the impeachment trials of the House of Commons in London in which 
the Company’s affairs in Asia were subject to the increasingly long arm of 
parliamentary accountability and the encroaching centralisation of the nation-state. It is 
a study of the agency of colonial actors on the so-called ‘peripheries’ of empire in the 
early modern period. It explores the process through which these actors established 
expansive social networks in an effort to integrate themselves into a wider global 
community between c. 1650-1750, and the decentralising dynamic this autonomous 
agency had upon the emergence of the colonial state in Asia. Colonial actors, in this 
case the Company’s servants, exercised powerful political agency in their own right, 
laying the foundations of a colonial state which was less Hastings’s centralised fiscal-
military bureaucracy and more Burke’s traditional groupings of ‘little platoons’. 
By making the distinction, in Burke’s words, between ‘the body of the Company 
and the bodies of the Company’, this thesis seeks to make three important contributions 
to the study of the English East India Company and the formation of the early modern 
colonial state more widely. First, by demonstrating the autonomy of colonial actors 
from so-called ‘centres’ and the decentralisation of political authority and decision-
making through their agency, it argues that explorations of global networks are more 
useful in explaining the development of early modern empires and the emergence of 
colonial polities than traditional centre-periphery models; second, it demonstrates that 
the foundations of the colonial state were laid gradually, in a far more contested manner 
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and over a much earlier period than the traditionally accepted period of the later 
eighteenth century; finally, it situates the colonial family at the heart of colonial state 
formation through an exploration of the role of the kinship networks they established 
across Asia by the early eighteenth century in transforming the political landscape 
around them. 
In doing so, this thesis follows Burke’s perception of the early modern state 
which rested on more traditional political models comprised of smaller groups or bodies 
of political, social and economic authority. For Burke, politics required a regime or 
system ‘other than the hierarchical bureaucratic government’ which he believed had 
been built in Asia by men such as Hastings by the later eighteenth century.4 Rather, 
‘local associations and groupings’ had to exercise political power free of larger 
bureaucratic structures built by a centralising polity.5 But under Hastings, these ‘little 
platoons’ were gradually excluded from exercising power and replaced with an army of 
‘sophisters, economists, and calculators’.6 Burke’s arguments in favour of the role of 
smaller, independent groups and associations in state and society stemmed in part from 
his reaction to the French Revolution in which Burke believed a more traditional age 
was being violently swept away.7 But his belief that these smaller groups were an 
essential component of political society, especially in Asia, was also reflective of the 
wider early modern political landscape in which non-state or non-nation-state actors 
could shape and determine the state itself. As Philip J. Stern has recently argued, the 
early modern British state was comprised of ‘an interlocking matrix of commonwealths, 
churches, associations, communities, office-holders, agencies, and families’, all of 
                                                 
4 Geraint Parry, ‘Enlightened Government and Its Critics in Eighteenth-Century Germany’, The 
Historical Journal, vol. 6, no. 2 (1963), pp. 189. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Burke, Works, vol. 3, p. 240. 
7 See Julie Murray, ‘Company Rules: Burke, Hastings, and the Specter of the Modern Liberal State’, 
Eighteenth-Century Studies, vol. 41, no. 1 (Fall, 2007), pp. 58. 
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whom acted as ‘body politics’ in their own right, exercising their own forms of political 
authority.8 This was particularly so in Asia, where the servants of the English East India 
Company were stationed thousands of miles from sites of central or metropolitan 
oversight. 
 It may seem paradoxical that Burke sought at once to argue against the actions 
of the East India Company at the same time as he championed the rights of its colonial 
agents as powerful components of that very Company. But Burke was always careful to 
distinguish between ‘the body of the Company and the bodies of the Company’.9 He did 
this predominantly by describing the Company as ‘a service of confederacy’, made up 
of many smaller groups, interests and associations distinct from the larger, or upper, 
frameworks of corporate ‘corruption’ and ‘greed’ that supposedly sat atop the 
Company.10 If Hastings and his masters at East India House in London were guilty of 
misconduct and misrule, ‘the bodies of the Company’ on the ground in Asia were guilty 
of nothing more than being at once under Hastings’s ‘terror and his protection’ as 
governor-general.11 Burke’s understanding of the way in which the Company operated 
as articulated in his speeches at the impeachment trial of Warren Hastings, reveal what 
has remained a predominantly hidden, forgotten or neglected side of the Company for 
historians: that the trading corporation was not a central, monolithic institution, but ‘a 
confederacy of little platoons’ with conflicting and competing interests, loyalties, 
associations and agencies. Following Burke’s analysis, the thesis presented here is that a 
‘confederacy of little platoons’ emerged within the English East India Company in the 
later seventeenth century, a social dynamic which decentred political authority within 
                                                 
8 Philip J. Stern, The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty & the Early Modern Foundations of the 
British Empire in India (Oxford, 2011), p. 9. 
9 Murray, ‘Company Rules’, p. 62. 
10 Cited in ibid, p. 63. 
11 Cited in ibid. 
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the early modern British Empire and led to a process of private colonial state formation 
in Asia. 
The first two chapters seek to understand the contest between the ‘public 
interests’ of the Company, that is the headquarters at East India House in London and 
their concerns for the dividends of their shareholders through commercial growth and 
the obedience of their servants, and the ‘private interests’ of the Company, being the 
Company’s servants and their pursuit of social, cultural, commercial and political power 
in Asia. Specifically, chapter 1 follows the state-building discourses of the committees 
and directors at East India House, in which they responded to the unregulated private 
interests of their servants in Asia by seeking to build social and political hierarchies at 
places such as Madras that would subordinate their employees there. By adopting a case 
study of the Company’s settlements on the West Coast of Sumatra, however, chapter 2 
reveals how the actual practice of colonial state building in Asia proved far different 
from the discourse of East India House. The colonial institutions which the committees 
and directors hoped would regulate private interest had to be built and maintained by 
those very servants in Asia that they sought to deprive. The latter responded by 
appropriating the public authority invested in them to further their own interests, 
establishing private regimes of personal governance that significantly decentred 
political authority within the Company and marginalised the supposed ‘centre’ at East 
India House. 
In establishing the significant role played by Company servants and their private 
interests in the colonial state formation process, this study then moves on to consider 
how such interests were developed and the forces driving them in place of a wider 
institutional or corporate framework in which Company servants have traditionally been 
studied. Thus chapter 3 highlights the importance of family networks in connecting 
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individual Company servants into a larger private community both within the metropole 
beyond East India House but also, from the later seventeenth century onwards, across 
Asia itself. Indeed, the growth and expansion of colonial families within the Company’s 
settlements in Asia led to a dynamic of global exchange in which goods, knowledge, 
communication and people moved across and around the family networks of Company 
servants, developing and shaping their interests, resources and actions. Chapter 4 
examines the role family networks played in laying the foundations of the colonial state 
in Bengal and Madras through a study of the Vincent, Pitt and Charnock kinship 
networks. It shows how, as colonial state formation was driven by the pursuit of private 
interest, its foundations in the Bay of Bengal were often incoherent and politically 
amorphous. Nonetheless, as chapter 5 demonstrates through an analysis of the Clive 
kinship network’s part in the conquest of Bengal, the foundations of the colonial state 
laid by such a ‘confederacy of little platoons’ facilitated the emergence of a 
considerable imperial domain by the later eighteenth century. As the opportunities for 
private gains were considerably expanded after this development, Company kinship 
networks reengaged with the ‘centre’ at East India House in an effort to extract greater 
resources for the security of their gains in Bengal. Company servants such as Robert 
Clive used his kinship network to assert his control over the court of directors, 
subordinating their policies to his private state formation interests, privatising the very 
heart of the public corporate body. 
  
The Making of an Early Modern Colonial State 
Until very recently, the English East India Company was understood by historians – 
both contemporary and modern – as a commercial corporation in which its directors in 
Britain and their employees in Asia were concerned with purchasing rare spices and 
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exotic textiles in India and shipping them back to the Company’s warehouses in London 
for auction, the profits of which would be paid as an annual dividend to its 
shareholders.12 This relatively uncomplicated, tidy and convenient narrative of the 
Company as a ‘mere merchant’ was only rarely complicated by historians showing the 
considerable private trading interests of employees in Asia, and the extent to which their 
aggressive commercialism led the Company deeper into regional societies and 
economies.13 Such traditional accounts understand the emergence of an empire in India 
from the mid-eighteenth century onwards as a surprising and unlooked for assumption 
of sovereignty by the Company as the last resort in defending its trade from the 
surrounding chaos of Mughal decline, often in combination with the idea that such 
chaos was facilitated by private Company traders undermining the political stability of 
regimes in places such as Bengal.14 
 To what extent, then, can historians even talk of a colonial state in Asia before 
the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries? One of the significant contributions 
this study seeks to make is in demonstrating that the foundations of the colonial state in 
Asia were laid in a much earlier period than the ‘sudden’ territorial acquisitions of the 
later eighteenth century, which the historiography traditionally dates from the battle of 
Plassey in 1757. Indeed, historians have only very recently started to explore the 
Company’s political development in the period preceding Plassey. Most notably, Philip 
J. Stern’s The Company-State has challenged the long established belief that nations 
monopolised processes of state building. Stern argues that a range of corporations, 
communities and associations could acquire and exercise their own forms of political 
                                                 
12 See the account given by Om Prakash, ‘The English East India Company and India’, in H. V. Bowen, 
Margarette Lincoln and Nigel Rigby, eds., The Worlds of the East India Company (Woodbridge, 
Suffolks, 2002), pp. 1-18. 
13 The most famous, of course, being Holden Furber, John Company at Work: A Study of European 
Expansion in India in the Late Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, MA, 1948). 
14 P. J. Marshall, ‘Economic and Political Expansion: The Case of Oudh’, Modern Asian Studies, vol. 9, 
no. 4 (1975), pp. 465-482. 
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and constitutional authority, including, most notably, the English East India Company. 
This sovereign power existed alongside that of the nation-state in what Stern describes 
as ‘an early modern world filled with a variety of corporate bodies politic and 
hyphenated, hybrid, overlapping, and composite forms of sovereignty’. Stern then 
explores the ways in which the Company, as a ‘public’ corporate body, built a state in 
Asia as early as the mid-seventeenth century, upholding legal jurisdictions, raising 
revenue, planting colonies, waging war and claiming territory.15 
Stern’s study represents a significant reinterpretation of the Company as a polity 
in its own right. However, despite the fact that Stern declares early modern states to 
have been ‘sets of de-centred processes’, his own institutional understanding of the 
Company as a state is one of a centralised political system free of the contested, 
overlapping and composite forms of authority represented by other polities in the early 
modern world.16 The ‘institutional focus’ of such revisionist history has largely been 
found in the colonial rhetoric of contemporary institutional figures, such as the 
chairmen and directors sitting comfortably in East India House in London. The result is 
that the actual practice of the Company in Asia, or what the historian Anna 
Winterbottom has recently termed ‘a far more chaotic reality’ when observing the 
networks of knowledge within the Company, is in danger of being written out of future 
histories of the Company altogether and of the early modern British Empire more 
widely.17 This trend is reflected in the examination of the technologies of knowledge 
within the Company by Miles Ogborn. When studying the bookkeeping practices of 
Company servants in Asia, Ogborn depicts political authority and social relationships 
within the Company’s settlements as conditioned by ‘specific institutional forms’ of 
                                                 
15 Stern, Company-State, p. 3. 
16 Ibid., pp. 213-14. 
17 Anna Winterbottom, ‘Company Culture: Information, Scholarship, and the East India Company 
Settlements 1660-1720s’ (PhD dissertation, University of London, 2010), p. 8. 
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management and regulation, and argues that the Company can only be understood 
through an appreciation of the top-down ‘process of institutional change’ which 
supposedly shaped so much of the Company’s political development.18 
 In this thesis, I argue against such institutional understandings of the early 
modern colonial state which suggests a simplistic model of political authority in which 
the centralising structures of corporate institutions seem effective in regulating a 
complex global community of Company servants. Such revisionist histories have paid 
exclusive attention to the public policies and interests of the Company’s metropolitan 
authorities at East India House, neglecting the prominent and wide-ranging nature of the 
private interests of the Company’s servants which shaped the practice and development 
of the Company in Asia. Rather, Stern argues that Company servants were public 
officials, promoting the interests of their masters in London above all else. He provides 
the example of Enoch Walsh, a member of the Bombay council who wrote to East India 
House in 1697 to assure them that he had ‘Acquited all particular Affairs & private 
Interest purely to Serve the Publick & intreat your Honnours.’19 Nonetheless, over the 
next three years, Walsh became a notorious private trader and social piranha, exhorting 
money from Indian merchants and borrowing heavily from other Company servants, as 
well as abandoning his public duties as the settlement’s accountant in order to drink, 
gamble and duel in the streets of Bombay.20 In 1700, his ship was impounded by the 
governor to meet the demands of his creditors, prompting Walsh to hijack the vessel and 
escape out of Bombay’s harbour under cannon-fire from the Castle.21 This suggests the 
need to examine, less the institutional discourse of Stern and Ogborn’s public 
                                                 
18 Miles Ogborn, Indian Ink: Script and Print in the Making of the English East India Company (London, 
2007), pp. 69-70. 
19 Cited in Stern, Company-State, p. 50. 
20 BL, APAC, IOR/E/3/55, Anonymous to Court of Directors, Bombay, 30 June 1699. 
21 BL, APAC, IOR/E/3/55, Bombay Diary and Consultation Book, 14 May 1700. 
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corporation, and more the practical realities of Company servants operating thousands 
of miles from central or metropolitan centres.  
In order to understand the interplay of the private and public interests in the 
formation of the early modern colonial state, this study draws upon recent 
historiographical trends on the domestic European state. These have emphasised the 
agency of informal or non-state actors in driving decentred processes of state formation. 
Eschewing traditional understandings of the state as consisting of a ‘centre’ with the 
means and willingness to project its authority, usually violently through warfare, 
Michael Braddick has emphasised the role of office holders operating in localities.22 
Such agents created networks which embodied the state by exercising political power 
beyond the so-called ‘centre’, and were thus capable of shaping, developing and 
expanding the state itself.23 Furthermore, according to Mark Goldie, these agents were 
not always political or social elites. In the absence of national or official bureaucracy, 
away from metropolitan centres, ‘large numbers of people undertook the self-
management of their local communities’.24 As Goldie points out, beyond Whitehall, 
which employed a mere 1,200 people in the seventeenth century, government was 
undertaken by ‘amateur, part-time and unsalaried’ community members.25 The early 
modern state, therefore, was neither a central nor a top-down building process. Rather, it 
was formed through the assumption and exercise of state power by informal and indirect 
agents operating within their own networks of association, loyalty, interest and 
authority. As Europeans travelled out to Asia in the service of the English East India 
Company, their ideas of political authority and the state reflected these localised, 
                                                 
22 For the state as a monopoly over the means of violence, see Max Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’, 
reprinted in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (Wiltshire, 
2009), pp. 77-128. 
23 Michael J. Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England c.1550-1700 (Cambridge, 2000). 
24 Mark Goldie, ‘The Unacknowledged Republic: Officeholding in Early Modern England’, in Tim 
Harris, ed., The Politics of the Excluded, c. 1500-1850 (Basingstoke, 2001), p. 154. 
25 Ibid. 
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autonomous systems of governance, and the so-called ‘centre’ at East India House 
remained as far removed from them in Asia as Whitehall had been from them in Britain. 
As in the domestic English state, metropolitan centres and colonial institutions 
possessed only a very weak, and often imagined and rhetorical, hold over actors, agents 
and groups operating in Asia across maritime expanses, up vast riverine basins, at 
subordinate settlements and beyond formal imperial boundaries and jurisdictions.26 
As such, this study argues that colonial state formation was similarly not so 
much about the centralisation or expansion of ‘military, fiscal, and bureaucratic power’, 
as it was ‘the incorporation, and empowerment, of disparate communities’, represented 
by Company servants and their wider family networks in Asia who commandeered 
public authority to pursue a range of private interests, interests which subsequently laid 
the foundations of the early modern colonial state.27 Indeed, Patrick Joyce has recently 
questioned understandings of the state as an ‘it’, defined by central constitutional and 
administrative functions. Rather, Joyce argues for an understanding of the state in 
relational terms, ‘not as a thing…but as something like a site of passage of and between 
different powers’, or, in other words, ‘in terms of relationships’ between agents or 
groups of agents.28 Lauren Benton has reiterated this perception when exploring the 
discourses and practices of colonial sovereignty, defining it as ‘a set of relationships 
that, through spatial and temporal prisms, may endow distant actors with greater 
specific powers.’29 
These explorations of state formation ‘from below’ by colonial actors and agents 
operating within colonial theatres allow a look beyond the predominantly peaceful and 
                                                 
26 For example, see Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 
1400-1900 (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 40-103. 
27 Phil Withington, ‘Corporate Citizenship, and State Formation in Early Modern England’, American 
Historical Review, vol. 112, no. 4 (2007), p. 1036. 
28 Patrick Joyce, 'What is the Social in Social History?' Past and Present, vol. 206, no. 1 (2010), p. 238. 
29 Benton, Search for Sovereignty, p. 292. 
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commercially-minded policies of the Company’s court of directors before the later 
eighteenth century. In doing so, glimpses of an ‘every day’ colonialism which was far 
more politically engaged in Asia itself, one that was laying the foundations of the 
colonial state as early as the later seventeenth century – despite the mercantile mind-set 
of East India House – can be captured. If we return to Patrick Joyce’s understanding of 
the state ‘in terms of relationships’, then it is necessary to understand the relationship 
not just between the court of directors at East India House and its servants in Asia, but 
between the servants  themselves who transformed the political landscape around them 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the early modern colonial state. There has 
been little space for such conceptualisations within the more traditionally accepted 
narrative of England’s overseas chartered companies as ‘bureaucratic economic 
organisations’.30 However, as this study reveals, the colonial polity which emerged in 
this period was less of a monolithic, fiscal-military machine, as conceptualised by John 
Brewer, as it was a social community connected through a series of global networks.31 
As the sociologist John Levi Martin argued, modern state organisations did not, 
historically, ‘spring up’, but developed from ‘smaller components…namely 
interpersonal relationships.’32 
Indeed, if the Company was a trading corporation, it was also, as its founding 
charter declared, a ‘fellowship’, imbuing the Company with an ‘inescapably social 
character’.33 Contemporaries certainly viewed ‘The Governor and Company of 
Merchants of London trading into the East Indies' as a society, or community of 
                                                 
30 K. N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company 1660-1760 
(Cambridge, 1978), p. 82. 
31 For Brewer’s ‘fiscal military state’, see John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the 
English State, 1688-1783 (London, 1989), pp. 22-3. 
32 John Levi Martin, Social Structures (Oxford, 2009), p. x. 
33 Stern, Company-State, p. 8. 
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members pursuing common interests.34 The etymological origins of the word ‘company’ 
itself, as Stern points out, derives from forms of association, not business or trade.35 
From the Latin companio, or 'companion, one who eats bread with you', in its many late 
medieval contexts, such as the Old French compagine, a ‘company’ referred to a 
‘Society or Corporation of men’, implying a social body of people.36 In fact, any such 
body of people who came together for a common purpose was perceived as a 
‘company’.37 Even parliament was understood in 1685 as 'a Company of men, pack't 
together by false returns, illegal Chartres and other corrupt means.'38 Ecclesiastical 
institutions were similarly conceived as social organisations. According to the cleric 
William Ames in 1642, 'the Church is a company of men.' He went on to define just 
what this meant in a passage which is worth quoting in full. 'It is called a company: 
because it doth consist properly in a multitude joyned in a fellowship together, or a 
community of many...and by the same reason it is often called...an House, a Family, a 
City, a Kingdome, a Flock, &c.'39 All institutions, then, whether political, ecclesiastical, 
civic, monarchical or national, were actually understood by contemporaries in social 
terms as communities of members. Even England’s highest form of political 
community, the commonwealth, was perceived in such terms. ‘A common wealth’, 
explained Sir Thomas Smith in his 1583 book De republica anglorum, ‘is called a 
society or common doing of a multitude of free men collected together and united by 
common accord and coveanauntes among themselves, for the conversation of 
                                                 
34 British Library [BL], Asia, Pacific and Africa Collections [APAC], India Office Records [IOR], A/1/2, 
Charter granted by Queen Elizabeth, to the Governor and Company of Merchants of London, Trading into 
the East-Indies, 31 December 1600. 
35 Stern, Company-State, p. 8. 
36 Guy Miege, A new dictionary French and English with another English and French according to the 
present use and modern orthography of the French inrich’d with new words… (London, 1677), p. 69. 
37 Stern, Company-State, p. 8. 
38 [Anon], Some remarks upon a scandalous libel, intituled, The declaration of James Duke of Monmouth, 
&c (London, 1685), p. 6. 
39 William Ames, The marrow of sacred divinity drawne out of the Holy Scriptures; and the interpreters 
thereof, and brought into method (London, 1642), p. 152-3. 
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themselves’.40 At their core, companies were social communities consisting of members 
pursuing common interests in many different forms. 
 This was especially true for England’s overseas chartered companies. As the 
secretary of the Company of Merchant Adventurers explained in 1601, the company 
was created when ‘men of olde time linked and bound themselves together in Companie 
for the exercise of Merchandise and sea-fare’.41  The English East India Company was 
also seen as a similar fellowship of men. In 1695 the merchant Roger Coke described it 
as a 'Company of Men'.42 Similarly in 1700 the writer and satirist Edward Ward defined 
the Company not in commercial or political terms, but as 'a Corporation of Men'.43 In 
fact the term 'corporation' was used interchangeably with that of 'company'. In 1597 the 
theologian Richard Hooker understood a united body of persons 'to appertaine unto 
severall corporations or companies of men.'44 When contemporaries referred to the 
Company, they were united in recognising that it was, predominantly, a social 
formation.  
 Despite the well-established understanding of the early modern English state and 
political authority as social constructs, this has yet to be integrated into approaches to 
the English East India Company.45 The existing historiography has largely neglected the 
Company as a social organisation due both to its remarkable commercial success by the 
end of the seventeenth century and its unprecedented political expansion by the close of 
                                                 
40 Cited in Mark Knights, ‘Commonwealth: the Social, Cultural and Conceptual Contexts of an Early 
Modern Keyword’, The Historical Journal, vol. 54, no. 3 (September, 2011), pp. 659-60. 
41 Cited in William E. Lingelbach, The Internal Organisation of the Merchant Adventurers of England 
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the eighteenth century. Thus studies of the Company as a trading corporation or as a 
colonial empire appear more proliferate as the evidence is more substantial, visible and 
obvious. Yet, as this thesis argues, such a conceptualisation of the Company is 
misleading. As the political theorist Harold Laski concluded, writing in the early 
twentieth century, what ‘men later deem a corporation is not to be found’ in the early 
modern period.46 As this study argues, it is only through an appreciation of the 
Company’s social nature and organisation that its commercial and political growth can 
be understood. If, as was argued earlier, it was the Company’s servants who were 
responsible for transforming the political landscape in Asia, then the key to 
understanding their actions, culture, ideology and motives can be found in the social 
relationships established between them.  
 The ‘early modern’ as a historical concept has too often been seen as only a 
stage, to imply an emerging form of modernity, or at least to mark the foundation of a 
proto-modern state. The ‘early modern’ is in fact a nuanced and ambiguous concept. To 
that extent, the phrase is misleading, as the period was neither entirely ‘early’ nor was it 
entirely ‘modern’, and thus clear distinctions or associations with this period must 
always be treated with a Janus-like approach.47 The failure to do so has led to 
assumptions that, as the first permanent joint-stock corporation, the Company laid the 
foundations of modernity in the British state and thus that the Company itself was a 
modern construct. At the very least the Company is thought of as a precursor to the 
modern ‘firm’; at the very most, the catalyst for a consumer revolution and a new age of 
global capitalism.48 Far from embodying a proto-modern commercial organisation 
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which paved the way for modernity in Britain, the English East India Company had 
more in common with its pre-modern forebears than the later modern developments in 
the British state and economy. This was insisted upon by Laski, who argued that if the 
Company did pave the way for a supposedly ‘modern’ world, it nonetheless carried 
‘traces of the old.’49 As Charles Parker has argued, global trading bodies such as the 
Company were merely new manifestations of earlier forms of traditional commercial 
enterprise, ones powerfully shaped by the dynamic of more traditional, smaller groups 
of socio-economic power pursuing their own private interests and concerns.50 
 
Global Networks in the English East India Company 
In rejecting a centralised, institutional and public model of the English East India 
Company in favour of a decentred community of Company servants and their families 
pursuing a range of private interests across Asia, this study reveals how the policies and 
ideology of East India House in London were divorced from the practical realities 
which shaped the actions of their servants stationed in Asia. In making such an 
argument, it is suggested that the historian’s emphasis on discourse to understand state 
formation provides ‘an untenable dichotomy between thought and reality’.51 In other 
words, accepting that the policies of the court of directors in East India House reflected 
the practices of their servants in Asia, is to neglect the role played by the latter through 
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whom such policies were channelled and implemented and thus mitigated, manipulated 
and subverted in the process. Kathleen Wilson, in her recent study of the state building 
practices on eighteenth-century British colonial frontiers, has similarly rejected such 
institutional understandings of the colonial state. Arguing that, as an entity, the state 
was a fiction, Wilson focuses instead on the performative nature of state power and the 
‘practices of state-building’ by colonial actors operating on the ‘peripheries’ of 
empire.52 
In that respect, this study is predominantly concerned with the practices and 
results of state formation. By suggesting that colonial actors could operate outside of the 
larger colonial structures imposed upon them, and even possessed the means to 
determine their own political environments, their ability to exercise independent 
‘agency’ is particularly emphasised.53 To understand the development of the Company 
with reference to metropolitan policy only is to create a seriously unbalanced picture.54 
However, those historians who have also taken into account the actions of Company 
servants, have mostly adopted a metropolitan perspective. Indeed, the significant 
autonomy of Company servants in Asia has traditionally been conceptualised as ‘the 
agency problem’, in which the exercise of private agency has been defined as a form of 
‘corruption’ or ‘malfeasance’.55 In examining the Company’s contract enforcement with 
its servants, for example, Santhi Hejeebu argued that the ‘the temporal and spatial 
distance between agents and directors’ presented a constant dynamic of tension ‘in an 
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era of slow communication and hazardous travel.’ However, Hejeebu goes on to analyse 
this dynamic through an exploration of ‘the incentive and monitoring systems used by 
companies to address the agency problem.’56  
On the contrary, this study conceptualises the political and commercial 
autonomy of Company servants in Asia not as the result of ‘corruption’, but as a direct 
product of their ability to exercise a form of ‘private’ agency distinct from the larger 
‘public’ policies of the Company in the metropole. Of course, a focus on the ‘man on 
the spot’, or of ‘sub-imperialism’, has had a long historiographical legacy.57 Stretching 
back to the Victorian period, such studies have revealed how the institutional, corporate 
nature of the Company was ‘largely obscured’ by certain Company servants in Asia 
who ‘very often disobeyed their masters, and acted on their own initiative without any 
reference to the policy and prejudices of Leadenhall Street.’58 The result was the neglect 
of metropolitan interests, often conceptualised as commerciality of ‘the ledger’, in 
favour of political expansion by means of ‘the sword’.59 These arguments were adopted 
by more modern historians as the model for understanding the Company’s inconsistent 
relationship with Indian states, in which Company servants pursued an aggressive 
policy that was constantly censured by East India House for deviating from their more 
commercial concerns. For example, Ian Bruce Watson argued that there were ‘two 
broad divisions of official and private aspirations’ which constantly ‘impinged on one 
another’.60 He characterised this as acting with ‘a sword in one hand and money in the 
other’, a Janus-like approach which represented the contest between the interests of 
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Company servants in Asia and their employers in London respectively.61 More recently, 
Robert Travers has explored colonial state formation in Bengal from the mid-eighteenth 
century onwards by analysing the role of Company servants operating on the 
peripheries of new colonial conquests. According to Travers, ‘the sub-imperialism of 
British officials in Bengal’ was the driving force behind the conceptualisation and 
appropriation of Mughal forms of political rule which fed into colonial models of state 
formation.62  
Despite the legacy of emphasising the divergent interests of metropolitan 
intentions and local realities, many histories of the English East India Company 
continue to look to the orders emanating from the court of directors in London in an 
effort to understand the Company’s development in Asia, as opposed to the groups who 
were physically operating there.63 As Stephen Howe pointed out in in his recent review 
of new approaches to the study of empire, there is still a need to properly understand 
and bring to the fore the smaller groups and the ‘sub-imperialisms’ they produced 
‘within the capacious but perhaps often ill-fitting overcoat of global Britishness’.64 Only 
very recently has new scholarship taken up this call and begun to integrate the 
transformative agency of colonial actors in Asia into larger narratives of the Company’s 
engagement there.65 By focusing on the ‘little platoons’, this study seeks to reveal not 
just the differences between the Company’s metropolitan authorities in London and 
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their servants in Asia, but the pivotal role of the latter in shaping the very political 
foundations of an emerging Company-state. 
Divorcing the ‘centre’ from the ‘periphery’ and analysing the ‘man on the spot’ 
in Asia revisits, in many ways, a more traditional historiography which placed the 
formation of the colonial state strictly within its local Asian context. For instance, 
historians such as C. A. Bayly explained the expansion of the Company in India through 
its reliance on, and mobilization of, Indian networks of trade, capital and information.66 
An entire generation of Indian historians have similarly emphasised the local 
circumstances of the Company’s development, placing its commercial and political 
growth within a continuous eighteenth-century Indian narrative, evaluated through a 
growing body of regional studies, from the Indian Ocean to the Mughal Successor State 
of Bengal.67 While such traditional historiography agrees that there were important 
social groups exercising a dynamic form of agency distinct from any imperial ‘centre’, 
their focus has been exclusively on Asian social groups, such as Indian bankers and 
merchants, or what Sanjay Sybrahmanyam has termed the ‘portfolio capitalists’.68 
However, as Soren Mentz has recently argued in his study of British networks of trade 
and capital between Madras and London, understanding the Company strictly within a 
local Indian context fails to link ‘developments in Asia together with the economic, 
social and political developments in the mother country’ which were equally as 
important.69 Indeed, since the emergence of ‘global history’ in the last two decades, 
more revisionist histories which have sought to integrate the expansion of the Company 
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in Asia into a wider analysis of the British Empire elsewhere, especially in the 
Atlantic.70  
How, then, can a historical analysis of the autonomy of Company servants in 
Asia be linked into wider British processes of empire, without directly subordinating 
them to metropolitan narratives? This study seeks to bridge the gap between these two 
contrasting threads of historiography by linking local colonial developments – 
specifically, the pursuit of private interests by ‘little platoons’ in Asia – with wider 
global processes of empire and state formation in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, through the study of social networks. Specifically, by uncovering the 
extensive family networks established by Company servants between Europe and Asia, 
and across Asia itself from the later seventeenth century, this study shows how political 
authority within the Company was significantly decentred by the early eighteenth 
century. Family networks linked individual Company servants into a wider global 
community based upon the exchange, circulation and movement of people, capital, 
goods and information, a process which undermined the public structures and 
hierarchies of the Company and shaped its political development along the contours of 
an expansive set of private family networks that criss-crossed Asia. 
According to Emily Erikson, in her recent study of the social networks 
established by the captains of Company ships trading to Asia in this period, ‘High levels 
of employee autonomy and cohesive networks of peer communication fed into each 
other’.71 Although Erikson argues that such decentralization actually assisted the 
Company’s success as a commercial ‘firm’, she nonetheless argues that the networks 
established between servants allowed them to control the role of the Company in Asia. 
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Thus while, in theory, ‘London principals exercised direct control over factories and 
forts by shutting them down…even these orders were not always followed.’72 In 
creating social networks, then, Company servants operated through their own systems 
of association, intelligence and resources, allowing them to take greater control over 
decision-making within the Company. By the later seventeenth century, the 
decentralisation of the Company allowed Company servants and their networks in Asia 
to shape the foundations of the colonial state according to their own ‘private interests’. 
In arguing that the family networks established by Company servants in Asia 
decentred the emerging colonial state, this thesis places itself within ‘new’ imperial 
history methodologies which seek to understand, amongst other things, the juxtaposition 
of the local and the global. As Kathleen Wilson has observed, these two concepts ‘have 
been difficult to disentangle since 1492’, and only now have historians started to 
abandon their separate treatment of the two in favour of understanding rather how they 
interlinked and shaped one another.73 Such an approach has emerged since the late 
1990s and has sought to redefine linear notions of an imperial or metropolitan ‘centre’ 
dominating a protean colonial periphery.74 This has begun, in many respects, with 
reconceptualising Immanuel Wallerstein’s ‘core-periphery’ model of colonial empires.75 
The process whereby authority, agents and resources ‘radiated outward’ from the 
‘centre’ or ‘metropole’, to the ‘periphery’ or ‘colony’, is an unsatisfactory explanation 
for imperial systems which consisted of highly autonomous areas of settlement, trade 
and conquest.76 As Jack P. Greene has noted, traditional ‘centres’, such as London, 
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lacked the resources or proximity to coerce distant sites of empire, whether in the 
Atlantic or Asia, which constructed their own, internal ‘European-style polities’.77  
 One prominent way in which the new imperial history has challenged more 
traditional ‘centre-periphery’ models is through a conceptual analysis of empire not as a 
linear or asymmetric construct, but rather ‘as a permeable “web” or “network”, shaped 
by global and regional currents, that impacted metropolitan as much as colonial 
culture.’78 Despite warnings by historians such as C. A. Bayly, who argued, at the onset 
of new imperial histories, that ‘it is still necessary to ask what the “centre” was around 
which these decentred discourses revolved’,79 new imperial historians have rightly 
posed the question of ‘whose centre is at issue in this account?’80 For those Company 
servants and their family networks studied in this thesis, who spent most of their lives 
outside of Britain, their ‘centre’ was not London, but Madras, Calcutta or Bombay, each 
of which maintained their own set of colonial ‘peripheries’ which themselves existed 
often thousands of miles away in the vast interior of Asia or across the maritime 
expanse of the Indian Ocean. According to Stephen Howe, one of the key challenges in 
writing future histories of empire, is in analysing such a move away from an 
understanding of empire as a nation and its colonies - or a ‘centre’ and its ‘peripheries’ - 
to something more decentred, transnational and inter-imperial as a set of global 
networks or a ‘web’ of imperial circuits.81 
In many respects, ‘global history’ has emerged in response to this very 
challenge. Historians are increasingly understanding empire as a process of global 
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connection.82 As David Armitage and Michael Braddick have argued, an ‘Atlantic 
World’ was created by ‘a complex of evolving connections’ in that particular ocean.83 
Similarly, Alison Games has exposed a ‘web’ in which ‘globetrotters’ circulated 
colonial experience, knowledge and models from one part of the world to another.84 
These connections, circuits and webs operated as forms of long-distance networks 
which, it has been argued, created the ‘first global age’ between the fifteenth and 
eighteenth centuries by bringing Europe, the Americas, Africa and Asia in to 
unprecedented levels of contact. What emerged was ‘an open, complex, dynamic, 
nonlinear system’ which led, among other things, to the establishment and expansion of 
European empires.85 The family networks established by Company servants created a 
similarly ‘nonlinear system’ in Asia, along the contours of which the early modern 
colonial state was laid, formed and developed.  
 
Family and Colonial State Formation 
At the core of this study is an analysis of the role played by families in the processes of 
early modern colonial state formation in Asia. Having been ‘the most elemental and 
enduring form of a mercantile partnership’ across Eurasia since the mediaeval period, 
the family produced the social capital, joint resources and loyalty that proved so 
fundamental in establishing global networks of trade in the early modern period.86 As 
the historian Margot Finn has recently argued, there existed a ‘close nexus between 
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family formations and economic development’, right up to the nineteenth century.87 
But, according to Finn, only with the growth in new imperial history has ‘an 
efflorescence of scholarship on the part played by family relationships in shaping the 
conflicted modernities of the British empire’ been possible.88 For the English East India 
Company, whose development was shaped by a network of colonial families which 
spread across the globe from the later seventeenth century onwards, the link between 
family formation and state formation is crucial in explaining the emergence of a 
colonial polity in Asia by the eighteenth century. Thus, if the Company can also be 
conceptualised as a social community, and not just a trading corporation, then an 
understanding of the process of colonial state formation must necessarily focus not just 
on the commercial transactions of its members, but also the social relationships which 
they established, cultivated, utilised, and ultimately exploited in an effort to transform 
the political landscape around them. As such, the third contribution this research seeks 
to make to the study of the Company and the early modern British Empire more widely, 
is in understanding the formation of the colonial state in Asia as a social process, 
emerging from the activities of the family networks established by Company servants in 
the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Indeed, to return to Edmund Burke and 
his concept of ‘the little platoons’ and their role in shaping the state, the great political 
philosopher had little doubt that the most important of these smaller configurations of 
social, economic and political power was the family. 
 Burke’s conceptualisation of the Company as a ‘confederacy of little platoons’ 
derived from his belief that modern, bureaucratic and centralised polities were unnatural 
and unfit to govern societies. After the execution of the Comte d’Artois’s brother by 
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French revolutionaries, an event Burke abhorred for the idea that a more traditional 
system of government was being replaced by a modern revolution, the British statesman 
wrote to console him in 1793. ‘The ties of nature, which are the laws of God, are much 
better, surer, safer, and pleasanter, than any which we make for ourselves, politically, as 
members of parties or states, or in the intercourse of common life as friendships.’89 In 
other words, Burke believed that the family was the most effective social, commercial, 
cultural and political unit of power, and that familial ties were a more natural form of 
association between people than any that might be imposed by larger social or political 
structures and hierarchies. For Burke, the family acted as a site, more so than any other 
in society, in which the ‘common opinions, common affections, and common interests’ 
of its members met.90 
 The importance of the family to every facet of society, from the economy to the 
state, has been well established by an extensive historiography.91 Lawrence Stone’s The 
Family, Sex and Marriage in England, 1500-1800 controversially sought to redefine the 
family as one which transitioned from a seventeenth century ‘open lineage family’ to an 
eighteenth century ‘nuclear family’.92 The key theme in Stone’s research was the 
decline of kinship in the early modern period and the emergence of individuality and 
‘the self’, divorced from notions of the family – a reflection of wider changes in society 
at the time in which the household was supposedly losing its prominent social and 
economic role. 
Much of the subsequent historiography of the family in the proceeding decades 
has sought to challenge Stone’s findings, and to ‘open’ the family back up as a wider 
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social construct with significant economic influence. For instance, the family has been 
identified as the primary force behind the development of material culture and an 
emerging consumer revolution.93 For Britain’s middle classes, the family has been 
conceptualised as a more physically definable but socially amorphous ‘household’ in 
which both men and women pursued a range of domestic, religious, economic and 
social interests.94 The emphasis on ‘the middle sort’ has been a notable feature of the 
historiography of the family in early modern Britain. Such studies have revealed a 
highly commercialised middle class whose economic expansion was rooted firmly 
within the family.95 Furthermore, it has been argued that a precariously emerging 
market economy was conditioned by equally precarious changes in familial 
relationships and household structure.96 
 Revisionist historiography, however, has recently challenged the more extreme 
portrayals of consumerism and commercialism within the family. Indeed, the rise of 
‘capitalist modernity’ by the end of the early modern period had a limited impact on the 
family. Despite the commercialisation of the British economy and the financial 
revolutions in banking and finance which occurred between the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, the structures, routines, concerns and culture of the family 
remained predominantly traditional. The oversimplified narrative of the English 
household as transitioning from ‘the moral economy’ to ‘the market economy’ fails to 
appreciate the ‘complexity and diversity of social and economic behaviour’, in which 
powerful ideologies such as patriarchy and conservative values such as community 
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juxtaposed within the family with increasing material wealth and bourgeois culture.97 
Personal, business and political relationships therefore continued to be cultivated, 
maintained and utilised through traditional methods, such as marriage, establishing 
‘fictive-kin’ or by familial patronage.98 
 The different spheres of activity within the family allowed it to act as a bridge 
between the social, commercial, cultural and political worlds of the early modern 
period. The ‘public’ and ‘private’ have been historically ambiguous concepts and ones 
that historians continue to find analytically contentious and difficult to define, 
especially so in the case of the ‘private’.99 Nonetheless, historians of the early modern 
state have traditionally defined the ‘private’ as that which did not pertain to the state 
itself.100 In the emerging ‘public sphere’ in Britain in the early modern period, actors or 
agents who held important political office but who used their position to pursue interests 
other than those connected to that particular office were increasingly seen as ‘corrupt’ 
and indulging in ‘private’ concerns in working against the state, and could as a result be 
divested of their ‘public’ status.101 However, within the ‘private sphere’, such as the 
family, the distinction between the public and the private were more ambiguous and 
largely irrelevant in the early modern period.102 For this reason, there was no 
segregation of the domestic or political in the family. To the contrary, how the 
household was governed, for example, shaped powerful ideas about how the state 
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should be modelled.103 Thus few political office-holders actually distinguished their 
official public duties from their more private interests, while the ‘collective’ of the 
‘public sphere’, such as the court of directors at East India House, more and more came 
to see the ‘private’ as a form of malfeasance or disobedience, a private gain at the 
expense of a wider public community.104 
The juxtaposition of the public and the private within the family meant that it 
was able both to drive and shape processes of early modern state formation. What in the 
nineteenth century became known as the ‘public sphere’ was historically constructed in 
the ‘private sphere’.105 As Dena Goodman observed, ‘Institutions of sociability were the 
common ground upon which public and private met’.106 Speaking of the late Tudor 
family, Barbara Harris noted how ‘the world of kinship, the great household, 
client/patron relations, and the court conflated concerns that we would label as either 
personal or political and virtually ignored the distinction between the public and the 
private.’107 In early modern Asia, the families of English East India Company servants 
similarly acted as a site in which the private juxtaposed and intermeshed with the 
public, and in which matters of personal material gain, for example, were difficult to 
disentangle from political engagement.108 Company servants and their families in Asia 
were constantly forced to confront ‘a multiplicity of interests’, in which their own 
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private concerns were so entangled with their public activities that they were unable to 
distinguish between the two.109 
In response to such scrutiny of the public role of the family, historians are 
increasingly looking beyond the socio-economic functions traditionally ascribed to 
colonial families to examine their political significance in the formation of European 
empires, especially in Asia. As Emma Rothschild has recently observed, ‘empire was a 
family enterprise’.110 She concludes that ‘the history of families has been the history of 
empires’, in which economic, political and military processes intersected with the ties of 
family and kinship that connected members of colonial families often separated by 
thousands of miles.111 Margot Finn similarly focuses on the various aspects of empire 
that intersected in the family, arguing that it operated ‘at once [as] a place of political 
power, a prime site of capital accumulation, a focal point of identity formation and a 
key locus of emotional development and expression.’112 For Finn, family formation 
shaped the motives and actions of those British officials responsible for driving the 
colonial state.113  
This was particularly true for Company servants in Asia before the nineteenth 
century. The English practice of establishing multiracial families ‘was sometimes seen 
as beneficial to the nascent colonial state of the East India Company.’114 Interracial 
relationships created a culture of intimacy that facilitated the establishment of colonial 
trade, politics and rule in Asia. In this respect, European officials in Asia could embody 
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‘the state builder, monied man, and family patriarch’ all at once.115 Far from being a 
familial dynamic exclusive to pre-capitalist societies, ‘elite families and states meshed’ 
in the early modern period.116 Thus Company servants operated economically and 
politically through their extensive family ties, monopolising political office and 
controlling vast colonial interests.117 As Julia Adams concluded of the Dutch VOC, ‘as 
the patriarchal family and lineal networks and ideologies were woven into the web of 
patrimonial power, they formed what we might call a familial state.’118  
The historiography of the colonial family has thus moved away from the study 
of the family as an end in itself, gradually ascribing it a greater role within processes of 
colonial state formation. However, two significant problems remain. The first is that, 
with the exception of Adams’ study of the Dutch VOC, historians of the English 
Company have yet to look at colonial families before the mid-eighteenth century. 
Before this period, Asia has largely been defined as a space of trade and commerce, not 
of settlement or families.119 This is in contrast to other areas of the early modern British 
Empire before the later eighteenth century, such as the eastern Mediterranean, where the 
families of Levant Company servants formed important colonial communities.120 
Secondly, the families of East India Company servants continue to be analysed as an 
extension of metropolitan groups in London: a subordinate cog in a wider colonial 
machine centred on the metropole which used the family as an ‘intermediary’ agent or 
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‘go-between’ through which the Company’s global concerns were governed.121 Margot 
Finn, for example, has argued that many factors, including the small number of 
Company servants, the vast distance between Europe and Asia and the influence of 
Indian political systems, ‘all reinforced the close ties between the Company’s proto-
state and governing-class families in India in this period.’122 Ghosh similarly promotes 
this conceptualisation of the colonial family, observing how it was responsible for 
‘maintaining the relationship between the state and its subjects.’123 Thus colonial 
families are understood as tools of the colonial state, not its authors. 
In contrast, this study challenges the idea that colonial families formed part of an 
institutional state infrastructure centred on the metropole, in which they performed the 
role of a Weberian patrimonial governing elite in Asia.124 Rather, it analyses the 
colonial family as the very authors of political power and authority, driving state 
formation through their pursuit of ‘private interests’, in direct opposition to the ‘public 
interests’ of the Company’s metropolitan authorities in London. By placing Company 
servants and their colonial families within their wider kinship groups, this study argues 
that such families were able to cross the Company’s official social, cultural, commercial 
and political boundaries through the networks of kinship which they established right 
across Asia from the later seventeenth century onwards. In the process, they engaged 
with new areas of trade, culture and politics, transforming these landscapes as and when 
it suited their private interests and personal requirements.  
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Kinship is currently enjoying a new prominence within the historiography of 
global trade and empire, where once it remained the preserve of anthropologists.125 
More fluid and open concepts of kinship have dramatically expanded the scope, extent 
and range of family units considered by historians, revealing the establishment of large 
kinship groups across often expansive geographic areas.126 Most people in British 
society relied on a network of kin for support, exchange and promotion in early modern 
social, economic and political life, particularly in the world of global trade.127 This was 
particularly so in London’s business community, which relied on kin stationed overseas 
to manage trade links and commercial ventures.128 Most importantly, kinship led to 
political solidarity, with large networks of kin pursuing a common political ambition or 
interest, as Company kinship networks consistently did in Asia.129 For Margot Finn, 
kinship is the key in understanding not just the actions, motives and resources of 
Company servants in Asia, but of the ‘vital socio-political mechanism by which the 
British East India Company managed imperial expansion during the later eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries.’130 
 When Burke spoke of the Company as a ‘confederacy of little platoons’ at the 
trial of Warren Hastings, then, he was referring to the hundreds of families that 
exercised the day-to-day functions of the colonial state. The families established by 
Company servants in Asia acted as sites of colonial authority, governance and 
sovereignty, and as they formed and reformed, such families also formed and reformed 
the political foundations of the Company, creating a dynamic and expansive, yet 
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amorphous and often incoherent, colonial polity which spread along the wider kinship 
networks established by families from the later seventeenth century onwards. While 
Stern’s ‘interlocking matrix of commonwealths, churches, associations, communities, 
office-holders, agencies, and families’ were all capable of exercising political agency to 
both embody and shape ‘the state’, it was the family’s effectiveness in creating global 
networks which meant that, overseas, it operated as the most important political agent 
within this diverse matrix.131 
 
Conclusion 
To summarise, this study analyses the role played by Company servants and the kinship 
networks they established in laying the foundations of a colonial state in early modern 
Asia. It does so in three ways: firstly, in arguing that Company servants operated 
autonomous of the ‘centre’ at East India House by revealing the dichotomy between the 
policies of the court of directors in London and the practices of their servants in Asia; 
secondly, in exploring the spread of Company kinship networks from the later 
seventeenth century onwards which connected Company servants in Asia into a wider 
global process of empire which was not centred on London; and thirdly, in 
demonstrating that the pursuit of private interests led such networks to transform the 
political landscape around them in Asia which laid the foundations of the colonial state 
by the mid-eighteenth century.  
In studying the processes of state formation and the agency of networks, the 
following chapters adopt a qualitative approach in a field which is too often dominated 
by quantitative analyses. Social network theory is a thriving methodological tool for 
sociologists, but more recently for historians, too. Emily Erikson’s recent study of the 
                                                 
131 Stern, Company-state, p. 9. 
35 
networks of trade in Asia established by the captains of Company ships is an excellent 
example of the successful application of quantitative network analysis in understanding 
the as-yet relatively unexplored impact of social relationships on the Company’s 
expansion. And yet, as Erikson herself writes of her own quantitative research into the 
social networks of captains employed by the Company, ‘I am ready to admit that 
readers may find themselves slipping around the bathtub model of micro and macro 
levels of [network] analysis’.132 While such quantitative and numerical analysis remains 
useful, nonetheless it is critical to retain a qualitative emphasis on the rich source 
material that remains so important to the study of social networks and their role in 
understanding the wider processes of empire and colonial state formation. For example, 
Sarah Pearsall has argued that the study of private letters is ‘one of the best ways to 
reach families and their histories, but they are also an excellent way of reaching larger 
changes in societies and cultures.’133 Margot Finn has similarly argued that qualitative 
approaches to the study of empire, such as the utilisation of biographies, is particularly 
beneficial to the study of empire through families. Finn argues that only through such 
qualitative methodologies can new imperial histories simultaneously reveal how ‘great 
and lesser men and women are simultaneously embedded in dense, localised, 
particularistic social webs comprised of friends, family and servants and also caught up 
in the trammels of global networks’.134  
This thesis adopts Finn’s model for studying the role of family networks in 
larger imperial processes. The research presented in this study is based primarily upon 
the private papers, correspondence and biographies of more than a dozen colonial 
families and their kinship networks, analysing – in various degrees of depth – hundreds 
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of individuals over a two century period. However, six families in particular reoccur 
throughout and are given greater focus: the Pitts, Charnocks, Collets, Scattergoods, 
Walshs, Fowkes and Clives. This is in part due to the extant source material available 
on these families, mostly in the form of private papers available in the British Library in 
London, which make their analysis far more comprehensive and thus considerably more 
demonstrative than other families who left little written record of their activities behind. 
But it is also because the majority of these families produced figures who held senior 
positions within the Company and featured prominently in key events in the period 
under discussion. Thomas Pitt was governor of Madras while his cousin John Pitt was 
consul for the New Company; Job Charnock waged war against the Mughal Empire and 
founded Calcutta; Joseph Collet was both deputy-governor of Bencoolen and after that, 
governor of Madras; John Scattergood was a free merchant operating in all of Asia’s 
major commercial markets; Joseph Walsh was deputy-governor of Bencoolen while his 
son John Walsh was intimately involved with the conquest of Bengal; Joseph Fowke 
was a successful diamond merchant; and finally Robert Clive was twice governor of 
Bengal. But while such families can, on the whole, be considered elite, their study as 
part of wider kinship networks reveals a much denser social and political web of 
subaltern actors, from widowed wives to impoverished cousins. 
However, there is a risk that in uncovering the private agency of families by 
focusing on the private papers of families, the historian will inevitably find the evidence 
they seek. This study thus places such archival sources strictly within the context of 
their wider socio-political framework by interrogating the public records of the English 
East India Company, similarly available in the British Library. There are two 
predominant forms of public records which have been extensively utilised for this 
study: the official correspondence between East India House in London and its servants 
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in Asia (and vice versa), and the diaries and public consultation books of the individual 
Company settlements in Asia themselves. In contrasting the private lives of Europeans 
in Asia with their public roles as servants of the Company, a holistic and rounded 
picture of their aims, motives and actions have thus been analysed, producing a study 
which crosses both the public and private boundaries which were so thoroughly 
intermingled to Company servants themselves, but which have since, through the lens 
of modern society and the segregation of public and private records within the archive, 













Public Interest and the Discourse of Colonial State Building 
 
 
In 1654, with Oliver Cromwell’s Protectorate established in Britain, the governor and 
court of committees of the English East India Company gathered at its metropolitan 
headquarters in East India House in London to discuss the Company’s future. Many of 
the committee-men present at this meeting argued that the time was right to acquire a 
new charter from the Lord Protector that would provide the Company with greater 
political, legal and constitutional powers to govern its members scattered across the 
globe. The proposal submitted to the court outlined ‘a model of government for 
disposing, managing, and improving’ the Company.1 It consisted, primarily, of 
dispatching senior officials to Asia appointed not by East India House but by Cromwell 
himself. As such, these men would possess the ‘authoritye and style of a publicke 
person’.2 This, it was believed, would allow for the emergence of a strong, centralised 
government in Asia, much like that which Cromwell was instituting in Britain at that 
very moment through the rule of his major-generals in the provinces.3 The committee-
men believed that the new charter would ‘settle the jurisdiction of the said Society with 
more union among themselves and more authority over the several traders and factors 
residing in India’.4 They argued that the acquisition and exercise of greater political 
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powers was ‘the only remedy that may be expected for regulating or preventing those 
great abuses that arise from disorderly, loose [conduct] and private trade.’5  
As the Company expanded across the globe from the mid-seventeenth century, 
from St Helena in the Atlantic and Madras on the Coromandel Coast, to Bencoolen in 
Sumatra and Hugli in Bengal, the need to regulate this growth became critical. That East 
India House considered forfeiting its own authority in Asia in exchange for more power 
to control the behaviour of its ‘disorderly’ servants there, reveals the existence of a 
general crisis which attended the Company’s global expansion. As new settlements 
were founded and new trades established, exerting a measure of control over the ever 
increasing number of members sent thousands of miles away across the vastness of Asia 
became the central preoccupation, anxiety and frustration of metropolitan authorities at 
East India House. As early as 1638 the court of committees had sought ‘to make 
ordinances for the government…and better control of their servants’.6 More than fifty 
years later, the committees were still seeking the most effective means for creating an 
‘English Politicall Government in India’ that would govern its servants there ‘with 
Coersive Lawes, and a strict execution of those Laws’. Until that was achieved, they 
argued, their servants would act as if ‘destitute of Wisdome Conduct or Order’.7 Indeed, 
from the mid-seventeenth century onwards, as the discussions at East India House in 
that August of 1654 reveal, the metropole’s desire to regulate the actions of its members 
by centralising authority within the Company, became East India House’s primary goal. 
Over the course of the later seventeenth century, the Company’s metropolitan 
authorities became less concerned with managing a commercial corporation, and more 
preoccupied with building the state apparatus that would allow it to control the 
behaviour of its members. 
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The first part of this thesis explores the highly contested nature of the colonial 
state, in particular the competing visions held by the Company’s metropolitan authority 
in London and their servants in Asia, of how a colonial state should act, who it should 
empower and what it should achieve. This first chapter analyses the discourse of state 
building created by East India House as a result of what it perceived to be the 
decentralisation of political authority within the Company from the mid-seventeenth 
century. It also considers its attempts to put this discourse into practice in Asia. This 
period represented a time of considerable change for the Company. In the first sixty 
years after its founding charter was issued in 1600, the Company experienced mild 
commercial growth, followed by a long slump in which profits dried up, dividends 
dropped and charter renewals encountered strong domestic resistance.8 After the 
Restoration in 1660, however, the Company underwent unprecedented levels of 
commercial and political expansion which saw it emerge as Europe’s largest trader in 
Asian goods, with factories and settlements spread right across Asia by the turn of the 
eighteenth century.9 However, this up-swing in fortunes for the court of committees 
(after 1685 the court of directors) and the Company’s shareholders in the court of 
proprietors at East India House, also brought with it considerable complications. As the 
Company’s official trade prospered, greater opportunities were made available to its 
servants in Asia to enrich themselves privately, stationed as they were many thousands 
of miles from executive oversight. From the 1660s onwards, what East India House 
perceived to be the neglect of the Company’s public interests by servants in pursuit of 
their own private concerns provoked them to centralise authority within the Company in 
an effort to better regulate and control their affairs in Asia. This chapter explores the 
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state building discourses promoted by East India House in an effort to increase its 
authority over its servants in the seventeenth century. 
As the Company’s global expansion accelerated, East India House sought to 
bind members of the Company to its ‘public interest’ by subordinating them into 
hierarchies built and legitimised upon a political discourse of ‘order’ and ‘obedience’. 
By acquiring greater political authority from the Crown, East India House sought to 
establish both a judiciary and bureaucracy, as well as to centralise government and to 
codify rules, orders and behaviour throughout their settlements. In doing so, they hoped 
such protean state institutions would create the political and social hierarchies which 
would command the obedience of their servants in Asia, ensuring their loyalty to East 
India House and its interests. It was a model of state-building shaped by contemporary 
understandings of the sanctity of order, both in society but also in trade and 
government. British theologians, philosophers, political scientists and writers articulated 
order as the product of natural and providential hierarchies, an ideology which 
determined political life in the seventeenth century and similarly shaped the emergence 
of the domestic English state. Nonetheless, much like the latter, the wish for 
centralisation and the rhetoric of obedience and subordination remained very much a 
discourse of colonial state building, one that was adopted as the political culture of the 
Company’s metropolitan authorities at East India House, but one that proved eminently 
difficult to apply in practice. 
Modern historians continue to perceive the Company as a centralised institution, 
in which its servants professed their loyalty to the public culture of East India House 
thousands of miles away.10 However, metropolitan state-building was severely limited 
when applied to the context of early modern colonial practices. In order to build and 
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maintain state institutions over such vast distances, East India House was forced to 
delegate substantial political authority to the same servants in Asia that it sought so 
thoroughly to subordinate. The relationship between the two groups was accentuated by 
the ‘temporal and spatial distances between agents and directors’ which, in a period 
when letters from London took up to two years to be received and replied to in Asia, 
made the centralisation of authority in the metropole problematic at best.11 Of necessity, 
then, certain Company servants were imbued with wide-ranging metropolitan authority 
in an effort to regulate their colleagues so far from effective oversight. But such 
servants, as this chapter will demonstrate, appropriated their delegated power in pursuit 
of their own ‘private interests’ in Asia, mitigating, transforming and eventually 
decentring the state building efforts of their masters in London. 
 
From Community to Corporation: Global Expansion and the 
Breakdown of Trust in the Early Company 
In the first half of the seventeenth century, the members of the Company were bound to 
East India House and one another through social ties of intimacy, trust and loyalty. 
Incorporated on 31 December 1600 for the Earl of Cumberland and 215 ‘Knights, 
Aldermen and Burgesses’, ‘The Governor and Company of Merchants of London 
trading into the East Indies' was a socially homogenous, interpersonal and tightknit 
community of members.12 Those who invested in the Company’s early voyages, acted 
as its committee-men or went out to Asia as governors, factors and writers, belonged to 
the City of London’s merchants and aristocrats, groups which possessed strong 
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commercial and social ties amongst and between one another.13 As George Lawson 
wrote in 1689, 'members of a community’ could be united ‘to make a body, bound by a 
spirit of fraternity.'14 This fraternal dynamic was acknowledged by one of the 
Company’s first members to be sent out to reside permanently in India as a factor. In 
writing to the governor and committee to thank them for his position at the Mughal 
Emperor's court in Agra in 1616, Joseph Salbancke wrote of 'the duty and respect which 
I owe to your honourable fraternity'.15 Indeed, a culture of fraternity shaped the 
Company's early development, in which personal ties between members were thought to 
be the strongest and most effective for conducting long-distance trade and politics. 'For 
nothing beside a relation can possibilie resyde actually one & the same and at all times 
in a companie of men', observed the cleric William Ames in 1615, 'and in all the parts of 
that companie.'16 The French theologian and philosopher Pierre Charron agreed. In fact, 
he argued that amity was specifically ‘the invention of alliances, companies, fraternities, 
colleges and communities.’ By forging intimate relationships, the members of these 
bodies created ties which were ‘commodious to the weale-publicke…the preserver of 
states and policies.’17 This homogeneity bound members of the Company operating in 
Asia to their masters in East India House, producing the social capital necessary for the 
maintenance of trust and loyalty between them.  
The money for investment into the Company’s joint-stock and the expertise to 
establish new factories and settlements were both raised through the social obligation 
between members of the Company’s fraternity. For instance, the group of members who 
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founded Madras in 1639 were described as ‘four gentlemen all sworne brothers’.18 This 
dynamic was highlighted by the Parliamentarian William Prynne in 1642 when he 
declared that the 'Fundamental Law and originall compact of every...Corporation, 
Company or Fraternitie...was that every Member of them should contribute 
proportionably upon all occasions...without which contribution they could be neither 
a...Coropration, Company, Fraternitie, or have any continuance, or subsistence, at all.'19  
To maintain the trust and obligation inherent in fraternal ties during the Company’s 
early development, members were encouraged to open their own families up for 
recruitment. When the Lawes or Standing Orders of the Company were first published 
in 1621, it was declared that each ‘Brother of the Company’ was to make ‘his Sonnes 
Free of this Society’ on their twenty-first birthday.20 Thus Francis Smithwick, son of the 
Committee-man Thomas Smithwick, was ‘made a free brother of this Company by 
patrimony’ in 1641.21 These rules maintained the Company’s homogeneity, binding its 
members, whether in London or Asia, into a vast web of interpersonal relationships, ties 
and obligations. 
These fraternal ties were invoked between members through a ritual of language, 
practice and routine. For example, members were defined in ordinances, orders and 
correspondence as ‘Brothers’, referring to themselves as ‘the Brethren’ and to the 
Company as the ‘Brotherhood’.22 According to Mary Ann Clawson, the conscious 
forging of artificial fraternal ties in communities such as the Company was ‘insisted on 
by their participants, which united these otherwise disparate institutions’.23 By invoking 
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the ties of kinship to define their relationship between one another, members were able 
to ‘create and sustain relationships among biologically unrelated individuals’.24 Thus 
the governor of Surat reported in 1616 that the success of the new factories in Persia 
was due entirely to the factors there ‘living together with mutual society of love and 
unity.’25 The intimacy and trust fostered by such ties were evident in the letters between 
members in the first half of the seventeenth century. Expressions of love, amity and 
fellowship littered the Company’s correspondence. ‘So commending my love and duty 
to your Worship’, ended one typical letter from a factor at Mocha to Sir Henry 
Middleton, the Company’s chief in Asia in 1610, ‘I remember my love also to Mr. 
Fennell, Mr. Fowler, Mr. Green and to all others our good friends with you’.26 Another, 
sent between factors residing in different parts of Japan in 1613, asked the recipient to 
‘forget me not in your love…whom upon my life you shall find dutiful, honest and true, 
both to the Company and yourself.’27  
While connections between members were not always necessarily ones of the 
utmost intimacy, most members shared some association or degree of familiarity with 
one another. When a Company fleet arrived in Asia in 1614, carrying a group of new 
senior officials to take office there, its members were already known to most of those 
awaiting their arrival. Thomas Aldworthe, chief of Surat, wrote to his ‘Loving friend’ at 
Agra, Thomas Keridge, informing him of the new arrivals. The senior most one was 
Nicholas Downton, ‘a man famous and well respected by the Company. He knoweth 
Nicholas [factor at Surat] and remembers his love unto him. Likewise Mr. Edward 
Dodsworth, one of the chief men, kin to Sir Thomas Smith [governor of the Company], 
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commends his love unto you…and has a letter and a token for you’.28 Shortly after their 
arrival, many of the new officials made their way to Keridge at Agra, where he declared 
‘my love unto the whole company’.29 
The friendship exhibited in official correspondence between members of the 
Company went beyond the necessity of formal guidelines for appropriate early modern 
letter-writing.30 As Jonathan Barry has shown, members of England’s early companies, 
guilds and liveries operated through ‘a set of overtly collective virtues, of sociability 
and good fellowship.’31 Strong connections of trust and loyalty tied together members 
belonging to the socially and commercially homogenous City elite who comprised the 
Company’s senior members. Nicholas Downton, aboard the Company’s ship 
Peppercorn in Asia, wrote to his ‘Beloved Friends’, the governor and court of 
committee in 1611, describing ‘with what great care, pains and charge this journey was 
set forth by the Indian Company, consisting of many, both of Nobility and merchants of 
London’.32 Downton wrote again in 1614 to explain to the governor, Sir Thomas Smith, 
that he had not accepted the post of general in Asia through ‘covetousness’, but rather 
‘the conceit I had of your love, with the love of divers others…drew me…neglecting 
my own ends, applying myself wholly to yours.’33 Consequently, when Company 
members failed in their duties, they considered it to be a ‘loss to the Company, and 
disgrace to ourselves’, promising the court of committees to remedy the situation and 
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‘win their love’.34 A tangible sense of familiarity, personal obligation and fraternal duty 
thus underpinned the functioning of the Company. 
From the 1630s, however, growth in the modest size of the fraternity which had 
fostered such trust began to threaten its homogeneity, and thus the ties which had bound 
members across Asia to East India House. The substantial amount of capital required by 
each joint-stock to maintain the Company’s ships, officials, settlements and 
investments, amounted to almost £3m between 1600 and 1630.35 Inevitably, the 
inclusion of those beyond existing networks of fraternal obligation, finance and 
expertise was necessary if the Company was to continue operating and competing in 
Asia. As a result, while the fraternity consisted of 132 persons at its first meeting in 
1600, over 1,300 individuals had joined the Company by 1630.36 The vast majority of 
these were small-scale investors, but some were new shareholders with substantial 
voting rights, or new committee-men that sat with the governor, or new agents, factors, 
chiefs and captains sent out to Asia to manage, govern and service the Company’s 
increasing responsibilities which became substantial. Exports to Asia had seldom 
exceeded £100,000 a year in the 1630s. But from 1660 onwards this increased sharply, 
reaching £600,000 in the 1680s.37 Similarly, the acquisition of Madras in 1639, Hugli in 
1651, St Helena in 1657, Bombay in 1661, Bencoolen in 1685 and Calcutta in 1690, 
greatly enlarged the Company’s physical world, and in doing so made the temporal, 
spatial and personal connections between members more disparate.  
This social and political impact such disparateness had upon the Company was 
most evident on the Coromandel Coast and in the Bay of Bengal. While the Madras 
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agency consisted of sixteen members in 1645, residing in five small trading factories, by 
1678 there were seventy-three officials stationed across eight settlements, from large 
cities like Madras on the Coromandel Coast in the south, to prosperous factories as far 
north as Patna up the Ganges River in Bengal, almost 1,500 miles away.38 That the 
substantial increase in the size of the Company’s establishment could lead to a lack of 
social and political cohesion amongst its members in the Madras agency was 
commented on by the court of committees in 1668. Having studied the list of officials 
serving there, the court took under ‘serious consideration’ the idea that any additional 
personnel would destabilize the agency, and resolved to ‘forbade the sending of such 
persons this year, & also for the future’, they declared to Madras, as it would cause ‘our 
Affaires not to bee well manadged.’39 Nonetheless the Madras agency continued to 
grow as new servants were sent in the following years, which the court of committees 
acknowledged in 1675, observing ‘how numerous the people grow’.40 Signs appeared as 
early as the mid-seventeenth century that the Company’s expansion had outstripped the 
fraternal obligations and homogenous ties which had traditionally bound it together.  
The creation of a permanent joint-stock through a new charter in 1657 
represented the most visible and official break in the interpersonal ties of trust between 
East India House in London and members in Asia. Before the charter, members 
admitted into the Company, who were almost always known to their new employers 
beforehand, were required only to take an oath before their departure for Asia. For 
example, six new members were admitted in October 1641. Four of these were the sons 
of Alderman Aboy, a committee-man; one the son of William Cockrayne, the deputy-
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governor of the court of committees; and the last the son of Richard Wick, a factor in 
Asia. The court met to discuss their applications and declared that they were ‘admitted 
into the freedome of this Society by Patrimony’.41 The fact that the court of committees 
only required these new recruits to swear an oath for their good behaviour – the 
breaking of which was declared to be ‘of dangerous consequence to the Company’42 – 
clearly demonstrates the trust evident in such informal and personal mechanics of 
employment which defined the relationship between East India House and members 
departing for Asia. 
A visible sign of the breakdown in such trust appeared when the Company 
became a permanent joint-stock in 1657. A large body of new members, the so-called 
‘New Subscribers’, pushed for the abolition of patrimonial service and oath taking.43 
Following an extended debate, the practise was abolished.44 In its place, more 
mechanical and direct forms of service were instituted. These took the form of written 
contracts, such as a covenant of indenture and a bond which had to be signed by two 
sureties on a new member’s behalf.45 While the violation of the covenant’s terms 
exposed the perpetrator to legal prosecution, their guarantors could also be sued by the 
Company for the amount of the bond. Although their size often changed, bonds were 
generally worth at the very least £500, and often as much as £2,000.46 The covenant 
itself, meanwhile, was a lengthy and detailed document which provided members with a 
rolling five-year contract of employment and thoroughly delineated all areas of 
acceptable and unacceptable conduct, especially with regards to private trade.47 Thus, 
when Streynsham Master was appointed governor of Madras in 1675, he assured the 
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court of committees that he was ‘bound by Covenants’ to serve them.48 The transition 
from informal to formal frameworks of service reflected the changing relationship 
between East India House in London and its employees sent out to Asia, one in which 
fraternal ties were replaced by legal contracts between members of an ever expanding 
and disparate global community. 
Global expansion and the creation of a permanent joint-stock had subverted the 
Company’s homogeneity. The legal case of the East India Company v Thomas Sandys 
revealed the breakdown in trust, obligation and intimacy between London and Asia. The 
case was brought before the King’s Bench in 1682 by the merchant Thomas Sandys 
who intended to trade to Asia in defiance of the Company’s monopoly. When his ship 
and goods were seized by the Admiralty, Sandys challenged the Company’s charter, 
declaring it, and all such chartered monopolies, as void.49 The case was a defining 
precedent for English political economy, upholding as it did the political, commercial 
and even moral legitimacy of monopolies. It also reveals the social crisis which had 
enveloped the Company during its unprecedented expansion from the mid-seventeenth 
century onwards.  
In this ‘Great Case of Monopolies’, as it became known, the counsel for Sandys 
argued that the East India Company was not capable of monopolizing the Asian trade as 
it was devoid of those properties which were required for the good governance of trade: 
trust, obligation and duty.50 As personal ties between members had been replaced by an 
impersonal obligation to the joint-stock, Sandys accused the Company of being little 
                                                 
48 Streynsham Master, The Diaries of Streynsham Master, 1675-1680, and other contemporary papers 
relating thereto (London, 1911, 2 vols.), Sir Richard Carnac Temple, ed., vol. 1, pp. 8-10 (hereafter 
Master, Diary). 
49 For an excellent account of the case and its wider implications for English political economy, see Stern, 
Company-State, pp. 46-60. 
50 For a published summary of the Sandys case, see Sir Henry Pollexfen, The argument of a learned 
counsel, upon an action of the case brought by the East-India-Company, against Mr. Thomas Sands, an 
interloper (London, 1696). 
52 
 
more than ‘the invisible Corporation’, unlike the Levant and Muscovy companies, who 
sought to be ‘Managers, Regulaters, and Improvers of Trade.’ The counsel for Sandys 
argued that in dealing with members of the Levant Company, ‘you know your 
Chapman’, unlike those of the East India Company. ‘Every Man, whether Merchant or 
not, if he can buy such a Share in their Stock, is of their Company.’ As such, the 
Company was ‘indefinite as to Persons; the Members thereof are daily changeable; 
some go out, sell their Stocks, or dye’. As members were defined by their contribution 
to the joint-stock, and not through ties of trust or intimacy, Sandys considered members 
to be faceless and ‘invisible East-India Merchant[s]’.51 The bottom line for Sandys was 
that the Company ‘hath neither Soul nor Conscience’.52  
These were, of course, extreme arguments in one of the seventeenth century’s 
most fiercely contested legal battles. But the case of Sandys illustrates how the ties 
which held the Company together had transitioned from the personal to the impersonal. 
As the Company expanded, its metropolitan authorities at East India House became 
increasingly anxious that the loyalty of its members to the interests of the governor and 
court of committees could no longer be assured. ‘Fraternity’, ‘amity’ and ‘love’ had 
been replaced by obligation to the covenant. A century later, Edmund Burke described 
this process as one which ultimately led the Company to violate their own chartered 
rights. In its ‘subjugation and subsumption of the individual to the dreadful totality of 
the corporate body’, the Company’s metropolitan authorities at East India House had 
broken the laws of trust which guaranteed the individual’s ability to pursue its 
interests.53 Corporations like the Hudson’s Bay Company had avoided conflict between 
the ‘public interest’ of the metropole and the ‘private interests’ of officials in Canada by 
fostering a social structure within the Company which treated members as one large 
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family.54 Similarly, the Company of Merchant Adventurers, one of England’s earliest 
overseas chartered companies, had ‘erected amongst themselves a several society, staple 
college, and confederacy strongly banded together.’55 The unintended consequence of 
the breakdown of such social homogeneity within the East India Company by the later 
seventeenth century led to the emergence of ‘disorderly’ behaviour amongst members in 
Asia which fed into metropolitan anxieties and shaped their perception of, and approach 
towards, ‘private interest’. 
 
The Emergence of ‘Private Interest’ 
Long before the Company became a joint-stock corporation in the 1650s, the writer, 
constitutionalist and M.P. John Hooker had warned of the dangers posed to companies 
that subordinated its individual members to the ‘dreadful totality of the corporate body’, 
as Burke had termed it in retrospect. Addressing an audience of the Company of 
Merchant Adventurers in Exeter in 1559, to which he was also a member, Hooker 
declared that the ‘fellowship’ must come together ‘in concorde and unitye’ by which 
‘all comonwelthes and all estates are preserved and kept’, warning ominously that 
‘without them all are turned to utter [ruin] and [desolation].’56 Hooker went on to 
illustrate his point with Aesop’s Fable in which a Scythian father challenged his thirty 
sons to break a faggot of thirty sticks; when they failed to do so, he ordered each son to 
break a stick individually. ‘As long as ye shall [continue] together within the compasse 
and bonde of love and unitie’, the Scythian told his sons, ‘ye shall be strong and 
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invincible’. If such social ties did indeed unravel, as they had done in the East India 
Company by the mid-seventeenth century and were threatening to do so a century 
earlier to the Merchant Adventurers, then Hooker argued that the only way to avoid 
‘utter ruin’ was if members showed complete ‘obedience to the Masters and Governors 
of this Company’.57 
Replacing informal social ties with formal bonds of obedience was a method 
increasingly adopted by the masters and governors of the East India Company after the 
establishment of a permanent joint stock in the later seventeenth century. As the ties 
which bound members of the Company in Asia to metropolitan authorities at East India 
House unravelled, the governor and court of committees perceived any deviance from 
the public interest as a form of disorder or disobedience, a dynamic which led to the 
widespread emergence of private interest. As the Company was defined through various 
royal charters as a ‘body politick’, it considered its servants as public officials with a 
legal duty to uphold the public interest.58 Furthermore, from the mid-seventeenth 
century, the upheavals of the English Civil War had brought a shift in the perception or 
notions of ‘public’, from an individual person holding a public office, to an ‘aggregate 
of people who made up a particular community.’59 Thus, as part of a political 
community, Company servants were expected to aspire to the highest possible aim: the 
good of the public. Not to do so was therefore considered as dangerous, subversive, 
corrupt or even evil. The delineation of the public from the private and the resulting 
demonization of the latter was shaped by a growing articulation of ‘national interest’ in 
England. As the Archbishop of York declared in 1702, when promoting the idea of 
loyal subjects, ‘They would have no Interests separate from the Commonwealth; nor 
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would they for the advancing themselves, ever seek the ruin of others.’60 The governor 
of Surat, Henry Peppwell, had worried about ‘disobedience’ through the growth of 
‘private interest’ when he was charged with enlarging the Company’s presence in the 
Persian Gulf by founding new factories there. When he dispatched his ‘loving friends’ 
to staff these new outposts, he instructed them to give priority to the ‘careful 
government of yourselves’ and to ‘supress all such disorders…each man to other 
yielding that due respect and right as becometh his place.’61  
The Company’s metropolitan authorities in London regarded ‘disorder’ as more 
than mere malfeasance. From the mid-seventeenth century onwards, they 
conceptualised any behaviour at odds with their orders or policies as a form of 
disobedience. When the court of committees wrote to Madras to warn them against any 
‘disorderly’ behaviour, such as ‘unhandsome & disrespectfull passages in your 
Letter[s]’, or even exhibiting ‘bad language to their superiours’, they were precise about 
how this was perceived. ‘You are to understand that by misdemeanour wee doe not 
mean onely Debaucheries’, they explained in 1678. Rather, ‘disorder’, ‘malfeasance’ 
and ‘misdemeanour’ were regarded as the willingness ‘of our Servants [to] disobey the 
orders of their Superiours in reference to our Service’. Such disorderly behaviour, the 
court of committees concluded, was a sign of ‘unfaithfullnes’ to the Company.62  
East India House interpreted the spread of ‘disorder’ across their settlements in 
Asia as a challenge and threat to their own authority. Disobedience, wrote the court of 
committees to servants in Persia in 1682, was a ‘Palpable crime’.63 Their understanding 
of the causal link between ‘disorder’ and ‘disobedience’ was made plain to Governor 
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Andrews’s successor at Surat, Sir George Oxenden. Before leaving for Asia in 1661, he 
was issued with a set of instructions which stated that ‘if any of our Servants 
shall…prove refractory, or not comply’ with his orders, then the new governor was to 
assume that they intended to ‘ffight, or contest with your Authoritie’ and therefore he 
was ‘at Liberty to dispose [of] them’.64 In 1660 the agent of Madras, Thomas Chamber, 
was accused of acting in an ‘irrationall, irregular’ manner.65 This included the expulsion 
of French priests from the settlement, governing without the consultation of a council 
and the acquisition of a vast estate from the profits of private trade.66 Since 1656, 
Madras had been delegated from an independent presidency to an agency subordinate to 
Surat.67 For its governor, Matthew Andrews, Chamber’s malfeasance at Madras 
amounted to insubordination. ‘Who made you our Superiour?’, Andrews demanded of 
the agent in 1661. ‘You say you have given us timely notice [of your actions]. Wee aske 
you where you had the Authority to give us timely notice to be obedient to your 
orders.’68 In reply, Chamber declared that while Madras might now be subordinate to 
Surat, he would nonetheless have ‘noe Coequall to contend withall in what should be 
acted on this [Coromandel] Coast and Bay Bengalla.’69 Although Surat warned 
Chamber that if he ‘Act not better to the Companys Benefitt’ then they would ‘provide 
for a remedy’, the agent argued that Surat’s overbearing behaviour had ‘turned us 
[Madras] out to graze in the world and shift for ourselves.’70 Crucially, while East India 
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House did indeed dismiss Chamber as agent of Madras, they also recalled Andrews as 
governor of Surat and, soon after, the agent for Bengal too, concerned that they might 
all have been carrying on their ‘owne private designs and Interest…to our greate loss’.71 
The court of committees’ hope that clearing house would put an end to the emergence 
of ‘private designs and Interest’ amongst members in Asia was quickly dashed. As new 
settlements were founded and new members sent out to govern them, the lack of 
obligation and ties between those in Asia and metropolitan authorities at East India 
House prevented short-term solutions from reversing the breakdown in trust and 
authority within the Company.  
The factional conflict, private malfeasance and the resort to violence amongst 
members stationed on the Coromandel Coast was understood by East India House as the 
subversion of the Company’s ‘public interest’ by its members’ ‘private interests’. As 
order was perceived to have collapsed in Asia, the actions of members there were 
articulated by the governor and court of committees in London as rebellion against their 
authority and thus against the Company itself. When Sir Edward Winter succeeded 
Chamber at Madras as the new agent in 1662, he reported to the court of committees the 
following year that servants there and throughout the Coast were ‘not soe reall and 
faythfull to the Company’. Rather, they were ‘carryed on by selfe interest’.72 Ironically, 
Sir Edward himself was accused of acting in the same manner by his colleagues at 
Madras and in 1664 East India House sent a supervisor there to launch an investigation 
into the agent’s alleged abuse of power.73 Sir Edward argued that some on his council 
had formed a faction and fabricated the claims against him. Far from abusing his power, 
Sir Edward argued, he was able to exercise very little due to the refractory nature of his 
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colleagues. The new supervisor, Nicholas Buckeridge, had been charged with 
uncovering the ‘divers misdmanadgments and misusages’ of affairs on the Coast.74 But 
according to Sir Edward, the supervisor had merely joined with factions opposed to 
him, which meant that ‘The Agent and the rest after that rate are nothing more then 
ciphers’. Sir Edward now considered himself to be an ‘Agent of wax’, controlled by his 
subordinates.75  
By the end of 1664, the Company’s affairs on the Coromandel Coast were in 
chaos. While the agent at Madras accused his colleagues at Masulipatam of 
embezzlement, they in turn attempted to usurp his authority. The Company’s chief at 
that settlement, William Jearsey, claimed to have received a letter and commission 
directly from East India House ‘impowering him, and rather making this place [Madras] 
subordinate to that then that to this’, Sir Edward wrote in a rather anxious manner to the 
court of committees.76 Meanwhile, the council at Madras refused to consent to any order 
of business directed by Sir Edward. ‘The world is now come to that passe that all are 
Councellors’, he lamented to London, ‘and there’s scarcely any left to bee Commanded, 
and less that will obey any thing that is ordered hence.’77 Finally, Supervisor 
Buckeridge was attempting to supersede the agent himself. He shut down subordinate 
factories without consulting the agent, established new ones, such as at Metchlepatam, 
and opened letters addressed to the agent without informing him.78 When Sir Edward 
ordered a chief of a subordinate factory to come to Madras to account for some 
misdemeanour, Buckeridge cancelled the order. ‘They are tyed together in a string’, Sir 
Edward declared of the supervisor and the rest of the council. ‘So the Agent leaves them 
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to doe their worke, and hee will doe his.’79 As the Company’s administration on the 
Coast ground to a halt, political authority all but collapsed. Settlements vied for 
jurisdiction, chiefs, agents and supervisors contested seniority, and all commercial and 
political affairs were left to flounder. Despairing of the situation around him, Sir 
Edward advised the court of committees that matters would be better managed if 
institutions were built and regulations put in place ‘among us that every man might 
know his place’.80 Despite being himself both the cause and victim of such ‘disorder’ 
and ‘private interest’, Sir Edward nonetheless acknowledged that without the 
establishment of a strict hierarchy, ‘disobedience’ to East India house would continue to 
flourish on the Coromandel Coast. 
Before East India House could heed their agent’s advice and act upon it by 
developing the state apparatus at Madras which would enforce obedience to the 
governor and court of committees, events deteriorated rapidly, threatening the 
continuance of the Company on the Coast altogether. When Supervisor Buckeridge 
returned to England in 1665, he took with him a lengthy document containing the main 
accusations against Sir Edward as agent. The most serious was the charge that he ruled 
Madras through an Indian merchant named Timmanna who ‘had risen to absolute 
power, which he had consistently abused in Winter’s interest.’81 Unsurprisingly, the 
Company sent out a new agent, George Foxcroft, to replace Sir Edward and therefore 
‘to settle and compose all differences’.82 Demoted to second of council, Sir Edward 
resented his replacement and sought constantly to undermine the new agent by 
implementing a strategy previously used against him: the formation of a faction to 
disrupt government. Once again the Company’s establishment on the Coast ground to a 
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halt through what East India House described as ‘such discord and Annimossities’.83 
Events at Madras would prove to be far worse than feelings of animosity between 
servants, however. As the court of committees complained to Madras of ‘discord’, a 
rebellion broke out against the authority of East India House in the settlement that 
would transform the way in which the Company’s metropolitan authorities approached 
the future government of their affairs and, ultimately, their servants in Asia.  
In September 1665, Sir Edward Winter launched a coup d’etat and seized 
control of Fort St. George by force, killing several factors and imprisoning Agent 
Foxcroft and his son on the falsified charge that they had used ‘severall seditious and 
treasonable words…against his now Majestie Charles the Second, King of England’ at 
the public table during dinner.84 In alliance with the commander of the garrison and 
several councillors, Sir Edward governed Madras ‘with tyranny’.85 He ‘did burne the 
faces, drub and otherwise punish’ those who ‘would not subscribe to comply with him 
and justifie his usurpation’, according to one witness,86 while Foxcroft himself, 
smuggling letters out of his prison to Chief Jearsey at Masulipatam, states that Sir 
Edward ‘cruelly and barbarously burnt and mangled and cut the bodies’ of those who 
opposed him, proceeding to have them ‘disgracefully turned out of towne while they 
were sore with their wives and families, to shift for themselves.’87 Many more were 
seized and imprisoned without cause.88 The purging and bloodletting was part of an 
attempt by Sir Edward to prevent any news from reaching East India House, ‘by which 
he would keep you from all true intelligence’, Foxcroft informed the court of 
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committees.89 Sir Edward’s motive in seizing Madras, he concluded to them, was ‘to 
nest himself in this Fort and not to obey any of your Commands.’90 
Sir Edward’s efforts to prevent correspondence from escaping Madras was 
effective enough to forestall knowledge of events there from being known for almost 
two years. Rumours abounded and circulated around Asia and back to East India House: 
a Catholic priest had stirred up a mutiny and now ruled Madras; Sir Edward had killed 
Foxcroft and intended to deliver the town and fort up to the Dutch; Sir Edward had 
clapped all of the Europeans in irons and governed Madras through ‘his black 
Guards’.91 In a letter to the court of committees, Sir Edward sent his own narrative of 
events to East India House wherein the coup was presented as a ‘revolution’, justified 
through Foxcroft’s alleged anti-royalist declarations.92 This claim polarised reactions 
amongst the Company’s other settlements in Asia. While the governor of Surat issued a 
proclamation condemning Sir Edward and his seizure of power, the governor of 
Bombay came out in favour of Sir Edward and issued his own proclamation in 1668 
against the imprisoned Foxcroft.93 Others, such as Benjamin Brond, purser of the 
Company’s ship Greyhound, stormed Fort St. George in the hopes of releasing Foxcroft, 
although the attempt failed and his small party of sixteen English soldiers were 
imprisoned by Sir Edward. ‘I hope your honours will not passe by such murderers and 
usurpers of your power’, Brond wrote to the court of committees shortly after.94 
 The first report of events at Madras was received at East India House in 1667, 
by way of letters from Surat. Despite not knowing the full extent of the situation, the 
court of committees nonetheless understood the calamitous consequences any 
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usurpation of their authority would have had for the Company. ‘The…Actions of Sir 
Edward Winter & his Compliances, hath very much troubled us, in that it hath 
distracted our affairs, and wee cannot but feare, will in ye closures, bee to our great 
losse & damage.’95 At first they wrote to Madras to exhort Sir Edward to reinstate 
Foxcroft as agent, and, to prevent ‘further Acts of disobedience’, also gained a 
proclamation from King Charles II ‘requiring all persons to returne to their obedience’ 
to the Company.96 When this was ignored, East India House despatched a squadron of 
warships to Madras in 1668, with the court of committees instructing its admiral ‘to 
shew those wch are wth ye Mutineers, the great Inconveniences & Dangers, that they 
have themselves into, by persisting in such rebellious practises to Our Soveraign & 
disobedience to us.’97 In the event, Sir Edward surrendered peacefully after the fleet had 
arrived.98 But the ‘rebellion at Madras’, as it was immediately described by the court of 
committees, was followed by six similar rebellions before the end of the century, most 
notably at Bombay in 1683 and St Helena in 1684.99 Together, they convinced the 
Company’s metropolitan authorities at East India House that only by building the 
institutions and systems which would create a strong, centralised state in Asia could 
private interests be kept in check by procuring the obedience and subordination of 
servants, one to another, and in turn, to East India House itself. In the wake of Sir 
Edward’s rebellion on the Coromandel Coast, the court of committees attempted to 
build such a state.  
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Public Interest and the Discourse of State Building 
In Britain in the seventeenth century, the gentry responded to the widening gulf between 
themselves and the lower orders of society by attempting to subordinate them into 
greater constitutional and legal regulatory frameworks through which ‘they were bound 
to abide’.100 East India House similarly sought to address the emergence of what it 
perceived as ‘private interest’ amongst its servants following the Madras rebellion. It 
did so by acquiring greater powers with which it hoped to regulate members of the 
Company operating in Asia and thus in future to bind them to the ‘public interest’. But 
the rules, orders and laws which comprised such regulation could only be effective – let 
alone legitimate and legal – if backed up by the necessary political authority. The need 
for a strong, central body politic to regulate and uphold order was seen as essential if the 
Company was to grow and expand. Indeed, the sole reason for the creation of ‘Bodies 
Politick’, according to the cleric George Lawson in 1689, was to achieve order ‘in a 
Society, or collective, as in a Family, Kindred, Congregation, Corporation, 
Community.’101 James Harrington acknowledged this in his Oceana in 1656 when he 
asked: 'What can a number of Men coming into a Society regulated by certain Laws, 
Constitutions, or Form, be but a Corporation?'102 It was a view shared by the theologian 
Richard Baxter. In 1667, he argued that without political power, a society would have 
been just 'a Community I mean a company of men that have yet set up no Government 
among them.'103 For a ‘company of men’ stretched by global expansion, it was essential 
for East India House to develop the state apparatus that would allow it to control its own 
members. This was the opinion of Benjamin Hoadly in 1715 when he wrote that 'a 
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Company of Men without civil government cannot have magisterial executive power.'104 
The latter, then, had to be acquired if East India House hoped to establish the regulatory 
frameworks in Asia which would contain and subordinate the ‘private interest’ of its 
disparate and rapidly growing member base.  
As Stern has recently shown, the ‘magisterial’ power needed to create systems 
of regulation was acquired by the Company through charters with ever wider ranging 
powers from the English Crown, as well as the various Asiatic rulers in whose 
jurisdiction the Company’s settlements resided.105 The Company’s first charter in 1600, 
granted by Elizabeth I, established a joint-stock with a monopoly over trade beyond the 
Cape of Good Hope. Significantly, it also created a ‘Body Corporate and Politick’.106 In 
this capacity the Company could ‘make, ordain or establish any such Laws, 
Constitutions, Orders or Ordinances…for the good Government…of all Factors, 
Masters, Mariners and other Officers’.107 This included the authority to punish offenders 
with fines, imprisonment and corporal punishment.108 While no doubt sweeping in the 
powers it granted to the Company, the first charter was for fifteen years only. Not until 
the charter ultimately issued by Oliver Cromwell in 1657 was the Company created a 
permanent joint-stock.109  
The Lord Protector secured the Company’s future and confirmed those 
sovereign powers which allowed it to legislate for its members. However, the Company 
still lacked the means and legitimacy to uphold these beyond the Cape of Good Hope, 
specifically where its members and settlements operated within the sovereign 
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jurisdiction of foreign powers, such as the Mughal Empire. A new charter, therefore, 
was granted by Charles II in 1661 which reinforced and expanded the Company’s 
authority in Asia. This was received ‘from the King to command all English in India to 
yield obedience to the Company’s Agents…living in conformity to the Company’s 
orders.’110 Simultaneously, a series of firmans were agreed with local rulers which 
invested the Company with jurisdiction over any Britons ‘that may dwell or reside in 
any of their dominions’ there.111 Anti-monopolists who opposed the Company resented 
the political power it had acquired both in Europe and Asia. In 1655 Thomas White 
described the Company as a 'slight imitation' of a government because 'it is not as [if] 
they are heads of such [political] Communities, but as they participate of Sovereignty 
by priviledge, or accident.'112 Such attacks merely served to confirm the significant 
state-building powers then enjoyed by the Company, autonomous of the English state. 
By the late seventeenth century, the Company had acquired the means and legitimacy to 
regulate, order and legislate for its ‘disorderly’ members in Asia. As Sir Josiah Child, 
chairman of the court of directors, explained in 1687, its charters and firmans allowed 
the Company to ‘claim the sovereignty’ over its settlements, and ‘govern by our own 
laws’ its members residing there.113 Indeed, the building of ‘a Politie of civill & military 
power’ would be ‘the foundation of a large well grounded sure English Dominion in 
India for all time to come.’114 Or, as one critic put it, the Company in Asia would 
become ‘another Common-Wealth’.115 
The model of such a state was shaped by a discourse of governance which the 
Company developed from the legal authority and political power gained from various 
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sovereign princes, both European and Asian, in the late seventeenth century. This model 
was informed by processes and ideologies of governance within the domestic English 
state in this period. The works of contemporary political economists, theologians, 
philosophers, social theorists and political scientists, exalted the organisation of society 
into a hierarchy for the achieving of social, political, economic and religious order.116 
This emerging discourse was shaped by political developments in England, such as the 
Restoration and the Glorious Revolution. Contemporaries believed in a ‘Cosmic 
Harmony’ which consisted of ‘an interlocking and interdependent scheme of created 
things existing in a natural hierarchy.’117 In the late seventeenth century, a staggering 
breadth of work was published articulating the duties of obedience by lesser members of 
hierarchies to their superiors, through a prism of historical and biblical precedent and 
evidence. As the theologian Richard Baxter observed in his survey of contemporary 
forms of government in 1667, there were just two such types: those which existed for 
the common good, and those which imposed order. 'The Government of Societies is 
always immediately for the Order of the Society', he concluded, 'But not always for 
their good, much less chiefly.'118 Early modern England was a hierarchical society built 
upon the extraction of obedience from one group by another. This was made abundantly 
clear through the work of men such as Gregory King, who quantified the classes of 
England and their wealth in 1688, and Guy Miege, who surveyed English society in 
1702 and defined dozens of individual ranks which formed a strict hierarchy, from 
‘Viscounts’ to those who received ‘their Livelihood after a Mechanick Way.’119  
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To contemporaries, however, hierarchy was neither a capitalist formation nor a 
political construct. Rather, it was a divinely ordained form or social organisation which 
found its legitimacy in nature and represented the only possible route to achieving 
order.120 In 1667, the year Winter’s rebellion at Madras was discovered by East India 
House, the English theologian Richard Baxter argued that the entire social landscape of 
the early modern period was organised as a natural hierarchy. In all the ‘rational world’, 
he explained, ‘there are Rulers and Subjects, Masters and Servants, Tutors and Scholars, 
which all are Governours or Governed.’ According to Baxter, without the obedience 
which defined the relationship between these groups, ‘there is no Government’.121 By 
the end of the seventeenth century, social insubordination was regarded as a cancer 
which would destroy the body politic.122 The importance of hierarchy to every possible 
form of order, whether social, political, economic or even religious, could not be 
exaggerated. Samuel Rutherford unsettled his fellow Englishmen in 1656 when he 
asked the disconcerting question: ‘When sacred Hierarchy, the order instituted by 
Christ, is overthrown, what is the condition of sovereignty?’123 The answer for 
contemporaries was disobedience and disorder. In 1645 the Parliamentarian William 
Pyrnn believed that the lack of hierarchy in ‘our Armies, Parishes, Cities, Churches, 
Families, Parliaments, Kingdome’ would ultimately ‘sunder all relations’ between 
members of society. The lack of relations, concluded Pyrnn, ‘subverts the very pillars, 
foundations of all Government’.124 Hierarchy was therefore believed to be necessary to 
ensure order, the only condition in which a state could function effectively.125 So it was 
                                                 
120 Julian Hoppit, A Land of Liberty? England 1689-1727 (Oxford, 2000), p. 74. 
121 Richard Baxter, The reasons of the Christian religion (London, 1667), pp. 40-42. 
122 Hindle, State and Social Changes, pp. 236-37. 
123 Samuel Rutherford, A treatise of civil policy: being a resolution of forty three questions concerning 
prerogative, right and priviledge, in reference to the supream prince and the people (London, 1656), p. 6. 
124 William Prynne, Truth triumphing over falshood, antiquity over novelty, (London, 1645), p. 150. 
125 John Walter, ‘The English People and the English Revolution Revisited’, History Workshop Journal, 
no. 61 (Spring, 2006), pp. 179-180. 
68 
 
that the East India Company, as a ‘Common-Wealth’ suffering from ‘disorder’, 
attempted to construct the state apparatus necessary to subordinate its members, 
legitimated through a political discourse which believed that order and obedience was a 
naturally ordained condition, and the true ends of the state. As Julia Adams has noted 
when exploring the colonial state-building efforts of the early modern Dutch Republic, 
‘a state can be said to be constituted when regulation and (in the last instance) coercion 
are anchored in…organization’.126   
Organized coercion, then, replaced doctrines of ‘fraternity’ and ‘amity’ 
following the collapse of the ‘public interest’ at Madras in the 1660s, a process which 
prompted metropolitan authorities to build what the historian Michael Mann has called 
the ‘infrastructural power’ necessary for the projection of political authority.127 For 
instance, in 1667 the court of committees instructed ‘all persons within ye lymitts of 
that Agency [Madras] of what degree or quality soever, doe yeild obedience to [the 
agent] & the Counsell’.128 The officials sent out on the warships to replace the 
rebellious agent in 1668 were instructed ‘to reduce to obedience’ those at Madras and to 
set up ‘ye orderly governmt of your selves.’129 In the wake of the rebellion, the 
Company sought to subordinate members into hierarchies which would produce order in 
Asia, therefore binding them to the Company’s ‘public interest’ while supressing their 
own private ones. ‘We require all persons to observe our Orders’, the court of 
committees declared in 1670, ‘in our settlement of each person, as to place & 
precedency, without continuing or making any new disturbance concerning the 
same.’130  
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The foundations of such a model of state building was an attempt by East India 
House to enforce a culture of obedience throughout the Company. For example, the 
committee-men who sat with the governor and had originally been addressed as 'Your 
Worship', were now predominantly referred to as ‘Honourable Masters’, while they 
regarded members sent out to Asia as 'our servants'.131 One proprietor bemoaned this 
transition in a general court, observing that he ‘thought that the Secretary, Auditors, and 
Accountants were the Company’s officers, but he now finds that they are servants of the 
Court of Committees’.132 It was hoped by the committees that the master-servant 
dynamic would reinforce the principles of hierarchy and define the relationship between 
members. Such a model aimed to convert the committees into ‘manorial lords who 
farmed their own demesnes’, in that they would be reliant on a rigid hierarchy to ensure 
maximum control over their disparate community of members, even at the cost of 
profit.133 When, in a letter, one agent addressed himself to the court of committees as an 
equal, he was scolded accordingly: ‘Wee have more grounds to write [you] in a higher 
Stile then [you] have presumed to doe to us, and for the future wee expect that you 
manage your pen with more respect’.134 East India House hoped that such a hierarchical 
culture would, over time, shape members in Asia into obedient servants, devoted to the 
‘public interest’ of their masters in London. 
In the Madras Agency, East India House sought to create hierarchies through a 
process of empowering senior servants with public authority which flowed directly from 
the Crown through the Company’s new charters. Before his rebellion, East India House 
had rebuffed Sir Edward’s request in 1664 for a ‘Strict Mandate’ which would force ‘all 
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our subordinate Factors to observe [his] Inimations’, as they believed that agents and 
governors in Asia already possessed ‘sufficient power formerly’ to enforce this.135 
However, following Sir Edward’s rebellion, the court of committees retrospectively 
acted on this plea, empowering future agents of Madras with the authority to construct a 
more formal and concrete hierarchy which, they hoped, would produce obedience in 
their subordinates and would, in turn, establish ‘order’ and ‘stability’ throughout the 
Company’s settlements in Asia. The court of committees wrote to Sir Edward’s 
successor, George Foxcroft, that they had ‘searched our Charter [of 1661], wherein we 
find that…Governours…have power to exequute Judgement in all Causes Civill and 
Criminall.’136 To provide Foxcroft with access to this judicial power, they elevated him 
from agent to the more substantial and eligible office of governor, increasing his 
authority and legitimizing his new legal position.137 After his release from prison and 
reinstatement in 1668, Foxcroft exercised the new powers his governorship brought, 
summoning Madras’s first grand jury to try the wife of a Company servant who was 
accused of murder.138  
In the immediate years following Sir Edward’s rebellion, the ‘public’ discourses 
of state building projected by East India House appeared, to an extent, to transfer in 
practice to Asia. In providing the governor of Madras with the means to enforce his 
authority and punish what he perceived to be the criminal proceedings of those under 
his jurisdiction meant that Foxcroft’s successor, Sir William Langhorn, endured little 
factional strife on the scale suffered by his predecessors. Indeed, the most notable act of 
disobedience was occasioned by the use of obscenities by a factor in public and his 
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throwing a brick through the window of another factor’s home. ‘All in our Service must 
behave themselves with due Respect to there Superiours’, wrote the court of committees 
to the governor following this incident.139 The new governor used this period of stability 
and order of this period to resolve pressing issues with surrounding Asian rulers, such as 
the confirmation of all of the Company’s rights to Madras from the King of Golconda in 
1674, as well as ending the long-running ‘town rent’ dispute in 1676.140 Similarly, 
Langhorn was able to rebuild the city’s fortifications which had, in many places, been 
allowed to fall into disrepair.141  
Convinced that ‘private interest’ had been flattened beneath their newly 
consolidated hierarchy at Madras, the court of committees capitalised on the situation 
by seeking to subordinate its lower levels, too. In 1668, Madras was informed that no 
more adult or senior officials would be sent out from Europe. Rather, they would only 
seek to despatch youths so that they could be trained up from an early period to be 
‘sober, Industrious & faithfull’. Furthermore, to ensure the subservience of the youths 
and to create ties of obligation and patronage, the court of committees decided to leave 
the power to appoint and promote them in the hands of governors and their councils.142 
Through the introduction of a grading system for those outside of the council in 1675, it 
was hoped that junior officials would become subordinated into a more formal and 
structured hierarchy. The youths were to become apprentices, established on £5 per 
annum, and after seven years’ service to become writers. After a year as the latter, they 
were promoted to factor on £20 per annum. Senior to factors were merchants on £40 per 
annum, rising to senior merchant on £50.143 These various levels of seniority outwardly 
confirmed the subordinate status of those below the council, while also providing 
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incentive for good conduct by progressing up the various levels.144 Members of the 
council themselves, meanwhile, were identified as a sacrosanct group within this 
hierarchy. ‘Because we are resolved to keep a good and orderly Government’, declared 
one governor of Madras, everyone, ‘particularly the Factors and Writers’, had to pay the 
utmost respect ‘to any and even the lowest of the Council.’145 
 
The Limits of Public State Building 
Unfortunately for East India House, what appeared to be the triumph of ‘public interest’ 
by the 1670s turned out to be little more than the failure to understand the 
transformation undertaken by the ‘private interest’ of its servants operating in Asia in 
the years following the Madras rebellion. Instead of outright rejection of metropolitan 
authority through the use of coercion and violence, Company servants started to work 
within the new political system of hierarchies and institutions. Indeed, Company 
servants maintained the façade of obedience to the ‘public interest’ while mitigating, 
undermining and ultimately subverting the state building efforts of their masters in 
London for their own private ends. This was particularly so during the governorship of 
Streynsham Master, a period which, outwardly, appeared to represent the full realisation 
of public discourses of state building within the Company. Master spent his 
governorship attempting to put into practice the rhetoric of his employers in London, 
building the key judicial, political, bureaucratic and social institutions in the Madras 
agency which East India House hoped would maintain their authority there and prevent 
any future outbreak of ‘private interest’. However, as shall be seen, ‘private interest’ not 
only survived Master’s formalisation of the ‘public interest’, but flourished through its 
manipulation and commandeering of the vastly expanded political authority such 
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institutions delegated to Company servants in Asia. When Master was replaced as 
governor of Madras in 1680, he left behind him not the strong, public foundations of a 
centralised state, but a series of powerful colonial regimes under the control of 
influential individuals pursuing their own policies and interests. 
 In 1676 the court of committees appointed Streynsham Master to succeed 
Governor Langhorn with the specific mandate to carry out the subordination of servants 
of the Madras agency into the fledgling hierarchy. During his period as governor, 
Master was directed to address the ‘disorderly practices of some of our people.’146 He 
was to do so by the ‘use and exercise [of] all such other power and Authorityes as by his 
Majesties Royall Charter’.147 His commission provided more power for promoting or 
demoting and fining or punishing Company officials in the Madras agency, as well as 
the administering of new oaths, or, most importantly, dismissal from the Company 
altogether.148 The court of committees declared to Master upon his departure for Asia in 
1675, that he must ensure their servants ‘conforme, submitt and yeild obedience’ to him 
as their delegated agent in India.149 If servants in the Madras agency could no longer be 
bound together through love and amity, then their subordination into a hierarchy would 
ensure that the Company’s ‘public interest’ would not be subverted ‘by their 
Divisions.’150 Over the next five years, Master attempted to strengthen, consolidate and 
expand East India House’s hold over Madras through the establishment of new social, 
bureaucratic, judicial and political institutions, all of which sought to formalise the 
Company’s hierarchy. 
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When Master arrived at Madras in 1676, he summoned all Company servants to 
the council chamber and read aloud his commission, emphasising his intent to enforce 
the hierarchy put in place by his predecessors.151 The new governor did not wait long 
before pursuing this intention. At one of his first consultations, he instructed for copies 
of orders and rules for the ‘Christian and sober Comportment’ of all Company servants 
to be hung up in public spaces and to be ‘duly observed.’152 These rules, which were 
quickly known throughout the Madras agency as the ‘Company’s Ten Commandments’, 
prohibited swearing and drinking while making attendance at divine service 
obligatory.153 To underline these, Master forcefully closed down all the taverns and 
‘punch houses’ operating in the city at the same time as he established the first Anglican 
church there, St. Mary’s.154 By seeking a reformation of manners at Madras, Master 
hoped that its servants would conduct themselves in a more orderly, obedient fashion. 
These rules were compounded by the keeping of a public table. Previously, each 
Company servant was issued diet expenses: an allowance for food, upkeep and housing. 
In 1676, however, this was abolished in favour of all Company servants dining together 
at a public table in the governor’s chamber. East India House believed it would help 
subordinate the younger servants ‘by enjoying so good an example, and preventing 
them from keeping ill Company’.155 At the public table, manners could be enforced, 
order maintained, and the settlement’s social hierarchy – which was inextricably linked 
with its political one - visually displayed.156 To this end, the governor sat at the head of 
the table, attended by a retinue which included a band of musicians, while the 
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councillors sat either side of him according to their seniority, and the rest in descending 
order: senior merchants, merchants, factors, writers and finally apprentices dining at the 
bottom of the table.157 The public table, then, was used as a site to effect the reformation 
of manners, but also one in which the top levels of the hierarchy could impress their 
status and seniority over subordinates. To that end, the custom of having an umbrella 
carried over a person’s head as a sign of respect and privilege was ordered by Master to 
be reserved only for the governor and the three most senior members of his council.158 
Master also sought to reform the administration and government of Madras in an 
effort to facilitate the subordination of servants into the agency’s hierarchy. The 
governor ordered that, in future, all superiors should 'be addressed with a becomeing 
respect, as becomes servants to their Masters…They are alwayes to be wrote in a 
Submissive stile’. Precise instructions on how future letters should be written to 
governors and committees were circulated throughout the agency.159 At the same time, 
servants were urged to create uniformity in the writing and keeping of consultation 
books, trade registers and political correspondence, while the ad hoc convening of 
consultation meetings was replaced with scheduled meetings every Monday and 
Thursday.160 By regulating the practice of writing, accounting, bookkeeping and 
decision making, Master hoped to delineate the individual responsibilities and 
obligations of each servant, one to another, and to the Company’s affairs as a whole, 
creating a ‘public space’ in which ‘private interest’ could be kept at bay.161 Finally, 
disruptions to public business by private conflicts between servants were to be avoided 
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by placing them within a legal framework where resolution was both more likely and 
more legitimate. Master strengthened the Choultry Court, which dealt with civil cases 
such as land disputes, by increasing the number of justices, and used the Company’s 
wider powers granted by the charter issued by Charles II in 1661 to establish the 
settlement’s first Court of Judicature.162 The latter, acting as both a Superior Court and a 
Court of Appeal, was convened by the governor and council sitting every Wednesday 
and Saturday in the chapel to ‘hear and judge all Causes’.163 This new court was 
serviced by the introduction of various judicial offices, such as that of constable, clerk 
and marshal. On its first day of sitting, in April 1678, the trial for two murder cases, 
which had been pending for over a year, were begun.164 
The supremacy of the ‘public interest’ in Asia could not be assured through the 
reform of Madras alone, however. As long as ‘disorder’ and ‘private interest’ went 
unchecked in other factors and settlements within the jurisdiction of the Madras agency 
– one which stretched across the Bay of Bengal as far as Patna on the Ganges – East 
India House could not be certain that a repeat of Sir Edward’s rebellion at Madras 
would not happen elsewhere. The ‘public interest’ in Bengal, in particular, had long 
been ‘impeded by the differences among our servants there’, as East India House 
observed in 1676. The breakdown of authority amongst those factories subordinate to 
Madras, both at Masulipatnam and, more widely, throughout Bengal, was noted by 
Master as he toured them in the following years, reporting to the court of committees 
that their factionalism and quarrels were ‘the Hazzard and peril of your whole trade in 
the Bay Bengala’.165 The factories at Kasimbazar and Ballasore, for example, were 
hotbeds of ‘discontent’, ‘disorder’ and ‘disobedience’. Hugli, to whom they were 
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subordinate, had attempted to address the situation by removing their refractory chiefs. 
But when they attempted to transfer the chief of Ballasore, Joseph Hall, in 1670, first to 
Patna, further up the Ganges river, and then to Hugli itself where he could be under 
more immediate supervision, he simply ignored their orders and spent ‘the whole 
monsoone’ trading privately. His administration of Ballasore had been characterised by 
tyranny and violence. In one incident, Hall had a member of his council bound, stripped 
naked, beaten with a cane and expelled from the settlement. ‘He has constantly, ever 
since his arrivall in Bengala, binn a Contemner of the Honourable Companyes Chiefs’, 
the chief of Hugli, Matthias Vincent, complained in 1676, ‘endeavouring to clandestine 
meanes to animate and Creat factions and partyes to their disquiete, and the Honourable 
Companyes disreputation, and to the great prejudice of their affaires.’166 Master 
attempted to enforce East India House’s authority over the settlements in Bengal by 
using the same process he had recently applied at Madras: subordinating them into a 
strict hierarchy under the authority of a powerful governor. 
 The court of committees had urged Master to regulate the haphazard relationship 
between Madras and its subordinate settlements by having them channel all 
correspondence through the former.167 It was hoped that, by making Madras the 
gateway through which their actions and affairs were transmitted to the court of 
committees, the subordinate settlements would be more obedient and obliging. It also 
meant that their conduct was more immediately available for the governor’s scrutiny. 
But Master intended to do more than reform correspondence and letter writing. For the 
first time in the agency’s history, the governor inspected every one of its settlements, 
undertaking two tours of the agency in 1676 and again in 1679. Instead of sailing 
directly to each one, however, Master travelled overland ‘attended with a princely 
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Traine and Charge’.168 With him in his survey were two members of council, a surgeon, 
chaplain, secretary, numerous young writers, a file of soldiers and even a trumpeter.169 
At a consultation held at Madras, the governor advised his council that the substantial 
charge was ‘necessary for the Hono[ura]ble Compa[ny]s interest…to go in a handsome 
Port and Equipage’.170 It was also, no doubt, necessary to impress upon the subordinate 
chiefs and servants the governor’s power, and the legitimacy of his authority to 
integrate them into the agency’s hierarchy. An overawed junior factor at the settlement 
of Musilapatam, for instance, described to a colleague how ‘the Agent [Master] came to 
towne in great State’.171 
As Master progressed up the Coromandel Coast and sailed across to Bengal, he 
visited over a dozen settlements, firing, promoting and reforming the Company’s 
servants as he went. He ordered posters of rules to be put up in factory halls and on city 
gates, created separate spaces for the orderly conduct and despatch of correspondence 
and recordkeeping, supervised commercial transactions, looked into cases of 
embezzlement and fraud, and proscribed lists of succession in each place he visited. 
‘The orders you have made for regulating our factories in ye Bay & other places wee 
think to be excellent good’, the court of committees wrote to Madras in 1681, ‘forme 
and order we know is needful in all businesses.’172 Master particularly sought to end the 
faction and quarrels which had paralysed the Company’s business in Bengal. At 
Kasimbazar, for instance, he summoned witnesses and heard testimonials on the 
behaviour and conduct of Joseph Hall, chief of Ballasore, and found him guilty of 
misconduct, dismissing him as chief.173 The court of committees anxiously urged 
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Master’s successors to maintain and uphold his subordination of the Bay settlements. ‘If 
you be not careful to hold all our servants to ye Performance of those orders’, they 
wrote to the new governor of Madras, William Gyford, ‘they will signifie nothing.’174  
The policies pursued by East India House and the governors of Madras in the 
later seventeenth century represent an attempt to put their discourse of state building 
into practice. In seeking to subordinate servants into social and political hierarchies, the 
court of committees hoped to achieve a form of order in Asia which they believed, 
according to contemporary domestic thought and ideology, was conducive to the 
Company’s public affairs. As Abbe Carre, a French visitor to Surat, observed in the 
1670s, ‘such good order and obedience helps [the Company’s] prosperity…Each 
[servant] keeps strictly to the rank of his employment, and is severely punished if he 
forgets himself.’175 By establishing law courts, creating a bureaucracy, reforming the 
administration and codifying social behaviour, East India House believed that they had 
succeeded in building the state institutions which ensured the supremacy of the public 
interest in Asia at the expense of private interest. As the Company’s chairman, Sir 
Josiah Child, proudly declared in 1687, ‘his Majestie has been pleased by his Royall 
Charters & during his Royall Will & Pleasure to forme us into the condition of a 
sovereign State in India.’176 
However, there were severe limits to East India House’s long-term ability to put 
into practice their public state building discourses. This was most evident in the 
subsequent development of the Madras agency. For, despite the best efforts of Governor 
Master, Bengal fell back into ‘disorder’ barely a year after his departure. The court of 
committees complained to Madras in 1681 of the ‘affaires in those factories’ as being 
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‘intollerably bad ye Last yeare…wee cannot bear with them any Longer’.177 They wrote 
again in 1682 to urge Governor Gyfford to demand ‘obedience thereunto from all our 
Factors and servants within your Agency’, but to no avail.178 In the following year, 
when William Hedges took over as the agent in Bengal, he found that every chief, factor 
and writer was pursuing their own private designs and interests. ‘The Company must be 
necessitated to follow the Dutch rule’, he complained in his diary, ‘and command 
absolute and entire obedience to be given to their Agent, or their affaires in this Country 
will run into great disorder and suddaine distruction.’179 Unlike the English Company, 
however, the Dutch VOC succeeded in maintaining two highly centralised bodies of 
government: the Company’s executive body in Amsterdam, the Seventeen Gentleman, 
as well as a colonial headquarters in Asia itself, the settlement of Batavia. The latter in 
particular provided the sort of centralising authority the English Company lacked in 
Asia, complete with colonial settler families and thousands of Dutch troops capable of 
enforcing Amsterdam’s authority over its servants.180 
Unable to act on Hedges’ advice, the continued disobedience of the Madras 
agency forced East India House to reduce it ‘to Governable limits’, separating Bengal 
from Madras.181 But as trouble continued within the now much reduced Madras agency, 
especially at Masulipatam which was a settlement ‘totally corrupt & depraved’, the 
governor was granted even wider autocratic powers to suspend or promote chiefs of the 
subordinate settlements without consulting East India House first.182 Ultimately, 
constant urging by the court of committees and the granting of more powers to 
governors could not prevent the breakdown of public authority within the Madras 
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agency. In 1713, another rebellion broke out, when Robert Raworth usurped power at 
Fort St. David and refused to hand the settlement over to the governor. Much like Sir 
Edward’s rebellion half-a-century before, a large force had once again to be assembled 
and despatched to bring the settlement and its ‘rebellious’ servants back under the 
control of East India House.183 
The period between Sir Edward Winter’s rebellion in 1665 and Robert 
Raworth’s in 1713, was that of the failure of the Company’s metropolitan authorities to 
translate into practice the discourse of public state building which was espoused in the 
domestic English state. This was especially evident in the supposedly transformational 
judicial system established after 1685. Despite establishing courts through which private 
disputes and conflicts could be addressed in public, East India House did not possess the 
means to sustain such colonial institutions in Asia. The historian Mattison Mines has 
described colonial governance at Madras after Master’s departure as being ‘Weakly 
administered…highly personalized, antagonisms were rife, and relationships constantly 
in flux, a product of personal competition and opportunistic alliances between 
individuals rather than of Company hegemony or even of local social hierarchy.’184 The 
new legal system rapidly became controlled, manipulated and undermined by ‘private 
interest’ in which Company servants contested political authority and perpetuated 
personal feuds. This was also extended to the Company’s Asian subjects, who regularly 
manipulated the colonial judiciary at Madras to prosecute political or commercial 
enemies, despite being excluded by charter from using it in the first place.185 
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In fact, all that had been achieved was to greatly expand the resources, 
patronage, authority and autonomy of governors and senior servants on the spot in Asia, 
itself an unintended consequence of East India House’s attempt to overcome the twin 
tyrannies of time and distance which inhibited their direct control over events thousands 
of miles away. As they had written to Bencoolen, the chief settlement of the West Coast 
of Sumatra, ‘We trust our Dep’ty Governour and Council with our authority to manage 
all our affairs under your care’.186 Empowering servants to act for them in Asia was a 
necessity if the public interest was to be enforced and maintained. The court of 
committees acknowledged this to the governor of Madras: ‘If any thing should [happen] 
extraordinary, that wee cannot foresee’, they wrote in 1678, ‘the keeping exactly to our 
directions might be greatly prejudiciall to us…wee leave it to you to vary from our 
Orders in any particulars’.187 However, as the court of committees themselves correctly 
perceived, the absence of their immediate presence and executive oversight provided 
exactly these Company servants with the independence to pursue their private interests 
in place of their public duties.  
When the chief at Hugli failed to send any letters or accounts to East India 
House in 1680, the latter complained that the public interest was being subverted. They 
court of committees wrote that their servants would never have neglected the vital 
duties of sending their accounts to London along with an update on affairs in Bengal, 
had they not been ‘overburthened with ye Load of private trade.’188 It is true that in 
1667, East India House had opened up Asia’s ‘country trade’ to its servants, allowing 
them to trade privately on their own accounts.189 However, they had done so purely as 
an incentive, another method through which they hoped to bind servants to the public 
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interest.190 As the volume of private trade grew at an alarming rate, Company servants 
were constantly urged to put public business before these newly legitimated private 
interests. ‘We are glad to heare when [our servants] thrive by any good meanes’, the 
court of committees wrote to Hugli in 1681, but, they pleaded, ‘if you have 
commissions or businesse for any other, dispatch ye Companys businesse first’.191 By 
empowering governors in Asia to build hierarchies and therefore subordinate servants 
into an obligation to the Company’s public interest, the court of committees sought to 
establish an indirect, delegated presence throughout their settlements. ‘Wee shall not 
Allow Any of our Servants of wt Quality Soever’, they declared to Madras in 1675, ‘to 
Contemne our Authority wch those doe that Contemne Any that Act by it’.192 This 
dynamic ensured that, by the early eighteenth century, every settlement in Asia did 
indeed possess a governor, deputy-governor, chief or agent with substantial executive 
authority. 
 Therein, however, lay one of the fundamental problems of the Company’s state 
building efforts: the principal-agent relationship. By delegating so much power to senior 
servants in Asia, East India House facilitated the emergence of autonomous centres of 
interest which could act virtually independent of their masters in London. Indeed, the 
empowerment of governors, far from centralising the Company’s authority, splintered 
it, perpetuating - not reducing - private interest and competing regimes of loyalty, 
obligation and obedience. Indeed, in the early modern period, social and political orders 
were imaginative constructs as much as they were material realities.193 In this respect, 
the practice of East India House’s discourse of order and hierarchy was applied in Asia 
in a haphazard, piecemeal and porous manner, as senior officials and servants contested 
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and negotiated its framework. The establishment centralised control and public 
hierarchies were only really possible if they provided certain advantages for those they 
attempted to subordinate.194  
Even as they were forced to grant governors and senior servants in Asia greater 
powers, East India House guarded their delegated authority jealously. The slightest sign 
– or rumour - of a servant misusing these powers to promote themselves and their 
private interests above the Company’s was cause for dismissal. ‘Wee can never hope 
any regularity to be observed’, declared the court of committees in 1681, ‘but in doeing 
publick right to us, be sure you never exercise private…prejudice.’195 It was believed 
that such ‘publick right’ was served best by obedient servants. Therefore, when Master 
wrote haughtily to East India House, the governor of the court of committees, Sir Josiah 
Child, accused him of ‘Insolence’. Child complained of Master’s ‘vain ostentatious 
pomp’, as well as his ‘pride in thinking yourself too good or too big…your intolerable 
presumption & indiscretion.’196 Despite his efforts in consolidating the hierarchy of the 
Madras agency, Streynsham Master was dismissed in 1680 when a receipt was found in 
a drawer at Fort St. George which proved that he had sold four elephants belonging to 
the Company to an Indian merchant and pocketed the profit.197 Private interest was 
articulated by the Company as disobedience to their authority and public concerns. 
Although governors were to act as the representatives of East India House in Asia, the 
court of committees nonetheless expected them to do so with ‘vigilant subserviancy and 
cooperacon in your stations.’198 At the turn of the eighteenth century, however, the 
Company’s governors, deputy-governors, agents and chiefs were anything but 
‘subservient’. With their new powers and resources, they created regimes in Asia which 
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sought not to promote the public interest of their masters in London, but to their own 
extensive private interests in Asia. 
In the Madras agency, those servants who operated, and accepted their place, 
within the governor’s hierarchy did so by shaping its terms to promote their own 
interests, an outcome which ultimately subverted the purpose of such hierarchies. 
Therefore, Company servants often espoused the order and hierarchy of the Company, 
paying respect to the governor and confirming their loyalty to East India House, but 
they did so to legitimate or further their private interests within that system.199 It was a 
dynamic which was perpetuated across Asia. The servants empowered by East India 
House to build the foundations of the Company’s state in the late seventeenth century, 
men such as William Jearsey at Masulipatam, Matthias Vincent at Hugli, and William 
Langhorn and Streynsham Master at Madras, were also those who most adhered to their 
private interests, emerging as the wealthiest, most influential and powerful European 
figures in Asia.200 Thus, when the court of committees received reports that Governor 
Langhorn had acquired a vast estate through private trade, they wrote to accuse him of 
placing his own interests above theirs. ‘I take no less care of their concerns, then of my 
own,’ Langhorn replied in 1673 in reference to the court of committees, ‘nay, much 
more, I assure you, God Knows it, for I do fully look upon their interest…as ye most 
principally…[and] my owne but in ye second place.’201 East India House dismissed the 
plea, and shortly thereafter the governor himself. In fact, of the six governors who took 
office between 1670 and 1700, all but one were eventually dismissed on accusations of 
corruption and insubordination. 
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The English East India Company’s formation of a discourse of colonial state building in 
Asia in the seventeenth century emerged from the need to place the ‘public interest’ of 
the Company over the ‘private interest’ of its servants. Forces of growth from the mid-
century, such as new members, increased investment and the establishment of new 
settlements, transformed the Company from a homogenous community bound by 
interpersonal ties of trust and obligation, to one that was disparate, diffused and 
appeared to those in London to be ‘disorderly’ and ultimately ‘disobedient’. From the 
1660s, East India House began to lose control over affairs in Asia, where the collapse of 
political authority at places such as Madras allowed private interests to subvert the 
Company’s public business. When East India House’s authority was usurped in a 
rebellion there, the court of committees empowered future governors with the legitimate 
means to build the state apparatus which they hoped would produce a strict hierarchy 
from which the obedience of subordinates in Asia could be effected. The discourse 
which shaped this form of governance was ground in the widely accepted political 
ideologies of seventeenth century England in which hierarchy was believed to produce 
the political order necessary for the establishment of good government. 
As this chapter has revealed, however, the process of state building in Asia 
proved far removed from the discourse of state building in Europe. When East India 
House sought to build the institutions and hierarchies that would enable it to regulate its 
servants and promote the Company’s public interests, it was forced to concede 
considerable political authority to those very servants from whom it sought obedience. 
As private interest flourished outside of centralised forms of governance, servants 
appropriated their public authority in pursuit of their own concerns, a dynamic which 
significantly undermined and, in many cases, made obsolete new judicial, bureaucratic, 
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social and political systems erected throughout the Company’s settlements. As a series 
of rebellions across Asia revealed, the attempt to centralise the Company by 
subordinating servants through a process of state building had largely failed by the turn 
of the eighteenth century. As the final chapter in part one of the thesis demonstrates, 
from the wreck of this great experiment in Asia was released a current of unregulated 
political authority, the most substantial of which descended from the Crown itself, 
providing unprecedented opportunities for Company servants to build their own private 





Private Interest and the Decentralisation of Political Authority 
 
In his seminal work, published in 1963 on the English in India, Percival Spear 
concluded that servants operating in Asia acted with great ‘respect and submission for 
the Company at home.’ He depicted East India House as an ‘overbearing and 
inquisitorial central office’, efficiently managing its ‘country branches’ in Asia.1 This 
unitary understanding of the realities of the relationship between the Company’s 
metropolitan authorities at East India House and their servants in Asia has been a 
persistent one. More recently, Robert Travers has argued that ‘the political, legal and 
bureaucratic complexity surrounding the Company’s operations, meant that Company 
servants were not as autonomous’ as they appeared to be.2 Phil Stern has similarly 
argued that servants were linked in to an unbroken ‘chain of command that ultimately 
led back to London’, ensuring their compliance with metropolitan orders and policies.3 
However, as the previous chapter has shown, the ‘chain’ between London and Asia was 
not as unbroken as historians have usually assumed. Indeed, it was a more complicated 
process. At Madras in the late seventeenth century, the chain was first twisted by the 
emergence of private interest, then broken through rebellion and finally linked up again 
through a public discourse of state building. But while this new chain was reinforced 
through the establishment of new colonial institutions and the professed loyalty of 
servants, each link had actually been manipulated and refashioned. The ‘chain of 
command’ was thus not so much a centralising ball-and-chain shackled by East India 
House around the ankles of its servants, but a chain on which servants constantly tugged 
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from across Asia, gradually pulling the centre of East India House apart and 
significantly decentring its authority in the process.  
The process of decentralisation within the Company was a direct consequence of 
the dichotomy between public discourse and private practice. As the previous chapter 
illustrated, the model of state building which East India House sought to put into 
practice was focused upon the public nature of political power, which, in the 
Company’s case, consisted of upholding the interests and policies of East India House 
and its governing body, the governor and court of committees. But such a model was 
mere discourse, promoting less an idea of the state as an ideal, in much the same way 
that Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan or James Harrington’s Oceana did not depict the state 
as it was, but rather described the state as they thought it should be.4 Indeed, systems 
and institutions of order, obedience and hierarchy could only be established and 
maintained in Asia by those very servants whom they sought to disenfranchise and 
subordinate. It became clear to East India House very quickly that their public models 
of state building could not be directly applied in Asia without being mitigated, reformed 
and rendered useless by servants promoting their own private interests. This was 
particularly visible on the West Coast of Sumatra, a region of Asia in which the 
Company had only established itself from 1685. As a protean region of settlement 
conceived at such a formative time in the process of political decentralisation, the West 
Coast of Sumatra provides an illuminating window into the state building practices of 
Company servants in Asia. This chapter therefore adopts a case-study of the West Coast 
of Sumatra, revealing the process through which senior servants in Asia appropriated 
the public authority invested in them by their masters in Europe to create private 
regimes of colonial governance which served their own interests.  
                                                 
4 Ibid., p. 213. 
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Contrary to the suggestion in the historiography, ‘private interest’ was not 
always of a pecuniary nature.5 For example, when Nathaniel Foxcroft, second of council 
at Madras, was charged with expressing anti-royalist views in 1665, he was accused of 
seeking ‘to maintaine his private interest before’ the Company’s.6 As the commercial, 
judicial and political powers of the governor and court of committees depended upon 
charters from the Crown, Foxcroft’s political views were conceived as being anti-public 
or, to conceptualise it as his accusers had, of representing ‘private interest’, one which 
threatened the very existence of the Company. This chapter reveals how ‘private 
interest’ was understood by contemporaries as a general label for the promotion or 
pursuit of any commercial, social, political or cultural action or thought by Company 
servants which did not align with those of their employers at East India House. This 
chapter thus broadens the narrow focus on trade and business through which historians 
have traditionally understood ‘private interest’. On the West Coast of Sumatra at the 
turn of the eighteenth century, private interest comprised a composite range of interests, 
from the appropriation of political power and the elimination of commercial 
competition, to the promotion of religious beliefs and the expansion of imperial rule. 
Such practices ultimately led to the emergence of private regimes in Asia whose 
existence undermined, decentred and reconfigured the centralisation of public authority 
and power sought by metropolitan authorities at East India House. 
The development of the Company’s settlements on the West Coast of Sumatra at 
the turn of the century reflects the circumscriptions imposed by Company servants on 
the policies, aims and interests of East India House, revealing the gulf between public 
discourse and private practice within the colonial state building process. While East 
                                                 
5 For example, see Spear, The Nabobs, p. 14; Marshall, East India Fortunes; Watson, Foundation for 
Empire; Om Prakash, ‘The English East India Company and India’, in Bowen, Lincoln and Rigby, 
Worlds of the East India Company, pp. 1-17; Mentz, The English Gentleman Merchant. 
6 RFSG, MDCB, Affidavit by Joseph Farley, Fort St George, 16 September 1665, pp. 227-8. 
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India House’s authority was theoretically absolute, the adoption of their ideologies, 
policies and orders in Asia depended entirely on the interpretation, collaboration, as 
well as the application, by their servants.7 As the previous chapter demonstrated, the 
actual result was often far removed from the intended one. With public policies 
constantly frustrated in their designs, East India House gradually transitioned from 
policymaker to reactionary, attempting to contain the agency of their servants who were 
in a stronger position to shape affairs in Asia. As one Madras factor wrote to another in 
1709, the ‘disobedience’ and ‘disorder’ in that agency could only be solved ‘if an active 
brisk stirring man was there, and one who would study the Company’s interest as well 
as his own.’8 The clear lines between ‘public’ and ‘private’ matters, which centralised 
political models demanded, were clearly blurring by the early eighteenth century. This 
was not due to a compromise, but rather was a result of the limits and ultimate failure 
experienced by the ‘centre’ in regulating its servants in Asia and thereby in shaping the 
Company’s development in the early modern period.9 
 
The West Coast of Sumatra in the Early Eighteenth Century  
The Company’s settlements on the West Coast of Sumatra were its most important 
establishment outside of the Indian sub-continent. Since the beginning of the 
seventeenth century, the Dutch VOC had gradually pushed the English Company out of 
its other spice yielding possessions in the East Indies, most notably at Amboina in  
 
                                                 
7 Watson, Foundation for Empire, p. 161. 
8 Cited in ibid., p. 160. 




Figure 1 Map of the West Coast of Sumatra 
 
1623 and Bantam in 1682.10 To retain a foothold in the spice trade, the Company was 
forced to seek an alternative settlement, largely free from Dutch interference. The West 
Coast of Sumatra was the answer. In 1685 two Company servants from Madras, Ralph 
Ord and Benjamin Bloome, arrived off Bencoolen to negotiate the establishment of a 
                                                 
10 For Amboina, see D. K. Bassett, ‘The “Amboyna Massacre” of 1623’, Journal of Southeast Asian 
History, vol. 1, no. 2 (1960), pp. 1-19. For the Dutch coup at Bantam and the English expulsion, see D. K. 




Company settlement there. The local raja, eager for protection against the Dutch, 
enquired whether they intended just to buy pepper or to settle permanently.11 Ord and 
Bloome replied that they wished the Company to be the 'onely Lords & Sole 
Proprietors' of Bencoolen.12 The negotiation for possession of the settlement was laced 
with heavy bribes and a generous purchase price for pepper, at which the raja and other 
prominent figures of the town and surrounding country agreed to cede Bencoolen to the 
Company. Ord and Bloome fired a canon in each direction to define the extent of their 
new sovereignty, and erected York Fort to act as the Company’s new headquarters in 
the East Indies.13 Gradually, other settlements were established along a two-hundred 
mile stretch of the West Coast, from Bantal in the north to Silebar in the south. 
 The development of the West Coast in the decades following its settlement 
mirrored, to an extent, that of Bengal. Its relationship with Madras, to whom they were 
also subordinate, was similarly characterised by ‘disorder’. Much like Bengal, the West 
Coast was gradually considered ungovernable, and both Madras and East India House 
pursued a range of strategies to deal with what they perceived to be the disobedience 
and corruption of their servants there as the result of widespread private interest. When 
declaring the modus operandi of their West Coast settlements, the court of directors 
informed their servants that ‘the Sum of all is to procure Pepper’ and, they added with 
anxiety, ‘to see our Estate is not carelessly or Wickedly lavisht out.’14 Nonetheless, far 
from promoting the Company’s public interest by becoming an entrepot for the pepper 
trade, underwriting their own expenses while yielding vast profits for the directors and 
                                                 
11 For an account of the settlement of Bencoolen, see York Fort to Madras, 28 June 1685, in Records of 
Fort St. George, Letters to Fort St. George, 1681-1765 (Madras, 1916-1946, 85 vols.), vol. 3, pp. 209-215 
(hereafter LTFSG). 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. In 1714 York Fort was replaced by Fort Marlborough, built some two miles away on higher 
ground above Bencoolen, see BL, APAC, IOR/G/35/8, Joseph Collet to Court of Directors, York Fort, 27 
February 1712. 
14 BL, APAC, IOR/E/3/101, Court of Directors to Madras, London, 14 February 1722. 
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dividends for the shareholders alike, Bencoolen and its subordinate settlements 
consistently failed to fulfil their quota for the shipment of 200 tonnes of pepper a year.15 
In fact, the charges incurred by servants on the West Coast created a vast deficit for the 
Company. Even in a supposedly reasonable year, the profits of the pepper trade barely 
met one-tenth of the settlement’s considerable upkeep of 42,000 dollars.16 The charges 
of Bencoolen for the month of July 1716 alone amounted to more than the cost of all 
pepper shipped off the West Coast in the preceding seventeen months.17 ‘Our Charge 
hath been & yet continues excessive’, complained the court of directors the following 
year, ‘Pepper is the one thing needful’.18 Nonetheless, shipments continued to decline 
throughout the early eighteenth century, forcing the directors to conclude that ‘We have 
not been so well dealt with as We expected in gratitude as well as Duty & Fidelity.’19 
Company servants on the West Coast were inhibited from exercising their ‘Duty 
& Fidelity’ towards their masters at East India House through their ‘disorderly’ conduct 
which resulted from their pursuit of private interests. Successive deputy-governors had 
observed how 'Corruption has been universall' throughout the West Coast.20 Faction and 
violence between Company servants, a product of competition in trade and politics, was 
endemic. An instance when a lieutenant in the garrison at Bencoolen assaulted Thomas 
Kingsley, a member of the council, was thought common behaviour.21 One new deputy-
governor reported how his subordinate, the chief of Bantal, had cut the second of his 
council in the face with a sword, while the third of council wished 'the Deputy Governor 
and Councill all Dragged at the Abingdon's stern from Bencoolen to Bantall', a distance 
                                                 
15 BL, APAC, IOR/E/3/103, Court of Directors to Bencoolen, London, 24 December 1725. 
16 BL, APAC, IOR/E/3/100, Court of Directors to Bencoolen, London, 25 November 1726. 
17 BL, APAC, IOR/E/3/99, Court of Directors to Bencoolen, London, 14 March 1717. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 BL, APAC, MSS Eur D1153/1, Joseph  Collet to Gregory Page, York Fort, 14 November 1712. 
21 BL, APAC, IOR/G/35/8, Joseph Collet to Court of Directors, York Fort, 28 February 1712. 
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of some one-hundred miles.22 Affairs were also in a constant state of confusion owing to 
the rapid turnover of servants. This was caused by a high mortality rate in which men 
were lost to ‘Drinking or Women' - the 'Bencoolen feaver' being a common venereal 
disease rampant amongst Company servants.23 One 'drank himself dead’ within a few 
weeks of his arrival, while others, even the senior members of council, were said to be 
addicted to opium, so that 'Some are fast asleep and others rave, but not one of them has 
taken the pleasant turn'.24  
 The neglect of public interest also characterised the relationship between 
Company servants and the Malay rulers and pepper merchants of the West Coast. 
Rather than obeying the instructions of the directors to procure as much pepper as 
possible by placing new pepper contracts and encouraging the Malay to plant more 
pepper vines, Company servants acted in an arbitrary and tyrannical manner. The 
pepper merchant Orumkey Lilla had facilitated the Company’s settlement at Bencoolen 
in 1685, acting as their agent to liaise with the surrounding Malay rulers. Within a few 
years, however, Company servants had 'Cutt off Orankey Lillos head for Severall 
crimes he was accused of''.25 When the mariner William Dampier visited the West Coast 
in 1690 he was amazed to observe two prominent Malay rajas confined to the stocks at 
York Fort.26 Similarly, Robert Skingle, the chief of Bantal in 1710, had a Malay chief 
beheaded for disobedience, and later as deputy-governor he 'put the Countrey into a 
flame' by forcefully disarming the Malay who entered York Fort, 'which is one of the 
greatest Affronts to them', barred them from sitting as judges and killed a local ruler 
                                                 
22 BL, APAC, MSS Eur D1153/1, Joseph Collet to Edward Harrison, York Fort, 5 May 1713. 
23 BL, APAC, MSS Eur D1153/2, Joseph Collet to Dic Ipse Club, York Fort, 23 September 1712. 
24 Ibid., Joseph Collet to Ann Bedwell, York Fort, 1 August 1713. 
25 RFSG, MDCB, 2 August 1692, p. 35. 
26 William Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries (London, 1931), p. 125. 
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himself for attempting to 'carry away a Slave Wench.'27 Such extreme and violent 
behaviour prevented an adequate supply of pepper from being acquired from 
surrounding populations. In 1710 Madras blamed their servants on the West Coast for 
'troubles and imbroyles with the Natives and Country Governmt' which led to the latter 
'destroying each other Pepper Plantation yn in blood or slaughter'.28 Although Company 
servants attempted to shift the blame on the Malay themselves, the directors warned 
them that 'Good words will no longer go down w'th Us'.29  
 In neglecting the pepper trade, servants on the West Coast of Sumatra 
represented the ultimate subversion of the public interest. Continued insubordination 
there in the early eighteenth century threatened to undermine not just the Company’s 
ability to compete against the Dutch in the pepper trade, but the entire discourse of state 
building espoused by the directors. This was acknowledged by the governor of Madras 
in 1703, who complained that their subordinates on the West Coast had not sent a single 
account book or letter of correspondence to them in five years. 'All their transactions 
was foreign to us...as believe themselves not accountable to us for any thing they did or 
should do.'30 The court of directors time and again recognised the need to ensure that the 
West Coast conformed to the compliant behaviour expected of its other settlements, 
despatching a series of agents from East India House to act as ‘supervisors’ who 
wielded unprecedented powers in an effort to enforce broken hierarchies and 
subordinate thriving private interests. In 1710, Jeremiah Harrison arrived as the first 
supervisor with almost unlimited authority to create 'a remedy against all such Evils & 
                                                 
27 York Fort to Directors, 4 July 1710, in John Bastin, ed., The British in West Sumatra 1685-1825 (Kuala 
Lumpur, 1965), p. 41. 
28 Madras to Jeremiah Harrison, Fort St. George, 10 March 1710, in Records of Fort St. George, Letters 
from Fort St. George (Madras, 1912-1946, 85 vols.), vol. 15, p. 27 (hereafter LFFSG). 
29 BL, APAC, IOR/E/3/99, Court of Directors to Bencoolen, London, 14 March 1717. 
30 RFSG, LFFSG, Madras to Jeremiah Harrison, Fort St. George, 10 March 1710, vol. 15, p. 26. 
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the many Errors that have crept in' on the West Coast.31 Specifically, Harrison had come 
to ‘remedy’ the incumbent deputy-governor, Robert Skingle, whose zealous pursuit of 
private interest had transformed him into an 'absolute and arbitrary' figure on the West 
Coast.32  
Supervisor Harrison's main task was to discover how Skingle had acquired so 
much personal and autocratic power.33 At first, it appeared that the supervisor had 
succeeded in enforcing central control from London and establishing the Company’s 
public interest up and down the West Coast. For example, Skingle was immediately 
dismissed and new rules were put in place to curtail the powers of future deputy-
governors: their personal retinue was reduced, official privileges limited and the process 
of council appointments reformed. However, these policies barely outlived the six 
months Harrison spent on the West Coast. Almost immediately after his departure for 
Madras, the deputy-governor appointed to maintain these reforms, Anthony Ettrick, 
presided over an entirely new chapter of private interest. In 1711, the governor of 
Madras was once again complaining that Bencoolen neglected to inform him of 
anything they did.34 In fact, as soon as Harrison had set sail for Madras, Ettrick 
'neglected all the Mercantile affairs', assassinated a local raja, invaded and occupied his 
territory and eventually perished in 1712 whilst retreating along with most of his men 
through sickness and death.35 Once again, the West Coast was left in 'Confusion', aided 
by the succeeding deputy-governors, one of whom was notorious for being a drunk 
which 'made him act thoughtlessly', and another who lived but a few months after 
taking up the post.36 Madras declared that 'there has been so much mismanagemt' by 
                                                 
31 Ibid., vol. 15, p. 27. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., Madras to Bencoolen, Fort St. George, 8 October 1711, vol. 16, p. 27. 




Company servants 'as has well nigh ruin'd all the Companies affairs in all their 
Settlemts. on the West Coast of Sumatra'.37   
 The pursuit of private interest had enveloped the Company’s West Coast 
establishment into an economic and political crisis. The 'troubles and Warrs' occasioned 
by Skingle and his successors had 'very much retarded the bringing in Pepper' and, more 
fatally, had led to widespread famine through the violent interruption of supplies of rice 
and paddy to the Company's settlements.38 Furthermore, as Bencoolen had 'spent the 
Companys Treasure in the Quarrells' with Malay states and new shipments of silver 
from Europe were stopped as a consequence of the War of the Spanish Succession, a 
debased copper coinage had been minted which was both resented by the Malay and 
unable to sufficiently supply Company servants with even the basic necessities.39 By 
1712, the West Coast presented an eerie spectacle: pepper plantations were neglected 
and overgrown, the Malay were starving, markets had disappeared and outposts had 
been abandoned through want of personnel, money and provisions.40 The reason behind 
the collapse of order on the West Coast was obvious to the governor of Madras, Edward 
Harrison: the state building discourse of the Company’s metropolitan authorities at East 
India House had not been implemented in practice. As he concluded to his counterpart 
at Bencoolen of the West Coast: 'there has not been little more than the shadow of any 
modell or scheme of a true & right Governmt in any of its parts whether Eeconomy 
Politicall or Millitary...Yor. whole constitution is all out of frame and of the Hinges.'41 
For East India House, the solution was clear. Much like Madras in the later seventeenth 
century, the remedy for the West Coast's subversion of the public interest would be 
                                                 
37 RFSG, LFFSG, Madras to Jeremiah Harrison, Fort St. George, 10 March 1710, vol. 15, p. 27. 
38 RFSG, LTFSG, Bencoolen to Madras, York Fort, 24 January 1712, vol. 8, p. 52. 
39 BL, APAC, IOR/G/35/7, York Fort General, 22 October 1712. 
40 J. R. Young, ‘The English East India Company and Trade on the West Coast of Sumatra, 1730-1760’ 
(PhD. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1970), p. 15. 
41 RFSG, LFFSG, Madras to Jeremiah Harrison, Fort St. George, 10 March 1710, vol. 15, p. 27. 
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found in the establishment of a strong, centralised government with the ability to 
subordinate servants, achieve order and revive the pepper trade. Much like Madras, 
however, the practice of colonial state building on the West Coast of Sumatra also 
proved far removed from the public discourse of East India House. 
  
The Multiplicity of the Metropole  
The decentred dynamics of political authority within the Company by the early 
eighteenth century was a reflection of the decentred nature of the metropole itself. 
Indeed, the metropolitan or central authority of the Company was, in theory, East India 
House in Leadenhall Street, London. From here, discourse, authority, orders, letters and 
material objects radiated out to settlements and servants in Asia in support of the public 
interest of the chairman and the court of directors. Although the limits of the early 
modern metropole’s ability to determine the development of colonial regions has been 
an issue of ongoing historical debate, historians nonetheless continue to regard the 
metropole itself as a single social, political and geographic construct.42 To the Company 
servant, the metropole was not a unitary or monolithic source radiating its authority 
outwards. Rather, East India House was just one of many strands of the metropolitan 
web which shaped and informed the policies and practices of Company servants across 
Asia. Particularly in the context of state building, East India House had to contend with 
a multiplex of other, more private and personal metropolitan sources, all of which 
presented alternative models of state formation for Company servants to put into 
practice. These included a wide range of 
                                                 




Figure 2 Diagram of the plurality of metropolitan influences upon Company servants 
 
groups, people and communities, including households, kin, friends, religious 
institutions, social clubs and political patrons. The connections which Company 
servants maintained with these metropolitan sources as they travelled out to Asia served 
to undermine the authority of East India House. Indeed, the contest between public and 
private metropolitan sources shaped the practice of colonial state building on the West 
Coast of Sumatra in the early eighteenth century.  
The plurality of metropolitan sources of authority was particularly evident 
during the deputy-governor of Joseph Collet between 1712-16. A prominent merchant 
in London, Collet had been tasked by the court of directors with subordinating 
Company servants on the West Coast of Sumatra into a public hierarchy which would 
establish the public interest as supreme, once and for all. Appointed in 1711, Collet 
seemed an ideal choice to centralise political authority on the West Coast. As an agent 
of the court of directors, Collet appeared dedicated to the public interest. Having 
declared bankrupt two years before, Collet was personally obligated to the Company’s 
chairman, Gregory Page, for his new appointment. ‘As to my future Conduct respecting 
both the Company’s affairs and my own’, Collet declared to Page as he rounded the 
Cape of Good Hope, he would look to emulate the governor of Madras and ‘obey him 
101 
 
as my Superiour’.43 Professing himself a loyal servant of his new masters, Collet 
reiterated his commitment to uphold the interests of East India House. Indeed, the 
social, economic and political turmoil he witnessed on the West Coast reinforced the 
importance of his commission to bring the settlements under a firm, centralised 
government.  
Arriving in the Toddington in 1712, Collet touched at the northern subordinate 
settlement of Bantal, some one-hundred miles up the Coast from Bencoolen. Sailing 
into the Bantal road on 23 July, the new deputy-governor stepped ashore to find ‘all in 
confusion’.44 Penning a quick letter to the directors in London, Collet reported how ‘by 
ignorance or otherwise’, the servants there had neglected all of the Company’s official 
commercial business, while the general books, in which every official act and 
transaction was supposed to be recorded, had laid untouched for months.45 With ‘The 
Northern parts in Confusion’, Collet continued his journey down the Coast and arrived 
at Bencoolen on 10 August to be installed as deputy-governor.46 His commitment to 
putting into practice the state building discourse of his employers at East India House, 
one that would consolidate the public interest through the provision of centralised 
government, was made clear in one of his first official letters to a local Malay ruler. One 
private interest which had drained the Company’s finances had been the military 
intervention of deputy-governors in the civil wars and succession disputes of 
surrounding Malay states. The public interest therefore demanded a cessation of 
hostilities with the Malay and a reduction of the West Coast military establishment. 
This was something the directors had ordered Collet to carry out immediately upon his 
arrival. Thus, when Sultan Gulemat, ruler of the large neighbouring state of Anak 
                                                 
43 BL, APAC, MSS Eur D1153/1, Joseph Collet to Gregory Page, 12 February 1712. 
44 BL, APAC, IOR/G/35/7, York Fort General, 22 October 1712. 
45 Ibid. 
46 BL, APAC, IOR/G/35/7, York Fort General, 22 October 1712. 
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Sungai, requested military assistance from Collet during a succession dispute, the latter 
wrote back accordingly: ‘I am obliged to acquaint you that my Hon’ble Masters are 
resolved to have their affairs on this Coast managed in a manner very different from 
what they have been of late years.’47 To Malay and European alike, Collet’s arrival thus 
appeared to signify a break with previous decentralised regimes of private interest, 
heralding a new political system constructed indirectly by East India House through 
their loyal agent.  
As deputy-governor, Collet was expected to replicate the state building practices 
of his counterparts at Madras in the later seventeenth century, which, as the previous 
chapter demonstrated, comprised the establishment of a judiciary, the reformation of the 
administration into a central bureaucracy and, most importantly, the subordination of 
servants into public hierarchies. However, Collet both carried his own private set of 
attitudes, beliefs and practices with him to Asia and also maintained connections with 
people, groups and communities in the metropole which consistently reinforced or 
refashioned these private discourses and practices. The orders and policies of East India 
House which were dispatched with, and to, Collet in Asia had to be constantly 
channelled, articulated, interpreted, and eventually implemented through a multiplex 
prism of private interests. Indeed, as with all Company servants who planted roots in 
Asia, Collet’s initial dedication to the public interest of his masters at East India House 
was reshaped by the private interests he quickly established on the West Coast of 
Sumatra, not just those of a pecuniary nature, but those also of a social, theological, 
cultural and political nature, too. Thus when Collet sought to gain the obedience of his 
subordinates or to centralise government, for example, he did so according to more 
                                                 
47 BL, APAC, MSS Eur D1153/1, Bencoolen to Sultan Guillamott, York Fort, 1 September 1712. 
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private understandings of obedience and governance, and the role these played in 
furthering his own increasingly considerable interests and ambitions in Asia. 
For Joseph Collet, a devout Baptist and family-man, the task of establishing his 
hegemony over the West Coast of Sumatra was not just a public duty, but a matter of 
conscience, morality and religion. Before his departure for Asia, Collet regularly 
conversed with his spiritual mentor and teacher, Moses Lowman, the Presbyterian 
minister of Clapham, on a range of subjects, but mostly the spirit and morality of man. 
In these debates, Collet had argued that mankind was naturally ‘capable of being 
Influenced by Principles of Reason, Justice and Gratitude’, whilst the reverend ‘urg’d 
the Generall Practice of Mankind to the Contrary.’48 Indeed, the reverend emphasised 
the corrupt and disobedient nature of ‘Mankind’ and the need to forcefully reform and 
continuously govern people if they were to exist in any kind of social or political 
order.49 In Britain, Collet had contested these beliefs with the reverend. But upon 
arriving on the West Coast and experiencing the disorder and disobedience amongst 
servants there first-hand, he quickly conceded to the reverend’s arguments. ‘In short, 
English, French, Portugueze, Brasilians, Africans, Dutch, Moores, Indians of many 
Sorts’, Collet wrote to Lowman shortly after arriving at Bencoolen, ‘are (almost) all 
alike.’50 At the same time, Collet wrote to another friend in Britain that ‘I find here there 
has been more villany and folly than I cou’d expect to have found amongst 
Englishmen’.51 Collet’s own private interests, in the form of his spiritual and moral 
beliefs, were already beginning to subvert his commission to create a centralised, public 
government on the West Coast. 
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The new deputy-governor’s conversion to the ideologies of Reverend Lowman 
and the Clapham congregation Collet had frequented when in England, fundamentally 
changed his understanding of and approach towards the state, government and the role 
of individuals within that system. ‘I knew many were corrupted’, he wrote in a letter to 
Lowman about the West Coast servants, ‘but did not believe the Corruption so 
universall as you apprehended…you had a truer Notion of mankind than my Self.’52 
After barely two months at Bencoolen, Collet’s private beliefs and values had diverged 
from the public interests of his masters at East India House. Indeed, the new deputy-
governor already had little intention of establishing those public state institutions which 
an earlier generation of governors had attempted to erect at Madras. ‘This Experience 
has entirely alter’d my schemes of Government’, Collet admitted to Lowman in 
November.53 An indication of what these alterations were can be found in a range of 
private metropolitan sources of social, cultural and religious thought. 
The prevention of private corruption and religious disobedience through the 
construction of providential and natural hierarchies was at the centre of ideas about the 
state for figures such as Reverend Moses Lowman. Indeed, according to the reverend, 
man’s disobedience could only be averted when ‘all Rights and Titles to Obedience are 
united’ in one supreme governor, the ‘Benefactor and Patron, our Master, Father, and 
King’.54 Investing absolute authority in a ‘Civil Magistrate’ would prove beneficial to 
‘publick Society’.55 In fact, it was essential for those who sought ‘Union of Social Life 
together’. According to Lowman, to grant a prince, governor or magistrate the ‘Power 
of directing the Actions of the Community’ was the ‘Soul of the Body Politick’.56 Thus, 
only powerful, absolute authorities, like Deputy-Governor Joseph Collet, could expect 
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obedience from members of a community, such as the one formed by the Company’s 
servants on the West Coast of Sumatra. However, their obedience was not to be 
commanded through legal regulatory frameworks or centralised political systems, as 
East India House believed and hoped, but through nothing more than the natural right of 
governors to command subordinates. As Lowman declared, 
 
The Right of the Magistrate to Obedience in…Acts of Government, must be 
the same as his Right to Government itself; and Men subject to Government, 
are held to answer this Right upon as high Obligations at least, as they are to 
answer the Duties of any other Relation they stand in to each other. So that 
this Civil Relation, once establish’d, induces a Moral Obligation. The Rights 
of Princes, and the Obedience of Subjects, become engagements of 
Conscience; in part, as the Duty of all Relations is bound upon Men by the 
Law of God; and further as the Order, Peace, and Happiness of Society, with 
the Means necessary to procure and preserve them, that is, the Institution and 
just Rights of Governours, is the Will and Intention of God himself; who is 
God of Order, and must certainly will the Peace and Social Welfare of 
Mankind.57 
 
By legitimising political authority not through any public or legal power, but through 
providential and natural rights, Lowman placed the power of magistrates, governors and 
princes beyond constitutional, contractual or consensual frameworks. East India House 
had empowered Collet with considerable authority so that he would put into practice the 
state building discourses that would subordinate Company servants to the public 
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interest. But Collet understood his authority in more private terms: he had a natural 
right, as ‘supreme magistrate’, to subordinate those on the West Coast through a 
personal, moral and religious duty. Their submission and obedience would be offered to 
Collet directly, not to their masters at East India House. 
 Reverend Lowman’s political ideology was part of a lineage of contested 
English political thought which stretched back over a century and included such figures 
as Lancelot Andrewes, William Pyrnn, Robert Filmer and William Sherlock, all of 
whom acknowledged the legitimacy of political authority as deriving from natural law, 
particularly evident through the exercise of patriarchal governance. For instance, 
Lancelot Andrews, the Bishop of Ely, announced from his pulpit in 1610 that monarchs 
were ‘Fathers of their Countreys’.58 Present in the audience was King James I, who had 
charged Andrews with commemorating the anniversary of a failed plot against his life.59 
Known as the Gowrie sermon, Andrews used this opportunity to inform the king of the 
patriarchal nature of his royal authority. James would do well, Andrews preached, to 
look to his ‘fatherhood, and government’ as one and the same.60 The parallels between a 
king’s divine right to rule and a father’s absolute power over his family was juxtaposed 
by England’s early modern natural law theorists to promote the practice of patriarchy as 
a political ideology, not just a social dynamic of the private household.61 In John 
Novell's 1662 book The Seditious Principle, it was argued that as head of the family, the 
patriarch was the 'Supreme Power' and therefore must command the absolute obedience 
of his subordinates. By this logic, he continued, the king's authority was therefore 'that 
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authority which a Father hath over his sons'.62 More than that, Novell argued, 'Civil 
Magistracy and Paternal Authority are really the same...in that Obedience is 
commanded to both…the People do no more authorize their King, than Children their 
Father, to have dominion over them.'63 Indeed, over the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, political theorists placed patriarchal authority at the centre of discourses on 
the right to rule, not just the monarch’s right, but a plethora of authoritarian rights: 
nobility over tenants, men over women, civil magistrates over the localities and even 
England over its growing empire.64 
 Hundreds of so-called ‘conduct books’ were published throughout this period, 
mapping out the hierarchy of patriarchal householders which reinforced the father’s  
undisputed rule, in which dependents, such as wives, children and servants, had to offer 
complete obedience.65. Conduct books acted as manuals, providing instruction for the 
organisation and effective management of a patriarchy. For instance, In 1621 A godly 
forme of houshold government for the ordering of private families outlined 'the severall 
duties of the husband towards his wife, and the wives dutie towards her husband, the 
parents dutie towards their children, and the childrens towards their parents, the 
maisters dutie towards his servants, and also the servants duty towards their maisters'.66 
The model patriarchy was defined as one which enforced hierarchy through the 
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obedience of its members to the father, master, and head of the household.67 The 
supremacy of the father within the family-household was acknowledged almost a 
hundred years later in Daniel Defoe's The Complete Family Instructor. The father, 
Defoe wrote in 1715, must constantly be aware of 'his duty in the future directing, 
teaching and governing his family.'68 Only by exercising his authority could a patriarch 
expect obedience from, and order within, the household. As Defoe's errant father 
informed his wife upon the disobedience of his children: 'it was my duty to have 
exercised the authority of a father and of a governor of a house...they are lost through 
my neglect!'69  
The corpus of guidelines promoted in conduct books reinforced patriarchal 
models of governance, shaping private understandings of the state and state-building.70 
As Robert Cleaver declared: 'An Houshold is as it were a little Commonwealth'.71 This 
symbiotic relationship between political authority and patriarchal power was 
acknowledged by some of the most influential political theorists of the early modern 
period. The political jurist Jean Bodin emphasised this in his 1606 work The six books 
of a commonweal. Bodin declared that ‘A Familie...is the true seminarie and beginning 
of every Commonweal, as also a principall member thereof’.72 He blamed early 
classical philosophers such as Aristotle for separating the ‘Oeconomicall government’, 
by which he meant the domestic management of a household, ‘from the Politicall, and a 
Citie from a Familie.’73 For Bodin, ignoring patriarchal authority as a model of 
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government was akin to ‘if wee should pull the members from the bodie.’74 There was 
little doubt that ‘the government of an house or familie’ was ‘the true modell for the 
government of a Commonweal.’75 The structure of authority in the family was further 
adopted as a model for shaping the early modern polity by James Harrington in his 
fictitious ideal commonwealth Oceana. 'Paternal Power is in the right of Nature’, 
declared Harrington, ‘and this is no other than the derivation of Power from Fathers of 
Familys, as the natural root of a Commonwealth.'76 Ground-breaking political theorists 
such as Bodin and Harrington, then, placed patriarchy at the centre of English state 
formation from the early seventeenth century onwards. 
  Patriarchal models of political authority and the state were not without 
opposition, however. By the early eighteenth century, such discourse was highly 
contested and increasingly polarised. Two opposing theories on the form and legitimacy 
of political authority gradually emerged. Sir Robert Filmer’s Patriarcha, published in 
the 1680s, quickly became the principal work on the importance of patriarchal models 
of power and authority in the state. 'If we compare the Natural Rights of a Father with 
those of a King', Filmer argued, 'we find them all one...as the Father over one Family, so 
the King as Father over many Families'.77 Patriarcha thus defined power in the early 
modern period as based on the laws of nature, not social contract or the civil laws of 
man. On the contrary, John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government adhered to the 
principles of contract and consent. This work aimed to legitimise the regime of William 
III after the Glorious Revolution of 1688, placing the Crown’s authority within 'the 
consent of the people, which being the only one of all lawful governments'.78 Locke’s 
entire first treatise acted as a critique of the patriarchal interpretation of political 
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authority through a line-by-line refutation of Patriarcha. 'Honour thy father and 
mother', Locke disparaged, 'cannot possibly be understood of political subjection and 
obedience; since the laws...were given to such, whose fathers were under civil 
government, and fellow subjects with them in political societies.'79 By separating 
patriarchal government from public government, obedience from consent, natural law 
from civil law, Locke sought to re-define the household as a private sphere arranged 
entirely on the basis of consent. 'The power of a magistrate over a subject', Locke 
declared in the second treatise, 'may be distinguished from that of a father over his 
children, a master over his servant, a husband over his wife, a lord over his slave.'80 The 
Bill of Rights, which legalised the 'abdication' of James II and the accession of William 
and Mary in 1689, was based upon these new contractarian interpretations. 
 In many respects, however, the Two Treatises and the Bill of Rights proved a 
false start. Indeed, Locke's ideas were neither popular with contemporaries nor as 
transformational at the time as posterity has assumed, at least not until the late 
eighteenth century.81 In fact, rather than signalling the inauguration of a contractarian 
English state legitimised upon the interpretation of political power as a construct of 
consent and the public as a separate civil sphere from that of the private, the post-
Revolutionary Settlement landscape signalled a continuation with its Stuart 
predecessors. This is revealed in one of the many pamphlets published in the wake of 
the Glorious Revolution, urging the new parliament to conduct itself upon 'A True and 
Perfect Model', one in which 'every Pater-Familias, or House-Keeper, is a Natural 
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Prince, and is invested with an Absolute Power over his Family'.82 By the beginning of 
the eighteenth century, it had become quite clear that political and, more particularly, 
royal, power had eschewed consent for the obedience and hierarchy inherent in 
patriarchal models of authority. Indeed, William III had placed his reign firmly within 
natural and providential bounds.83 Well into the eighteenth century, political thought 
continued to be shaped by ‘those who espouse the Patriarchal Scheme of Government’, 
according to the bishop of Bangor, Benjamin Hoadly, in 1710.84 
 Joseph Collet projected patriarchal models of political authority both on the 
governance of the West Coast of Sumatra, as well as on his own family. ‘Whenever you 
marry,’ Collet wrote to his daughter in 1718, ‘remember that it is the Husband’s part to 
be head and Protector, and the Glory of the Wife to be his delight.’85 The successful 
establishment of a patriarchy at home was a necessity if it was to be legitimately 
exercised outside of the family. As the Reverend Moses Lowman declared, only by ‘an 
especial Care of Vertue and Religion in your own Families’, could princes, governors 
and magistrates subordinate those they hoped to govern.86 By maintaining contact with 
metropolitan sources of social, political and spiritual thought and authority other than 
East India House, Collet’s adherence to the Company’s public interest was 
fundamentally reshaped by much more powerful private interest. Indeed, his practice of 
natural law and his promotion of patriarchal models of the state on the West Coast of 
Sumatra were themselves the pursuit of private interest, one that undermined the public 
state building discourse of East India House. This quickly became evident as Collet 
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began to exercise the powers invested in him by the court of directors from 1712 
onwards. 
 
The Formation of a Private Colonial Regime 
The debate over consent or obedience at the heart of British political thought, both in 
the family and in the state, was reflected in Joseph Collet’s formation of a private 
regime of governance on the West Coast of Sumatra. Collet used the sweeping powers 
delegated to him by the directors, not to promote the public interest, but to pursue his 
own varied and extensive private interests, from exercising his patriarchal authority to 
curtailing the profits of his commercial competitors. East India House was not a passive 
actor in this process, however. The painful lessons of state-building at Madras in the 
later seventeenth century led to the development of preventative measures which would 
place powerful governors like Collet within a legal framework of political consent and 
even limited – or shared - constitutional authority.  
This was attempted primarily through the establishment of collective action in 
decision making.87 Every executive official, whether the president, governor, deputy-
governor or chief, sat with an appointed council, consisting of a settlement’s most 
senior servants. They met regularly to share, discuss and rule upon important matters.88 
Appointment to the council, therefore, granted a senior servant a share in the governor’s 
decision making policy. In seeking to dilute the substantial powers of governors in Asia 
by allowing others to both scrutinise and contest them, East India House hoped to 
subject governors to a series of checks and balances. It was believed that governing by 
consultation was the best method for preventing the kind of absolute power which 
allowed servants to act independent of East India House. For example, as early as 1661 
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the court of committees had written to Thomas Chamber, agent at Madras, ordering 
‘that all matters bee debated and concluded of by Consultation and not as formerly 
singly by our Agent…wch wee utterly dislike and will by noe meanes allow of in the 
future.’89 Furthermore, all of the council’s debates and decisions carried out in 
consultation were also to be open and accessible to any servant who wished to be 
informed of even the most sensitive policies enacted by the governor and his council.90 
The importance East India House placed on consensual political frameworks to 
prevent arbitrary and independent behaviour constantly manifested itself in letters and 
orders. Despite empowering governors with sweeping political authority, they were 
nonetheless rarely provided with the power of dismissing members of council. This was 
seen when Madras appointed a supervisor for the West Coast, ‘empowered to act 
independent of the Council…and to dissolve them or dismiss or suspend any of them’. 
When news of this appointment reached East India House, they professed themselves 
shocked and wrote quickly to admonish Madras: ‘This Commission is of so 
extraordinary nature that we can by no means approve or allow it.’91 Despite forcing 
senior servants to govern in consultation with their councils, the fear remained that such 
councillors would merely become pawns of their more powerful servants. This was 
particularly true of the West Coast of Sumatra. The court of directors constantly urged 
members of the Bencoolen council to ‘speak up against evil practices’ in which deputy-
governors ‘brow beat or intimidated’ them in an effort to force compliance with their 
own decisions.92 ‘We appoint a Council’, the directors explained to their servants on the 
West Coast, ‘to see our affairs under their inspection be well managed & to controul 
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whatever [is] amiss’.93 But while the hierarchical government of the public state was 
supposed to be structured in a top-down way, in practice the representative assemblies 
of the Company’s various settlements, such as councils, were highly personalised, 
internally divided and therefore very weak, allowing senior servants to push them aside 
and gather power solely into their own hands.94  
Despite the orders and instructions of the court of directors to exercise his power 
with the consent of the Bencoolen council, Joseph Collet’s patriarchal conception of 
power as being invested absolutely in one individual led him to marginalise and 
eventually disband the theoretically consultative system of government on the West 
Coast. Instead, he created an absolutist regime, one in which all authority was invested 
in a supreme power: Collet as deputy-governor. Almost immediately after his arrival on 
the West Coast, he began to exercise the functions of government without his council. 
In February 1713, he informed the governor of Madras how he had taken ‘all matters 
especially of Importance’ out of the council’s hands and transacted it in his private 
quarters. ‘As for my Councill, God help them, they know nothing of the matter’.95 To 
share power with his council would have meant compromising Collet’s patriarchal 
power and therefore conceding his position as master of his own household. ‘Instead of 
asking them what I shall do’, Collet concluded to the governor, ‘I only tell them what I 
have done.’96 
Unsurprisingly, the council resented their authority being usurped and all 
political power being gathered up into the person of the deputy-governor, contrary to 
the directors’ orders. But as Collet informed the chief of Bantal in 1714, ‘I keep the 
Great Boys [his council] as quiet as I can but am oblig’d now and then to take away 
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their Bread and Butter.’97 Curtailing their numerous perquisites as councillors was one 
way Collet sought to gain their submission. Another was by their very visible 
subordination. In 1712 Collet ordered York Fort to be abandoned, and rebuilt the 
Company’s headquarters at Fort Marlborough, placing the deputy-governor’s chambers 
at the centre of the settlement, surrounded by those of his councillors. The new fort, 
Collet informed Henry White, chief of Bantal, would ensure that the councillors would 
‘be more under my eye’, which would allow him to ‘constantly pursue my Old Maxim – 
He that will not bend, shall break.’98 The visible display of Collet’s authority as deputy-
governor was also constantly employed to overawe the council. Whenever Collet left 
his chambers, he was led by a flag bearer, attended by a horse guard, a troop of Malay 
soldiers, four men carrying blunderbusses, and followed by a Malay rear-guard. ‘If I 
[go] abroad…or shou’d lye out of the Fort’, Collet informed friends in England, ‘the 
number of my Guard is encreased.’99 Thus through neglect, coercion and intimidation, 
Collet was able to defunct the only rival body for power on the West Coast, reducing it 
to obedience and ruling with absolute authority. 
Having established his uncontested control over political authority, Collet set 
about demolishing the existing ‘shadow of government’ that had led the collapse of the 
Company’s power on the West Coast. He began by punishing those who exhibited 
opposition to his government or signs of insubordination. As he wrote to the members 
of the Dic Ipse, a religious club he belonged to in England, Collet deemed such acts to 
be ‘matters of the greatest Importance’ which challenged both his religious sensibilities 
and his political position. ‘I have been obliged to some severities unknown here and yet 
at the same time wisht for a Power to inflict greater Penalties.’100 As Collet’s powers of 
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punishment were already wide-ranging, he was clearly talking about the power of 
capital punishment. As he shared these policies and ambitions with members of the Dic 
Ipse, he was reconfirming his belief in the absoluteness of political authority which the 
club itself represented. The name Dic Ipse is an Anglicised version of the Latin phrase 
ipse dixit, coined by the Roman orator and political philosopher Cicero to denote an 
arbitrary or dogmatic authority deriving from the power of individuals as opposed to 
wider logic or reason.101 Such alternative sources of metropolitan thought and practice 
as the Dic Ipse Club led to an ever widening gulf between the public discourses of East 
India House in London and the private practices of their deputy-governor in Asia. 
The pursuit of Collet’s private interests, particularly in regards to the exercise of 
his absolute political authority, was quickly felt amongst the small community of 
Company servants on the West Coast. Within the first month of his deputy-
governorship, Collet had imprisoned one Company servant while ‘another I have 
broken for lewdness and cowardness’, both of whom, he triumphantly declared to the 
Dic Ipse Club, were sent off the West Coast on the departure of the first ships for 
Europe.102 In the following year, the purge had gathered apace. The chief of Bantal, 
Stephen Bailhorn, was dismissed ‘for his insolence to the Deputy Govern’r’, along with 
his second of council, Gilbert Cook, who dared to challenge Bailhorn’s replacement.103 
At Bencoolen, the warehouse keeper was suspended indefinitely ‘for abusing, 
affronting, and challenging’ another Company servant. When the purging came to an 
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end in 1713, only nine covenanted servants remained on the West Coast, roughly half of 
the usual number.104 
After eighteen months in office, Collet had dramatically altered the socio-
political landscape of the West Coast settlements. Rivals for power had been brought to 
heel and subordinated, while insubordinate servants had been punished and dismissed. 
‘I have effectually destroy’d almost all the perquisites of their respective offices’, Collet 
boasted to his brother, Samuel Collet.105 Indeed, the ‘shadow of a true and right 
Governmt’ complained of in 1710 by the governor of Madras had been effectively torn 
down and demolished. There had perhaps never been a more opportune moment to 
make the public interest of the Company supreme by reviving the pepper trade, reducing 
expenses and disengaging from conflict with the surrounding Malay. However, like 
most of his fellow governors and senior servants, Joseph Collet had developed private 
interests, loyalties and associations of his own within his eighteen months of residence 
in Asia, outside of the public task entrusted to him by Gregory Page and the rest of the 
court of directors at East India House.  
The deputy-governor outlined the maxims of his ‘schemes of Government’ to 
the Reverend Moses Lowman. ‘I make all under me know that I will be obey’d.’ He 
hoped to accomplish this through various methods. ‘I gradually work on the severall 
affections, Gratitude, Hope and Fear, and find Springs to move them all.’106 These 
varying strategies were deployed in a reformation of manners which Collet pursued 
amongst subordinates on the West Coast. Whereas East India House hoped to reform 
the public behaviour of its servants in places such as Madras as a way of preventing the 
spread of private interest, Collet was motivated by what he believed was a paternal duty 
and patriarchal right. Collet took moral, godly and respectful behaviour by other 
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Company servants as a sign of their submission to him as deputy-governor. ‘I think I am 
rather feared by the English’, Collet wrote to Gregory Page, chairman of the court of 
directors. ‘Their reformations of every kind that I must go through with render them 
uneasy.’107 
Collet aimed to create a godly regime at Bencoolen. The main thrust of 
reformation, therefore, was directed at the lack of religiosity in his subordinates. 
According to the deputy-governor, they exhibited ‘Wickedness and Blaspheme…and 
this I had almost said is Universall.’108 In a letter to a friend in Britain, Collet declared 
his intention to ‘endeavour a Reformation both by Authority and Example. God grant 
Success!’109 Through rigorous attendance at divine service, he hoped to instil piety, 
justice, charity, temperance ‘and Purity of Heart as well as Life’ in his subordinates.110 
To this end, Collet preached to the West Coast establishment every Sunday at 
Bencoolen, holding ‘Prayers’ and delivering ‘a Sermon’.111 For the latter, Collet quoted 
directly from the works of theologians such as John Tillotson and John Wilkins, both of 
whom espoused patriarchal models of political authority.112 ‘Obedience’, declared 
Wilkins in his Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, published two years before 
Collet’s departure for Asia, ‘being nothing else but that homage which we owe to such 
as are in a superior relation, who have a right to command us.’ He continued: ‘Every 
relation of superiority and dominion being a distinct engagement to subjection; whether 
Oeconomical, as that betwixt Parent and Child; Political, as betwixt Magistrate and 
Subject’.113 Collet adopted and preached these messages of obedience to reinforce his 
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right to rule his audience, not through any constitutional or public power granted by 
East India House, but as possessing natural and providential authority, as a patriarch 
does over his own household.  
By mid-1714, Collet believed that such private reformations were beginning to 
succeed in creating a god-fearing society under his rule. As he wrote to his brother-in-
law, ‘a great Reformation of manners is visible amongst my People; and I have reason 
to believe that in some instances there is a change of heart as well as Life.’114 As Collet 
stamped his private authority over West Coast society, a political system began to 
emerge that was less about the loyalty of servants to East India House or the promotion 
of the public interest, and more about loyalty to Collet and the promotion of his own 
private interests, whether attendance at one of his sermons or acknowledging the 
uselessness of the council as a political body. Collet’s pursuit of his private interests on 
the West Coast of Sumatra was succinctly summed up in a letter to his brother, Samuel 
Collet, in 1714: ‘And as for the English, we make up one great Family of which I am 
the head and common Father, to whom all pay the Reverence, Respect, and Obedience 
of Children.’115 
In projecting himself as a powerful patriarch while casting his subordinates as 
‘children’, Collet transferred the loyalty and obligation of those on the West Coast from 
their public masters and employers at East India House, to him personally as their 
‘common Father’. When William Palmer arrived on the West Coast in the junior station 
of writer, Collet extended his favour to him and established a patriarchal relationship 
between them. ‘Gov’r Collet useth me like a Son’, Palmer wrote to his patron in 
England in 1713, ‘he has made me his Secretary.’116 Such obligations bound the young 
Palmer to Collet directly, so that he informed his patron that only God’s pleasure in 
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sparing the deputy-governor’s life, despite an outbreak of plague, ensured that the 
Company’s affairs on the West Coast continued to flourish. ‘In short’, Palmer 
concluded to his patron, ‘We are all an entise Body knit together in amity’.117 Even the 
most senior servants found themselves subjected to Collet’s own private forms of 
government, as opposed to the more public idea of the state which their employers at 
East India House promoted. As chief of Bantal, a subordinate settlement some one-
hundred miles north of Bencoolen, Henry White was the second most powerful figure 
on the West Coast. Traditionally, the chiefs of Bantal were the competitors of their 
superiors at Bencoolen, in commerce and politics. But under Collet, this dynamic was 
reversed. ‘I always wrote to him in the Stile and with the freedom of a Father’, Collet 
wrote of White to his daughter Elizabeth in 1714, ‘which he returns with the duty and 
affection of a Son.’118 Indeed, governing White as a father allowed Collet to subject 
Bantal to his authority and control its affairs to a greater extent than any deputy-
governor had managed before. 
The emergence of a private colonial regime on the West Coast of Sumatra 
reflected Collet’s pursuit of private interests, those of a social, theological and political 
nature. But in binding Company servants to him on such an intimate level, Collet was 
also able to facilitate his pecuniary interests from the obedience they offered to him. For 
instance, many of his so-called ‘children’ felt obliged to make Collet, as their ‘father’, 
the executor of their estates in Asia. Richard Connell, a member of the Bencoolen 
council, died from plague in 1713. Shortly before his death, Connell had changed his 
will to make Collet’s daughter Henrietta the sole heir, and Collet, as executor, remitted 
the £400 which the estate realised home to his daughter.119 Writing to his eldest 
daughter Elizabeth, Collet related how her sister had a fortune left to her by ‘a 
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Gentleman that thought himself under some obligations to me’.120 Similarly, another of 
Collet’s subordinates left his youngest daughter Anne an estate of £250.121 Nor was 
Elizabeth herself neglected. Henry White, the chief of Bantal whom Collet had treated 
like a son, asked the deputy-governor permission to begin a correspondence with 
Elizabeth in 1714. As his powerful deputy in the northern subordinate factories, his 
main trading partner and his successor as deputy-governor, Collet sought to strengthen 
his authority over the chief of Bantal and bind him further to his own interests. ‘I 
require of you to return his civility’s in the Stile and with the Freedom of a Sister’, 
Collet instructed his daughter.122 He further ordered Elizabeth to sit for her portrait and 
send it to White ‘as a Present from a Sister to a Brother’, and also to visit and acquaint 
herself with White’s relatives in England.123 White himself sent Elizabeth a gold 
nutmeg grater in the shape of a heart, and a small gold nutmeg case.124 By 1716, he had 
also made her the executor of his will and heir of his entire estate.125 
The ends of Collet’s government of the West Coast, of course, were not to fleece 
subordinates of their estates for the benefit of himself and his own family. But the 
patriarchal model of governance established by Collet tied servants to him on a private 
level, creating not just professional and public obligations, but personal, emotional and 
even intimate bonds in which their loyalty and subordination was offered to him 
directly, and not to East India House. Indeed, authority in colonial governance was not a 
public matter, rather it was shaped, exercised and legitimised through a series of 
interpersonal relationships based upon a private discourse of natural and providential 
right. East India House saw such behaviour as the corrupt and dangerous pursuit of 
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private interest, but for their servants in Asia, it was simply the way in which power, 
authority and governance were articulated and exercised, far removed from the 
immediate oversight of the directors in London. Thus, while East India House sought to 
encourage and reward loyalty to the Company’s public interest through increased salary 
or a share in private trade, Collet did so by acting in a paternal manner. 
Paternalism in this respect was not distinct from patriarchy as a form of 
authority. Rather, it was another manifestation of patriarchal power, a ‘tool’ in the 
‘toolkit’ of fathers to enforce obedience over the household.126 For instance, Collet 
‘adopted’ the unmarried European women of the West Coast as his daughters, arranging 
their marriage to the most suitable of his subordinates.127 Similarly, he extended his 
protection and care to the children of such unions. When John Hunter left Bencoolen to 
take up the post of chief of Bantal in 1712, Collet brought his daughter into his own 
household, appointed a nurse to look after her, and even consulted a doctor when she 
fell sick. ‘Whilst under my care’, Collet informed her father, ‘[she] shall want nothing 
in my Power to provide for her.’128 If their parents died, as many did from disease and 
the climate, Collet took the children in as his own, or arranged for their transport to 
Madras ‘where better care may be taken of them.’129 The paternal affection which Collet 
extended to his subordinates incentivised their loyalty to him, as he wrote to his sister in 
1717: ‘I shall think a Father’s Care repaid by his Children’s duty.’130 But at the same 
time, it also reconfirmed their subjection to his authority, and his position as the 
supreme power on the West Coast of Sumatra. 
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Imperial Expansion as Private Interest 
Perhaps the most significant – and visible - difference between the public discourses of 
East India House and the private practices of its servants, can be found in their 
conflicting approach to the Company’s political and territorial expansion in Asia. 
Traditionally, historians have understood European imperial expansion there to be 
shaped by wider geo-political circumstances and currents, such as Anglo-French 
conflict or the ‘decline’ of the Mughal Empire.131 However, the composite nature of 
private interest, which included not just pecuniary interests such as private trade, but 
social, political and cultural interests, too, meant that waging war and conducting 
foreign diplomacy were also duties assumed by Company servants who attained great 
personal power in Asia, as Joseph Collet had. Indeed, as part of the development of 
private forms of governance on the West Coast of Sumatra, imperial expansion was a 
key dynamic in legitimising private power. Collet’s regime would have been fatally 
undermined had groups existed beyond his authority, exercising independence and 
maintaining different socio-political orders on Bencoolen’s doorstep. Imperial 
ambitions, therefore, shaped Collet’s interaction with the Malay up and down the West 
Coast.  
Joseph Collet represented the diverse contours of imperial politics in Asia in the 
eighteenth century. His subordination of Company servants on the West Coast and his 
exercise of autocratic power derived from his private social interests, for example the 
role of natural law in politics. His imperial ambitions, on the other hand, derived more 
particularly from his cultural interests, specifically his attitude toward and perception of 
Malay culture. The latter, Collet consistently declared, created uncivilized and 
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backward political societies on the West Coast.132 This was a widely held view by most 
Europeans stationed on the island during this period, one that was promoted from the 
very beginning of the Company’s presence there. 'In a word I shall Plainely tell yor 
Honor &ca', Company servants wrote to the court of directors in 1686, after barely a 
year on the West Coast, 'that this Place is a receiptall for Vagabonds & runegates & 
from ye King to ye beggar theaves.'133 In 1700, the chief of Bantal also condemned the 
surrounding Malay in similar terms. ‘The Mallays are a people Barbarous in their 
practice, false in their faith, and unsteady in their resolutions.’134 While the Company’s 
public interest demanded the accommodation of Asian culture, religion and society in 
the interest of positive diplomatic and commercial ties, the private cultural stereotypes 
fostered by Company servants fed into their patriarchal discourses. Colonial encounters 
thus became opportunities for the exercise of patriarchal authority and, as a 
consequence, of outright conflict and territorial expansion. 
 Fresh from his voyage to Asia in 1712, Deputy-Governor Collet penned a letter 
to a friend in England a few days after his arrival at Bencoolen. After his initial contact 
with various prominent Malay rajas and sultans, he articulated to his friend the 
encounters through the prism of his private social and cultural attitudes and beliefs. 
‘They tell me I am a good Man and pray for my life daily; I treat them as a Wise man 
shou’d his Wife, am complaisant in trifles, but immoveable in matters of importance.’135 
One again, the patriarchal models of political power which were fed into the West Coast 
through private sources of metropolitan authority and thought, shaped Collet’s practice 
of foreign diplomacy, ultimately driving his imperial ambitions. Thus for Collet, the 
perceived backwardness of the Malay made them natural ‘wives’ and ‘children’ in his 
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personal colonial regime. As William Palmer, Collet’s secretary, wrote in 1713: 'the 
[rulers] of the Country love the Governor and fear him and he useth them as his 
Sons’.136  
During the four years of his deputy-governorship, Collet sought the complete 
obedience of the surrounding Malay to his rule. The forum at which this was most 
frequently achieved was that of the bitchar. An assembly where Malay rulers and 
Company servants convened to deliberate on everything from judicial matters to 
diplomatic proceedings, the bitchar provided Company servants with a platform to 
demonstrate their authority over the Malay. It was a gathering of great pomp and 
display, where gifts of expensive silk taffeta and luxurious cotton cossaes (fabrics) were 
distributed to various Malay rulers by the deputy-governor, while the military were 
drawn up in formation, parading and beating drums.137 The Malay and members of the 
deputy-governor's council were seated hierarchically according to rank, Company 
servants at the highest end of the table with the deputy-governor at their head, presiding 
over the entire gathering.138 As the distribution of gifts and the symbolism of ceremony 
formed a vital aspect of the culture of diplomacy in West Sumatran society, a Company 
servant’s control over a bitchar was a powerful political expression of his personal 
authority.139  
Although bitchar was a uniquely Malay institution, the respect, cooperation and 
negotiation East India House urged their servants to pursue with the Malay rulers there 
was disregarded, and the bitchar subverted, particularly by Joseph Collet, into a private 
court in which the Malay visibly expressed or offered their subordination to him. ‘I have 
been ador’d with Prostration and have had my feet bath’d with tears of Joy and 
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Gratitude’, Collet declared of his time in bitchar in 1712 to the Reverend Hodges, an 
acquaintance in Britain. ‘My Knees have been embraced and that even by a Prince as 
well as Slaves’, Collet continued. ‘I am dayly pray’d for in various languages and with 
different Rites by severall Kings, and all their Subjects.’140 As flowery as such boasts 
may seem, they were more than just rhetoric. During bitchar, Malay rajas, sultans and 
emperors sought Collet’s judgement on judicial cases, accepted his rulings on 
diplomatic incidents and were ascribed punishment for disobedience.141 Far from 
upholding the public interest of his employers at East India House, Collet considered 
himself to be achieving ‘the ends of Justice as a Man, and Duty as a Parent’.142 The last 
part was important. While holding bitchar, the deputy-governor exercised his patriarchy 
by enforcing his authority over the Malay and accepting their submission to his orders. 
Equally, the absence of a Malay ruler at a bitchar was a direct affront to Collet’s 
personal authority, and a danger to the regime he had built on the West Coast. 
When the Malay opposed Collet’s subjugation of them, or attempted to operate 
outside of his regime, he projected his authority through military force. Collet’s 
approach to the Sultanate of Anak Sungai, a large state to the north, reveals how private 
practices of government led to imperial expansion on the West Coast. In 1713, two 
prominent rajas of the sultanate inaugurated their rebellion against Collet’s authority by 
refusing to attend bitchar. The reasons for their disobedience can be found in the 
turbulent political conditions of the sultanate over the preceding years. As Collet wrote 
to the directors at the beginning of 1713, ‘affairs in the North have been hitherto very 
much out of order'.143 He witnessed the situation first hand when his ship had docked at 
Bantal on its way to Bencoolen the year before. There he had learnt that a long-
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threatened civil war had finally broken out in the sultanate, where the ruler, Sultan 
Gulemat, was being challenged for the throne by Rajas Suleman and Mansore.144 The 
chief of Bantal in 1710, Robert Skingle, had seen this as an opportunity to weaken the 
sovereignty of the sultanate and increase his own political authority by supporting both 
candidates to the throne.145 Skingle's successor, Anthony Ettrick, went a step further and 
used the breakdown of authority in the sultanate to annex the territory of Raja Jangallo. 
'He attempted conquest but with great baseness & imprudence,' Collet wrote of 
Ettrick.146 The raja had been invited to Bantal on the pretence of joining a bitchar, but 
once he had arrived and entered the Company's fort there, Ettrick had given the signal to 
concealed soldiers to fire upon the raja's party. Although Raja Jangallo survived this 
assassination attempt, he was presently seized and murdered two days later. Imprisoning 
the raja's brother and successor in the fort, Ettrick 'attackd the [raja's] Countrey and 
expelld his family,' garrisoning the capital.147 As most of the soldiers Collet had brought 
with him from Madras had already perished in the various campaigns of the chiefs of 
Bantal, he was therefore forced to stall for time while he rebuilt his military capabilities. 
 As the new chief of Bantal, Collet selected his ‘son’, Henry White, with 
instructions to summon a bitchar and mediate between Sultan Gulemat and the 
pretender, Raja Suleman.148 But when Suleman failed to attend, and instead withdrew to 
his fortified settlements at Moco Moco and Manduta with his ally Raja Mansore, he 
signalled his intent to dispute Collet’s power over him. The deputy-governor wrote 
furiously to White that he was 'not at all disposed to bear their Insolencys', and 
encouraged him that 'if ever they come within reach of the Guns [of Bantal Fort] 
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without leave I would have you be very liberall of your shots.'149 Unless the rebel rajas 
were brought to submission, Collet’s position as ruler of the West Coast was in danger 
of being undermined. White therefore proposed to Collet a 'Scheme of Warr', which 
included raising a force of 30 Europeans and 100 Malays to take the offensive and hunt 
the rajas down. But the manpower available to Collet was still severely restricted, as 
were his military stores. 'I am sorry your neighbours are so troublesome especially at a 
time when it is not in our power to call them to account’, Collet wrote to White, ‘but 
where are these 30 Europeans to be had?'150 However, when the Frederick and 
Susannah sailed unexpectedly into the Bencoolen road, the deputy-governor was 
provided with the means to bring the rebel rajas back under his authority.  
 'You will perhaps wonder to find the Postscript to my private Letter a direct 
contradiction to our Generall Letter wherein You are told that we can spare no men to 
make the Appearance of a Military force Sufficient to make your troublesome 
neighbours quiet,' Collet wrote to White in October 1713.151 On board the newly arrived 
Company ships were complements of troops and military stores sufficient to act 
offensively. Collet immediately despatched an officer with twenty European and sixty 
Malay troops to Bantal, granting White power to subordinate the rebel rajas, ‘by 
Military Execution', as he termed it.'152 Collet sought to bring the sultanate once and for 
all under his control by making the sultan his puppet: his rights were to be reduced by 
increasing those of his proateens; he was to pay for the upkeep of all Company 
settlements within his territory; Company servants assumed the right to regulate the 
economy of Anak Sungai by banning the import of gun-powder, forbidding the export 
of pepper, and enforcing the cultivation of pepper vines upon threat of fining every 
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family fifteen dollars who failed to do so; most importantly, Collet claimed full 
territorial sovereign rights to Raja Suleman's settlements of Moco Moco and Manduta. 
The treaty concluded with the stipulation that 'whoever breaks Peace without first 
complaining to the English shall be lookd on as Publick Enemys.'153 When the sultan 
finally agreed to these exacting demands on 30 November 1713, Collet instructed White 
to march against the rebel rajas.154 
 The campaign itself was swift and involved a direct march overland some forty 
miles from Bantal to take Moco Moco and Manduta from the rajas, especially important 
now that Collet claimed possession of both places. This was a war to demonstrate the 
deputy-governor’s patriarchal authority, and his ability to punish and correct those who 
disobeyed him. Few were to be left in doubt of this, with Sultan Guleman's offer to join 
forces declined, Collet 'only desiring his People to carry their Baggage & provide 
Barracks.'155 Catching Moco Moco by surprise, an assault from the river led by William 
Fox, third of council at Bantal, was enough to ensure its capture, but not before Raja 
Suleman set fire to a portion of the town as he fled.156 A detachment was then sent up-
river to Maduta which they found abandoned and largely burnt to the ground. 'The 
Compys forces took in this expedition,' Collet boasted in early 1714, '13 p[ound] 
Ordnance, 1 mortar, 47 shot, 20 Granado Shells filld, 26 empty & above 20 bahar 
Pepper.'157 The deputy-governor believed that his subjugation of Anak Sungai would 
bring it more firmly under his patriarchal authority. In 1714 he observed victoriously 
that Sultan Gulemat ‘calls me a Father and asks my advice in the Government of his 
                                                 
153 For the treaty’s full terms, see BL, APAC, IOR/G/35/8, Treaty with Anak Sungai, York Fort, 30 
November 1713. 






own people.’158 To the Reverend Moses Lowman, whose patriarchal ideas of political 
power had so influenced Collet’s own private understandings of state formation, the 
deputy-governor wrote in 1715 that ‘I have gone through two successfull Wars…and at 
the same time have gain’d the Love of the people I have conquer’d’.159 
 
The Triumph of Private Interest 
After four years on the West Coast of Sumatra, Joseph Collet was promoted to governor 
of Madras in 1716, the most senior office in the Company’s service. After his departure 
from Bencoolen, the court of directors noted to Collet’s successor how his actions as 
deputy-governor had made the Malay ‘esteem him the Father of their Country’.160 But 
far from perceiving Collet’s private colonial regime as a usurpation of their authority 
through the corrupt pursuit of private interest, East India House rewarded him for the 
political stability, social order and commercial growth his form of governance had 
brought to the West Coast. Indeed, the dynamic of creating autonomous, private 
regimes in Asia through the appropriation of public authority could not only endure, but 
receive official recognition and even endorsement by East India House if it also 
succeeded in serving the ‘public interest’, however incidental. Collet was well aware of 
this fact. As he wrote to his brother, the establishment of a private regime on the West 
Coast meant that ‘my private Affairs are in a flourishing condition’, but, he added, it 
also ‘renders my Government very easy; the publick Affairs prosper abundantly.’161  
The pursuit of private interest had indeed put Collet’s affairs in a ‘flourishing 
condition’. His commercial interests, for example, had been spectacularly realised. 
While Collet professed to earn £2,000 a year from his private trade, others estimated it 
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at the more likely sum of £10,000.162 For instance, it was later discovered that he had 
taken commission on all pepper, redwood and saltpetre shipped from the West Coast, a 
practice which was both unheard of and which likely provided him with a substantial 
sum.163 Yet even far more modest estates than that acquired by Collet had raised the 
suspicions of East India House and often led to prosecution. Collet, however, was 
allowed to enjoy his without censure – even with praise.  
The private colonial regime established by Collet on the West Coast may have 
been formed through the pursuit of a composite set of private interests, but it also met 
the expectations of the ‘public interest’ that East India House sought so strenuously to 
promote in Asia through its state building efforts. Commercial growth was the 
cornerstone of the Company’s public interest. As the court of directors had reminded 
Collet in 1712, ‘Trade is our business and if fully pursued will take up the time of our 
Councils at all places’.164 To the directors’ delight, Collet succeeded in reviving the 
severely diminished trade in pepper during his deputy-governorship, one of the key 
aims Collet was specifically sent to Sumatra to achieve. Before Collet’s arrival there, 
Malay pepper farmers had been alienated, pepper plantations were overgrown, and 
trading posts abandoned, providing barely a trickle of pepper for the Company’s 
warehouses in London.165 Under Collet, the acquisition and shipment of pepper became 
a priority. He urged the Malay to ‘increase Pepper which is as much as their Interest as 
the Companys’.166 He also opened new trading posts in places such as Moco Moco.167  
Collet’s efforts quickly bore fruit. As he wrote to the governor of Madras, ‘I am 
now pretty confident of being able to answer the Company’s Expectations of enlarging 
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the Pepper Trade to their Content.’168 In 1712 the deputy-governor reported to the court 
of directors that the Success had set sail from Bencoolen fully laden with 960 bahar169 
of pepper, more than twenty tonnes than was customary, as well as containing stocks of 
redwood and saltpetre.170 A further 1,500 bahar of pepper was shipped throughout 
1713, with 2,000 more predicted for the following year.171 Under Collet, a record 
amount of pepper was acquired from the West Coast of Sumatra. As the directors 
informed Collet’s successor, Richard Farmer, in 1717, ‘he procured for Us more Pepper 
the first & second year’, than any other year in the establishment’s history.172 If such 
private forms of governance secured the public interest as well as the private interest of 
their authors, they were tolerated and in some cases – although far more rarely – even 
rewarded by East India House. Physical conflict between East India House and their 
servants in Asia materialised only when such private regimes failed to realise the public 
interest, a situation which was more the norm in the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries. When this happened, the usurping Company servant was either 
successfully dismissed or driven to rebellion against his masters. Such was the fate of 
Richard Farmer, Collet’s successor as deputy-governor.  
Deputy-governor Farmer was far less successful in building a private colonial 
regime. Although he sought to replicate the practices of his predecessor, Farmer’s 
acquisition of autocratic power lacked the patriarchy exercised by Collet, and thus 
sought to subordinate his peers while failing to integrate them into a wider political 
order. Furthermore, his regime was ultimately unable to realise any aspect of the public 
interest, particularly its economic aims, which resulted in conflict with East India 
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House. ‘[It is] not in his nature to do well for any body’, complained the West Coast 
factor Joseph Walsh in 1718, ‘not having one spark of Hon’sty or Generosity within 
him.’173 Furthermore, according to Walsh, Farmer had ‘us’d every one here very ill, 
making us live in continual disquiet’.174 The new deputy-governor had engrossed all 
private trade to the exclusion of his subordinates, imprisoned his competitors and even 
monopolised all manner of provisions, even the basic necessities such as salt and rice.175 
There was to be no paternal care or weekly sermons under Farmer. Furthermore, he had 
entirely neglected the pepper trade, allowing Company ships to lay empty and idle, even 
rotting in some cases.176 This was partly due to his erratic and violent policy toward the 
Malay. ‘He has by his pervious’, continued Walsh, ‘incend’s the whole country against 
us, & involv’d us in Wars to the very brink of ruin.’177 Farmer’s wars meant that he was 
unable to ship any pepper from the West Coast during the eighteen months of his 
regime. ‘We can attribute this failure to nothing else but our Dep’ty Governour’s 
infidelity, supineness or want of Judgement and Zeal for our service’, declared the 
directors.178 Once it had been proved that the deputy-governor had defrauded the 
Company’s accounts, the governor of Madras despatched a military force to depose 
Farmer.179 Having alienated the entire political establishment on the West Coast, 
however, Farmer lacked the popular support to physically rebel against the Company. In 
March 1719 the ships from Madras arrived and Farmer was seized, imprisoned, and 
eventually shipped back to Madras to be charged.180  
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The fate of the West Coast of Sumatra serves as an accurate epitaph for the 
Company’s public state building efforts in Asia. Farmer’s erratically violent regime had 
left the West Coast in a state of disarray after 1719. His attempt to place his own 
candidate on the throne of Anak Sungai had inadvertently united the various warring 
Malay factions under the deposed Sultan Gulemat. The new deputy-governor, Edward 
Cooke, was caught unawares when a large Malay army marched on Bencoolen in mid-
1719, burning it to the ground and expelling the Company’s servants off the West Coast 
of Sumatra. ‘The fatal desertion of Bencoolen as We have the account from several 
hands’, bemoaned the court of directors in 1722, ‘casts a Reproach more or less on 
every body there so that We are not very willing to Station any of them in Our 
service’.181 Although Bencoolen was resettled again in 1721, none of Collet’s 
successors were able to repeat his balance of public and private interests. Instead, they 
entirely rejected the public interest, aggressively pursuing their own private schemes of 
commerce, governance and imperial expansion to varying degrees of intensity. In 1721, 
Nathaniel Elwick, the governor of Madras, accused the new West Coast deputy-
governor of having ‘enter’d upon a design of flinging off all subordinacy to this 
Presidency & has assum’d to himself a power of acting at the West Coast in defiance & 
contempt of our authority and contrary to the orders he hath rec’d from the Honble 
Company’.182 The Company finally withdrew from the West Coast in 1824, conceding 
Sumatra to the Dutch in favour of Singapore.183 Much like the gradual failure of the 
West Coast to realise East India House’s expectations in the pepper trade, so the pursuit 
of private interests by senior servants decentralised political authority within the 
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Company, severely limiting the ability of metropolitan authorities at East India House to 
build the early modern colonial state in Asia. 
 
Conclusion 
As events on the West Coast of Sumatra in the early eighteenth century show, the 
ability for the Company’s public discourse of state building to be put into practice by its 
servants in Asia was limited and remained unrealised. East India House was forced to 
empower senior servants in Asia through the spatial and temporal limits placed on their 
ability to project their own authority there. In doing so, they believed such figures 
would build the colonial institutions necessary for the establishment of a strong, 
centralised state. Such a polity, they hoped, would ensure the obedience and loyalty of 
servants scattered throughout Asia to the public interests of metropolitan authorities at 
East India House, interests concerned with commercial growth and shareholder 
dividends. But public institutional understandings of hierarchy and order conflicted with 
the private interests of those very servants empowered in Asia to undertake such state 
building. Indeed, the policies and orders of East India House had to be channelled 
through their servants, and in the process became subject to reinterpretation and 
reconfiguration, and were, ultimately, applied according to the composite interests of 
servants. These interests, moreover, were shaped by competing sources of metropolitan 
authority, thought and practice, fed through the connections Company servants 
maintained with households, kin, social clubs and religious orders in Britain. Such a 
decentralised process of political authority did not always lead to the subversion of the 
public interest, however. In some cases, such as Joseph Collet’s deputy-governorship of 




The first part of this thesis has exposed the failure of East India House to shape 
the emergence of the early modern colonial state, revealing instead the triumph of 
private interests in subverting public models of the state and replacing them with more 
personal ideas of the purpose and projection of state power. By the early eighteenth 
century, the policies of East India House were shaped by the pursuit of the private 
interests of its servants in Asia, remaining very much subservient to their personal 
actions and beliefs. As Collet himself observed as he prepared to leave Sumatra in 1716: 
‘He that attempts to go thro’ the Exercise of power and administration of government so 
as to please all Men, will very probably please none; my rule is so to act as that in the 
first place may approve Myself to my own Conscience, and next to those by whom I am 
entrusted’.184 This private approach to colonial governance emerged as the model 
through which the English East India Company developed in Asia.  
Fundamental to this process of political decentralisation were the long-distance 
ties which connected associates, friends and family members in Britain with Company 
servants operating thousands of miles away across Asia. Such connections ensured that 
the interests and actions of Company servants were constantly shaped and reshaped by a 
composite range of metropolitan influences in places such as India and the West Coast 
of Sumatra which determined their private interests, specifically their understandings of 
the state and the exercise of state power. Indeed, family and friends in Britain played 
critical roles in the Company servant’s appropriation of public authority and their 
transfiguration of new systems and regimes of colonial power. This was clearly evident 
in the transformed political landscape of the West Coast which Collet left behind in 
1716, and it was a process repeated across Asia in the early modern period.  
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The decentred nature of the Company’s political authority in Asia was reflective 
of the decentred nature of the imperial metropole itself. As the court of directors 
dispatched their orders from East India House to their servants in Asia, these were 
accompanied by the gifts, patronage requests, pamphlets, books, opinions and 
information of a multitude of other metropolitan groups, all of whom shared a private 
relationship with the Company’s servants that challenged and reshaped the latter’s ties 
with East India House. In this respect, the metropole was not a single, unitary structure, 
but a web of various people, groups and communities. Such a ‘web of empire’ tugged at 
the Company’s ‘centre’ in London, decentring it in the process.185 Part two of the thesis 
thus undertakes a closer analysis of these connections which established a global 
community outside of the Company’s own corporate system, and studies further their 
impact upon the colonial state formation process in Asia. 
                                                 











Company Kinship Networks in Early Modern Asia 
 
 
As section one revealed, in order to understand the political development of the 
Company in Asia, it is necessary to study not just the decisions or orders of the court of 
directors at East India House, but also the establishment and growth of the networks of 
Company servants, both between Europe and Asia, and across Asia itself in the early 
modern period. The web of networks along which political authority splintered and 
flowed was fundamental in shaping the private interests of Company servants. As Emily 
Erikson has recently noted, ‘the push and pull between the coordinating hierarchical 
form of the Company and the many loose ends of the different desires and ambitions of 
enterprising individuals’ was a process of political decentralisation which led directly to 
the massive growth of social networks through which the Company would ultimately 
develop in the eighteenth century.1 The growth of a particular form of social network, as 
glimpsed in the dynamic of Joseph Collet’s ties to the metropole in the previous chapter, 
will be the focus of the second part of the thesis. This chapter will explore the formation 
and expansion of family networks between Company servants, and their importance in 
developing a wider global framework through which the Company ultimately 
developed. 
The development of a private colonial regime under Joseph Collet on the West 
Coast of Sumatra revealed the importance of family networks within the Company. A 
majority of the letters, gifts, goods and information sent or received by Collet on the 
West Coast came from, or were sent to, members of the Collet family or their wider kin 
in Britain. Family members made recommendations for appointments, conveyed 
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140 
political views, sent theological tracts, requested patronage, provided resources and 
made demands which fundamentally altered both Joseph Collet’s interests and the 
political makeup of the regime he created on the West Coast. Even Collet’s most 
influential theological correspondent, the Reverend Moses Lowman, was actually the 
Collet family’s pastor. Collet’s actions as deputy-governor were shaped by his wider 
family network. Spreading and threading themselves between Europe and Asia, and 
across Asia itself in the early modern period, family networks provided otherwise 
localised and often isolated Company servants with access to a much wider global 
system of exchange, circulation and movement which allowed them to exercise their 
own distinct political agency, independent of East India House. 
Family relationships, connections and networks played a fundamental role in the 
political development of the Company in early modern Asia. The powerful private 
interests of Company servants were shaped by their families. Every governor of 
Madras, from Thomas Chamber in the 1660s to Thomas Pitt at the turn of the eighteenth 
century, conducted their administrations with, and through, family members. For 
instance, Sir George Foxcroft came out to Madras as governor in 1663 with his son, 
Nathaniel Foxcroft, whom he made second of council and his successor.2 Similarly, the 
man who eventually deposed and imprisoned him, Sir Edward Winter, was accused of 
inappropriately ‘receiving several of his Relations into our imployment’, at least one of 
whom he promoted to third of council.3 Winter also communicated and legitimised his 
rebellion against Foxcroft to East India House through his brother Sir Thomas Winter, 
who sat on the court of committees and mediated between London and Madras during 
the rebellion.4 
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 As early as the late seventeenth century, East India House became aware of the 
‘great inconveniency’ caused to the public interest when ‘near Relations’ gathered in the 
same settlement to achieve a monopoly, or at the very least a large influence, over 
political power.5 To mitigate this, whenever possible, East India House attempted to 
station family members in different parts of Asia, such as the son of William Puckle, the 
chief of Masulipatam, who was ordered to leave that settlement and reside in Bengal.6 
However, as with other designs and policies aimed at limiting private interest, this was 
subverted by Company servants who were keen to create powerbases in certain 
settlements by concentrating their families there. Thus, when Robert Hedges was sent to 
Madras in the junior capacity of writer, his uncle William Hedges used his influence as 
agent of Bengal to have his nephew stationed with him instead, ‘that he might have the 
breeding of him under his Eye.’7 Similarly, both Elihu Yale and Thomas Pitt, as 
governors of Madras, developed the Company’s trade with China through family 
members. Yale had appointed his brother Thomas as chief factor in 1689 and tasked 
him with establishing a new factory at Canton, while Pitt used his son Robert as his 
agent there in 1701 to acquire goods, information and influence, which the latter 
considered ‘a post of the most trust, credit, and profit’.8 By the turn of the eighteenth 
century, this pattern of family settlement became the norm, and the emerging colonial 
state became increasingly shaped by powerful families.  
Families played a vital part in every aspect of the lives of Company servants. 
When travelling, settling, trading or governing in Asia, they operated firmly within the 
context of their immediate families and wider kinship groups. In the context of the early 
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modern British Empire, however, historians have traditionally defined Asia as a space 
of trade and commerce before the mid-eighteenth century.9 Supposedly, the small 
number of the latter operating there were restricted to merchants and officials residing 
in scattered and isolated Company factories and forts, hoping to make a quick fortune 
and return to their families and homes in Europe.10 Within such a scheme, the 
establishment of a colonial community, society or ‘space’ appeared unfeasible given the 
impermanent nature of the British presence.11 Such a theme has been recently 
contradicted by Emma Rothschild, who observed that, across the early modern world, 
‘empire was a family enterprise’.12 
This chapter will show the significant role family networks played in the world 
of the Company servant. Sir Josiah Child, chairman of the court of directors, revealed in 
1681 that those ‘living in any places within their Charter' in Asia comprised 'many 
hundred[s] of Families'.13 Company servants maintained connections with family and 
kin in Europe and depended significantly on the not inconsiderate number of members 
who went out with them to Asia. As well as reiterating existing connections, however, 
they also established new ones by integrating cross-cultural and interracial relationships 
into their own families. In doing so, they cast a web of networks across Asia which 
subverted, reconfigured and then broadened the official social, commercial and political 
boundaries of the East India Company. 
The first part of this chapter will seek to analyse the extent and importance of 
the familial world of Company servants, revealing the ways in which the latter not only 
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maintained ties with family members who remained in Europe, but sought to reiterate 
and strengthen them while in Asia. Furthermore, the families of Company servants 
transitioned in this period into ‘Company families’, creating new familial ties in Asia by 
integrating cross-cultural and interracial relationships into existing families, 
significantly expanding their social, cultural, commercial and political interests in the 
process. The second part of this chapter will argue that, from the early eighteenth 
century onwards, such families began to organise themselves into wider kinship 
networks. Maintained by the exchange, circulation and movement of goods, capital, 
information and people around a network of nodes and centres founded by various kin 
members, these kinship networks spread across Asia by the mid-eighteenth century, 
creating an increasingly interconnected colonial space in the process. The expansion of 
these networks of kin will then be analysed in the context of the emerging diamond 
trade between Asia and Europe. Their ability to marginalise the Company’s official 
trade and monopolise valuable commodities, as well as to create channels of 
international finance which operated outside of the Company’s official systems of 
capital, reveals how kinship networks were able to shape the nature of the emerging 
colonial space in Asia. By emphasising the extent to which families determined the 
actions, interests and motives of Company servants, this chapter will contrast the private 
world in which they operated with the visibly public one in which they are traditionally 
analysed and understood by historians. 
 
The Familial World of the Company Servant 
The hereditary dynamic of Company recruitment was a significant factor in the growth 
of its servants’ families throughout Asia. Those hoping to join the Company’s service or 
reside within its jurisdiction beyond the Cape of Good Hope required the use of familial 
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patronage.14 The Company itself privileged new servants from the families of existing 
servants, considering such recruitment as the most efficient vetting process available, 
one that would ensure trust, loyalty and usually experience amongst new servants.15 
When the court of directors considered the application of new factors in April 1697, it 
accepted that of Thomas Marshall’s as ‘his Father [is] an ancient Member of our Court’. 
Thomas Lovell also met success due to being the ‘Son to our Recorder’, as well as 
Trevor Games who was ‘related to Sir William Langhorne’, an ex-governor of 
Madras.16 This hereditary preference meant that most writers, factors and agents sent 
out to Asia were following or accompanying a father, uncle, cousin or brother.17 For 
instance, George Oxenden went out to Asia in the Company's service with his brother 
Christopher in the 1640s.18 When George returned in 1661 as governor of Bombay, he 
brought with him his nephew Henry Oxenden and his godson Streynsham Master, the 
future governor of Madras.19 
 Once Company servants arrived in the vastness of Asia, factors conspired not to 
dislocate families, but to bind them together. Company servants relied on the support 
and resources of family and kin in Asia for everything beyond what their meagre wages 
allowed.20 When Joseph and John Walsh were sent out to Asia through the patronage of 
their uncle, the Madras Councillor John Styleman, they relied on kin for even the most 
basic of sustenance. Joseph, who was stationed on the West Coast of Sumatra, was 
regularly forced to ask his aunt in Madras to send him parcels of 'things I wrote for', 
while his uncle supplied him with European articles such as 'the head of a cane', and 
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another sent him European shoes.21 John Wright spent so many years paying his son 
Thomas’s bills of exchange from Bombay, that he warned him in 1703 that the next bill 
he drew on him 'will bee the last mony you will evver receive from mee.'22 Beyond the 
basic necessities of food and clothing, Company servants also required an almost 
constant supply of credit and investment from family members if they were to embark 
on the trading ventures which would bring them financial success. When the supercargo 
Thomas Dixon lost his ship and all of his goods in a storm in the Bay of Bengal in 1718, 
he declared to his cousin John Scattergood that he was now ‘utterly Ruined and not 
worth one Rupe in the world’, requesting a substantial loan from him of three thousand 
pagodas to recover his losses.23 Such a dynamic of necessity reinforced ties of joint 
interest, obligation and trust between the families and kin of Company servants 
dispersed across Asia.24 
 That is not to suggest, however, that eventual financial independence, if it 
happened at all, loosened family ties. As siblings, sons, nephews and cousins were sent 
out to Asia in the service of the Company through the support of their families, they 
were expected to relieve the often impoverished circumstances of the latter if they met 
with success.25 For example, Joseph Collet’s family suffered financial ruin when he 
declared bankruptcy in 1710.26 In an attempt to retrieve the family's fortunes, he 
accepted the Company’s offer of the deputy-governorship of the West Coast of 
Sumatra. On arrival in Asia, Collet depended on the financial and material support of 
family members, such as his brother-in-law John Bedwell who furnished him with a 
regular supply of European articles including hats, leather shoes, vinegar, spectacles, 
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silk stockings and Virginian tobacco.27 But within two years, Collet’s political and 
commercial success meant that he was able to provide his family and kin with 
substantial allowances, dowries and pensions.28 For example, his four daughters enjoyed 
a considerable annual allowance of £400 each while his mother was paid a pension of 
£100 which he hoped would provide ‘a comfortable maintenance.'29 Besides cash 
remittances, Collet provided his son John with several thousand pounds worth of capital 
for his private trading ventures, and appointed his eldest brother as supercargo of one of 
his own ships.30 Collet revealed the underlying motives of his presence in Asia in a 
letter to Governor Harrison: 'The proffits of my Government...maintain my Family', he 
wrote in 1714.31  
 As Collet's financial intervention in the affairs of his family deepened, so too did 
his social involvement, creating ties, obligations and duties which bound his familial 
world closer together.32 When the deputy-governor first took up his post at Bencoolen 
in 1712, he informed his sister Ann Bedwell not to worry about taking 'care of my poor 
Girls', and that all they needed in life was 'Virtue and a good education'.33 As Collet 
allowed each of his four daughters large allowances and substantial dowries, he 
heightened his control over their affairs, arranging their education, marriage and private 
character. To his sister Ann he provided a strict set of guidelines on how his eldest 
daughter Elizabeth was to correspond with a potential suitor: ‘she ought to avoid both 
the distance of a Mistress and the fondness of a Lover’.34 To Elizabeth herself, he wrote 
a letter ‘enlarging on the instructions I have already given you for your conduct’, 
                                                 
27 BL, APAC, MSS Eur D1153/1, Joseph Collet to John Bedwell, Cape of Good Hope, 12 February 1712. 
28 For this dynamic in the Johnstone’s family, see Rothschild, Inner Life of Empires, p. 51. 
29 BL, APAC, MSS Eur D1153/3, Joseph Collet to Mary Collet, Fort Marlborough 8 September 1716; 
BL, APAC, MSS Eur D1153/2, Joseph Collet to Mary Collet, Fort Marlborough, 10 October 1715. 
30 BL, APAC, MSS Eur D1153/1, Joseph Collet to Edward Harrison, York Fort, 15 June 1714; BL, 
APAC, MSS Eur D1153/3, Joseph Collet to Ann Bedwell, Fort St. George, 13 July 1717. 
31 BL, APAC, MSS Eur D1153/2, Joseph Collet to Edward Harrison, York Fort, 2 June 1714. 
32 For this process in the Atlantic, see Pearsall, Atlantic Families. 
33 BL, APAC, MSS Eur D1153/2, Joseph Collet to Ann Bedwell, York Fort, 24 September 1712. 
34 Ibid., Joseph Collet to Ann Bedwell, York Fort, 5 May 1714. 
147 
ordering her to pursue the study of religion and ‘Domestick Life’ for ‘the improvement 
of your mind and the conduct of your Actions.’35 Collet’s attention to her conduct was 
frequent and all pervading, even intervening with how she should govern ‘a black boy’ 
named Bacchus which he had sent her: ‘Let him be taught to read, and make him know 
you will be obey’d.’36 Collet admitted to his sister the following year that the education 
of his daughters was now his most important concern.37 Also of particular concern was 
the reputation of his son, for whom he had secured a lucrative post at Madras directly 
under the governor. He lectured him on improving himself ‘in Writing and Accounts’, 
and warned him ‘to avoided women and alcohol, ‘the fatall rock on which so many 
Youths miscarry’.38 Not just the maintenance of his family connections, then, but their 
strengthening since his arrival in Asia was summed up by Collet in a letter to a friend in 
1715. ‘The int’rests’ of family, he wrote, ‘are so closely united…and distance of times 
or place ought to be no Obstruction’.39 In fact, it proved the catalyst for binding a 
Company servant’s familial world closer together.  
These families were not only strengthened by their engagement with Asia. They 
were also changed and reconfigured in fundamental ways. Although substantial 
numbers of British mercantile families were dissenters and foreign immigrants and were 
thus never entirely a culturally homogenous group, in Asia they nonetheless represented 
a racially cohesive community.40 However, the families of Company servants became 
‘Company families’, transitioning into amorphous sites of interracial and multicultural 
relationships. This enabled Company servants to straddle the various ethnic, linguistic, 
religious, economic and political worlds of which Asia was composed. The Powney 
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family represents the typically composite, polyglot and changing makeup of Company 
families during this period. The brothers Henry and John Powney were both employed 
on Company ships stationed at Madras, where they established households and raised 
families from 1703 onwards. John, for example, married Mary Heron, daughter of the 
Company’s master-mariner at Madras. Their seven sons and five daughters created a 
vast kinship group which established connections that crossed the boundaries of cultural 
and national affiliation, marrying an assortment of the settlement’s most influential 
British and non-British residents and their daughters, including a governor, a mayor, 
numerous councillors and the port’s most affluent merchants. For instance, Rebecca 
Powney married the Portuguese registrar of the Mayor’s Court, Noah Casamaijor, while 
Thomas Powney was married to Catherine de la Matrie, daughter of Antony Coyle De 
Barnaval, a Franco-Irish supercargo of Company ships trading between India and 
Manila.41 
 Blurring the lines of nationality and culture, Company families also incorporated 
significant multiracial elements as well. The legitimate and illegitimate unions between 
Company servants and Asian women produced a substantial number of Eurasian 
marriages and offspring.42 In this respect, servants of the English East India Company 
sought to mimic practices carried on by the servants of other European companies 
operating in Asia, such as the Portuguese Estado da India (State of the Indies) or the 
Dutch Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (United East Indies Company).43 Although 
marriage between Dutch officials and Javanese women at Batavia was officially 
acknowledged, the VOC sought to regulate such unions in order to limit the number of 
subsequent Eurasian families. Unofficially, however, ‘the overwhelming majority of 
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families’ living there were of this nature, even those of senior VOC officials.44 As early 
as the mid-seventeenth century, such practices had led to the formation of a ‘Mestizos 
society’, transforming Batavia into the centre of Dutch power in Asia.45 
Similarly, few of the Company’s elite families with which this chapter is 
concerned were purely European.46 On the West Coast of Sumatra, the incorporation of 
Eurasian members into Company families was the product of sexual, commercial and 
political opportunity.47 Company servants frequently sought to integrate Malay wives 
and children into their lives and promote them as legitimate family members. In 1713 
John Hunter was sent north up the West Coast of Sumatra to be chief of Bantal. He left 
behind him at the Company’s capital of Bencoolen a Malaysian daughter whom he 
valued so much that he would only entrust her to the care of the deputy-governor, 
Joseph Collet. ‘My little charge’, as Collet wrote of her frequently to her father at 
Bantal, was treated with the utmost consideration and concern. When she became 
‘Indispos’d with the worms’, she was attended by the doctor on a daily basis and cared 
for by a ‘wench’ named Jacinth ‘of whom the Child is very fond’.48 Similarly, in 1714, 
Joseph Collet arranged the courtship of his main trading partner and second-in-
command on the West Coast, Chief of Bantal Henry White, with his daughter 
Elizabeth.49 He facilitated the match at the same time as he cared for Henry White’s 
Malaysian daughter at Bencoolen. Although official correspondence between Company 
servants rarely revealed the existence of such children, subtle and often cryptic 
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references point to their presence, as when Collet informed White that ‘Our Female is 
like to pay you a Visit’ if Collet were to send her to Madras on board the President.50  
Collet’s need to bind his trading partner and successor to him through marriage 
necessitated the acceptance and integration of Malaysians into such an elite Company 
family. Not just Malaysians, significant numbers of African slaves brought to the West 
Coast from Madagascar were also incorporated into the dynamic of Company 
families.51 In 1714 the British resident of Silebar, a subordinate port which lay 
approximately one-hundred miles to the south of Bencoolen, brought with him on a visit 
to the latter his new son, ‘born last month of one of our Slaves…begot by himself’.52 As 
Collet personally discovered as deputy-governor, Company families could also integrate 
Asian political elites as well. No less than three Malay rajas sent him their wives or 
daughters as gifts ‘to attend me’, as Collet tactfully described to his brother. Although 
he rejected these offers on the grounds that ‘the Christian Religion does not allow such 
practices’, nonetheless the diplomatic custom was a long established one in which less 
religiously observant deputy-governors rarely refused to indulge.53 Such policies – 
although with a greater degree of success - had certainly driven the substantial growth 
of Eurasian families in the settlements of the Portuguese Estado da Indias.54 In Sumatra, 
Portuguese officials married Asian women in the hopes of forging alliances with 
political elites, while in South India they did so to break into local trade networks.55 
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Their success in integrating with Asian cultures since the sixteenth century prompted 
the servants of other European companies to consider the Portuguese there as topasez, 
an Asian people whose language was the lingua franca of Asia’s coastal regions.56 
Replicating the practices of other European company servants in Asia, these 
families acted as colonial sites of racial and cultural reconfiguration which allowed 
Company servants to integrate themselves into Asian societies and incorporate aspects 
of those societies into their own families. These processes created a web of global 
connections, both between Europe and Asia, but more importantly right across Asia 
itself as Company families spread out to new regions of trade, settlement and 
opportunity by the turn of the eighteenth century, usually within the Company’s 
jurisdiction, but often beyond it. 
 
Kinship, Exchange and the Formation of Networks in Asia 
The emergence of Company families was also facilitated by their organisation into 
global networks of exchange in the early eighteenth century. The circulation and 
movement of goods, capital and information between Company servants and their wider 
kinship group in Europe and Asia challenges the localised treatment of the Company in 
Asia, in which its various regions are considered as separate, with divergent political 
trajectories which were shaped by the Asian states in whose jurisdiction they resided.57 
Through their kinship networks, Company servants operated not just within local 
regional frameworks, but through an increasingly interconnected global community of 
Company families. 
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In the eighteenth century Atlantic world, networks of ‘associates’ contributed to 
the integration of an Atlantic community which facilitated British commercial, political 
and territorial expansion.58 Similarly, as argued by Eivind Seland, the spread of 
commercial networks in the Indian Ocean led to ‘a degree of social cohesion’ there as 
early as antiquity.59 Establishing social networks of a geographic, linguistic and 
religious nature, ‘circulation societies’ of Roman, Greek and Christian traders connected 
the vastness of the Indian Ocean and created the ‘infrastructure of trust’ between 
otherwise indifferent groups and communities.60 Early modern Asia was similarly far 
from a tabula rasa. European companies arriving in Asia from the sixteenth century 
onwards encountered pre-existing, complex and well-established networks of ports, 
communities and merchants.61 These networks had created commercially and culturally 
integrated regions in places such as the Bay of Bengal which lasted well into the 
eighteenth century and over which European companies often organised their own 
networks.62 Furthermore, these networks were established by Asian merchants through 
their families and wider kinship groups. Asian merchants formed themselves into 
‘endogamous guilds’ that represented ‘a cluster of families related by ties of marriage 
and kinship’: what Tirthankar Roy has conceptualised as the ‘collective’.63 As they 
spread out across Asia, vast networks were sustained by these ‘collectives’ of families 
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and their interests.64 At first, the English Company and its servants delegated 
responsibility for managing their interests to elite Asian kinship networks.65 By the later 
seventeenth century, however, Company servants had begun to develop their own 
extensive kinship networks to both compete with and eventually dominate those of their 
Asian and European rivals.66 
With the growth of Company families in Asia in the later seventeenth century, 
networks became an increasingly important dynamic of colonial expansion. In contrast 
to Europe, the amplified factor of time and distance separating members of Company 
families and their kin in Asia changed the pattern of interaction between them.67 Along 
with the obvious obstacles involved in maintaining family ties between Europe and 
Asia, those even between Bombay and Madras proved just as challenging. As Sir Josiah 
Child explained, it was 'much more difficult to maintain a Correspondence by Letters in 
India from Port to Port; by reason of the set Monsons or Trade-winds, that blow six 
moneths together one way.'68 Thus in Asia, Company families were forced to live, 
interact and communicate across various disparate coastal enclaves and maritime 
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spaces.69 The result of such a spatially fragmented existence was the creation of global 
networks of exchange, circulation and movement.70 
According to Kerry Ward, such factors ensured that the colonial state in Asia 
was ‘comprised of an intersecting set of networks’, of both a temporal and spatial 
nature.71 This was certainly true of the Dutch VOC, which consisted of multiple 
material and discursive networks which ‘exist simultaneously as paths of circulation for 
people, goods, and information’.72 It was also a dynamic which defined the shape of 
networks established by those cultural diaspora groups who operated outside, or across, 
the many European chartered companies. For example, the network of Armenian 
families in Asia was sustained ‘through the circulation of men, capital, information, 
priests and women’.73 The global expansion of English Company families as described 
earlier developed along a similar pattern to those of Dutch or Armenian families: the 
establishment of networks of exchange, circulation and movement which integrated 
scattered kin members into a wider global community. The reconstruction of one such 
Company kinship network reveals the process through which this was achieved.  
John Scattergood, a free merchant stationed at Madras at the turn of the 
eighteenth century, belonged to an extensive kinship network which had established 
itself across Asia, stretching from Bombay to Canton. In 1681, John was born into a 
small family with few connections beyond the insignificant settlement of Balasore on 
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the Bay of Bengal where his father was third of council in the Company's service.74 
When the latter died shortly after John’s birth, his mother married Robert Trenchfield, 
the brother of another Balasore councillor. The Trenchfields were a large family with 
members and interests spread throughout the Bay of Bengal. After his mother’s new 
marriage bore John two half-sisters and two half-brothers, the family relocated to 
Madras so that Richard Trenchfield could more effectively coordinate his family’s 
trading concerns.75 By the time John Scattergood was old enough to enter the 
Company's service in 1698, his family had expanded to include numerous kin from both 
the Scattergoods and Trenchfields, including several aunts, uncles and at least a dozen 
cousins, all of whom played a role in John's day-to-day life or possessed active 
connections to the family at Madras.76 These kin had established themselves in most of 
Asia’s main ports and along its maritime highways by the time of John's death in 1723. 
 The exchange and circulation of goods, capital, information and people across 
and around John Scattergood's kinship network maintained relationships between 
members and bound together the various nodes from which members operated. John 
Scattergood’s receipt of a letter at Madras in 1715 from his brother Elihu Trenchfield at 
Calcutta, discussing the arrival in Asia of their younger brother Jack Trenchfield, is 
typical of the dynamic of Company kinship networks in Asia. 'When my brother Jack 
arrived, he delivered me six hundred Madrass rupees on Account of your Daughter 
Carolina,' wrote Elihu, 'which according to your desire have interested in my private 
Adventure this Voyage'.77 Jack Trenchfield had arrived in Asia from Europe to trade in 
partnership with his brothers, bringing capital from family in Lincoln to invest in their 
Asian commercial enterprises. As a free merchant operating between places as 
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geographically diverse as Persia and China, Elihu offered family members opportunities 
for employment and financial gain, whilst they, moving between Europe and Asia, and, 
more importantly, around Asia itself, provided both a source of family capital to invest 
in his voyages and a connection to other nodes of their kinship network. In the same 
letter, Elihu, occupied in Bengal, pleaded with his brother John at Madras to acquaint 
him with 'all news, foreign and Domestic, especially in the last of Our own family', and 
to send him 'all the News Papers and pamphlets you think worth my reading.'78 
Company kinship networks were indispensable to commercial, political and social 
transactions in Asia through their ability to acquire and circulate information, 
communication and knowledge ‘within the Compass of our own family’, as Arabella 
Scattergood’s brother in law declared in 1703, to members operating in the disparate 
regions of Asia.79 
 The commercial relationship between John Scattergood and his cousin Bernard 
Wyche was an important link in the trade carried on by their wider kinship network at 
that time. As chief of Surat, Wyche employed his younger brother George and his 
cousin John Scattergood as supercargoes on the ships trading from Surat to the port of 
Amity in China, a lucrative and privileged appointment.80 Wyche was also instrumental 
in protecting John Scattergood's interests further down the coast in Malabar, where he 
engaged in joint ventures with their cousin Charles Burniston. The importance of the 
Wyche connection within the kinship network was considerable and John Scattergood 
was aware of the need to reinforce and strengthen the link on a continuous basis. One 
way in which this was achieved was by extending hospitality to Bernard Wyche's 
family. For example, in 1714 John and Arabella Scattergood invited the Wyche children 
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to stay with them at Madras, extending the invitation to the family of William Phipps as 
well, John Scattergood’s cousin and a member of Wyche’s council at Surat.81 Other 
relationships were also strengthened in this way, and periodically members from 
Bombay and Surat went to stay with the Scattergoods at Madras, including Carolina, the 
daughter of Charles Burniston, deputy-governor of Bombay, and John, the son of 
William Aislabie, governor of Bombay. The connections which maintained Company 
kinship networks were consolidated by such circulation of family members across the 
network to the diverse regions of Asia. 
 It is important to note, however, that Company servants were not always 
successful in maintaining kinship networks through circulation and exchange. Indeed, 
an exploration of Scottish networks in the Madeira wine trade in the eighteenth century 
by David Hancock - also familial in organisation - has shown that their private nature 
made them more resource-intensive to maintain as well as more fragile in the face of 
personal conflicts between members.82 Company kinship networks in Asia were 
similarly susceptible to challenges and, often, outright failure.83 Many factors conspired 
to reduce them in size, extent and importance, all of which meant that the mutual 
benefits derived by kin members from their participation could dry up. The removal of a 
family member from an advantageous post, for example, might impair the effectiveness 
of an entire centre of network nodes. When John Scattergood's accommodating and 
generous cousin William Aislabie retired from his position as governor of Bombay in 
1715, a position from which he had facilitated the commercial and political aspirations 
of the network, he was replaced by Charles Boone. Despite having been an old trading 
partner of John Scattergood's, Boone proved less amenable than his predecessor. Things 
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started off well enough, with Elihu Trenchfield reporting that he found the governor to 
be ‘a very generous friend’ and ‘very assisting in the disposal of our Cargoe.'84 But 
without the ties of kinship to bind them to the new governor, the network found its 
influence at Bombay reduced by 1719 and the governor's attention to their affairs 
diminished. 'I wrote him about it', John Scattergood complained to his brother, 'but 
believe shall not get much Justice from him.'85  
 To survive and to provide opportunities and greater cohesion for its members, 
constant expansion of a kinship network was therefore vital. This can be perceived in 
the transition of Edward Fenwick from business associate to intimate member of John 
Scattergood’s kinship network. Fenwick, supercargo of the Pembroke since 1703, had 
long been a friend and trading partner of John’s.86 Describing him to family members in 
1713 as ‘my old friend’, John integrated Fenwick into his kinship network initially by 
using him to deliver gifts and goods to family members in Lincoln, including a parcel of 
Indian tea for his sisters, six Chinese fans for his aunts, a gold snuff box and an image 
of himself for his mother.87 During these visits to England, Fenwick stayed with the 
Trenchfields and wrote to John in 1716 of 'enjoying the Company and Conversation of 
the best Mother and Sisters that ever Man had'.88 At this point, Fenwick began a 
courtship with John’s eldest sister Elizabeth Trenchfield, which was encouraged by her 
brothers.89 Due to Fenwick’s position as supercargo of the Marlborough on the lucrative 
trading routes to China, Elihu regarded him as ‘one that I should sooner choose to be 
allied to.’ Jack similarly agreed to ‘the Match’ and signalled his approval by appointing 
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Fenwick as his attorney, trusting him with the management of his financial affairs in 
Asia.90 Such encouragement ensured that Fenwick and Elizabeth were married in 1717 
when he returned from Asia.91 From then on, John Scattergood addressed him as ‘Dear 
Brother Fenwick’, appointed him as his attorney, and declared that 'the tyes of old 
Friendship as well as that of a relation' would strengthen the bond between them.92  
 Such processes of expansion meant that John Scattergood’s kinship network was 
the largest of its kind in the first two decades of the eighteenth century. At its height, the 
network operated right across Asia and organised the Company's largest private 
commercial transactions. For example, in 1714 John Scattergood conducted a voyage to 
China as supercargo of the Amity. He coordinated investment from all of the network's 
nodes in Asia, and of the 179,800 rupees eventually subscribed to the voyage, 40% of 
the investment came from members of the network, with John and his cousins William 
Aislabie and Bernard Wyche committing the largest sums.93 These families - the 
Scattergoods, Aislabies and Wyches - were the most prominent nodes within the 
network. The Scattergoods were based at Madras, where John operated as a captain and 
supercargo of Company ships since 1698 and remained there, with a brief return to 
Britain, until his death in 1723. Through John's marriage to Arabella Forbes in 1707, the 
Scattergood-Trenchfield families formed links with her kin in Bombay, consisting of 
the Burnistons and Aislabies.94 They were both distinguished families, with Samuel and 
John Burniston having each served as deputy-governors of Bombay, while William 
Aislabie served as governor from 1708-1715. Kin also occupied important positions 
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further up the coast at the port of Surat where the Wyches lived. One of these, Bernard 
Wyche, held the senior post of chief of Surat, with his brother George acting as 
supercargo on ships trading to China. While the Scattergoods, Burnistons, Aislabies and 
Wyches each operated from the networks terrestrial nodes, the Trenchfields existed in 
the oceanic spaces between, acting as captains and supercargoes. They travelled along 
Asia’s maritime routes which served to connect the various families together, and these 
families to other parts of Asia. Jack and Elihu Trenchfield for example made regular 
trading voyages to places such as Tellicherry on the Malabar Coast, Mocha in the 
Persian Gulf and Canton in China. 
 The families mentioned above formed the most important nodes of the kinship 
network, in terms of being the most numerous and the most distinguished. A number of 
lesser family branches lived and operated alongside them, however: the Phipps in 
Bombay, where William Phipps lived with his wife and two children, first as member of 
council and then as governor from 1722; a pair of brothers such as Thomas and 
Christopher Dixon in Bengal; even a single relation such as 'my Cozen Thomas Pain' 
who accompanied Elihu and Jack as they traded across Asia.95 Regardless of their 
collective size or individual distinction, these families formed a network of mutually 
beneficial exchange and shared interest, maintained by the strengthening of family ties 
and the expansion of its member base across Asia by the second decade of the 
eighteenth century.  
 
Private Trade and the Re-creation of the Bay of Bengal 
The expansion of Company kinship networks across Asia in the early eighteenth 
century gradually integrated the Company’s disparate political jurisdictions and 
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commercial systems into more coherent colonial spaces. Such a process was 
accomplished through the establishment of new trading routes, as well as shaping 
existing commercial markets and merging regional economies together. The private 
trade conducted by Company servants in Asia has been ascribed as one of the leading 
contributory factors to the Company's eventual political success there in the eighteenth 
century, relative to the other European companies.96 During the first half of the century, 
the private trade of its servants was the Company's most dynamic sector, growing at a 
far greater rate than official trade.97 In pursuit of their own commercial interests, 
Company kinship networks operated the breadth of Asia, penetrating far beyond the 
jurisdictional and territorial boundaries of the Company itself, drawing the latter ever 
deeper into Asian states, economies and societies.  
Private trade, or ‘country trade’, has traditionally been understood as 
conditioned by uniquely Asian factors such as indigenous networks of credit or the 
cooperation of Asian business agents such as banyans. Supposedly, it was this 'Age of 
Partnership' which allowed European private trade to expand and thus for the Company 
to become more entrenched in regional economies and, by extension, regional states.98 
However, as will be shown, Company kinship networks laid the foundation for British 
private trade and in turn led to the re-shaping of European commerce in Asia in the 
eighteenth century. Wider kinship networks provided Company servants with the social 
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capital and financial resources through which private trade could become established 
and expand. More importantly, this process acted as a cohesive force in binding the 
various territorial regions of the Company together. Without such familial links, the 
Company’s control of certain factories, ports and coasts, such as those on the West 
Coast of Sumatra, would have been severely weakened, and its territorial integrity 
undermined. 
 As part one of the thesis demonstrated, East India House’s efforts to bring the 
West Coast of Sumatra more firmly into a centralised state since the beginning of the 
eighteenth century had met with consistent failure. The emergence of private regimes of 
governance, such as that of Joseph Collet, ensured that the West Coast remained 
resistant to public forms of state building. But that does not help to explain why, if it 
proved so recalcitrant and disobedient to central forms of authority, East India House 
retained the West Coast settlements. It was certainly not for pecuniary purposes, 
because the settlements never turned a profit, as chapter two showed. The reasons may 
have been strategic, both to prevent the Dutch from acquiring possession of the West 
Coast and to ensure the Company retained bases east of the Indian subcontinent.99 
However, if the West Coast was perceived by East India House as only a strategic base, 
they would not have been so persistent in attempting to minimise its military resources 
and capabilities.100 Moreover, the military infrastructure was never developed to make 
the West Coast a strategic base. As the court of directors observed of Fort Marlborough, 
‘if it may be called a Fort’, its defences were so insignificant that it really had ‘no 
Fortifications’ at all.101 
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 The explanation for the continued settlement of the West Coast lies in the 
private commercial interests of Company kinship networks. It prevented a withdrawal 
from the West Coast by integrating settlements into a wider Bay of Bengal trading 
system. The Company’s official trade was unable to create such consolidation. The 
Company had relied overwhelmingly on the export of silver to Asia in order to make its 
investments in goods.102 This was also the case with the West Coast, where the 
Company despatched silver bullion every year from London to be exchanged at 
Bencoolen for pepper and, to a lesser extent, saltpetre and redwood.103 This was most 
notable in the early eighteenth century. The War of Spanish Succession in Europe led to 
attacks on Company shipping which fatally disrupted the flow of specie to Asia and, in 
particular, to the West Coast of Sumatra.104 This meant that, by the time peace had been 
concluded in 1714, commerce had all but ceased there: pepper plantations had shrunk 
and markets had disappeared.105 This specie famine stalked the West Coast for some 
years to come. Deputy-Governor Joseph Collet lamented to the court of directors that 
unless more silver was despatched to Bencoolen, 'all will run to ruin'.106 The situation 
became so acute that East India House considered withdrawing from the West Coast 
altogether in 1717.107 The destruction of Bencoolen shortly after seemed like an obvious 
and convenient moment to do just that. But within two years Bencoolen was being 
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resettled and the Company’s establishment continued well into the nineteenth 
century.108 
 Despite being politically and commercially invaluable and even outright 
subversive of East India House’s wider state building efforts, the West Coast of 
Sumatra remained an important part of the Company’s presence in Asia. In many 
respects, this demonstrates the way in which private interests determined the 
development and shape of the colonial polity, even in the teeth of opposition from the 
court of directors. In the early eighteenth century, Company kinship networks stepped 
into the commercial vacuum created by the disruption of the War of Spanish 
Succession. In doing so, they reconfigured Sumatra’s role in the Company’s Asian 
trade, diverting much of the pecuniary benefit to themselves while simultaneously 
building strong commercial, social and political links between the West Coast and the 
Coromandel Coast. This process made it virtually impossible for East India House to 
separate the regions politically by withdrawing from Sumatra. 
 The arrival of the brothers John and Joseph Walsh to Asia in the Company's 
service in 1715 was the beginning of a kinship network that continued to operate there 
well into the nineteenth century. The network was built and expanded through 
participation in private trade between the Coromandel Coast and the island of Sumatra. 
The Walsh family had served the Company since at least the mid-seventeenth century, 
and since then sons had followed fathers into the accounts department at East India 
House in London.109 However, the wider kinship group of which the Walsh family was 
a part, including the prominent Styleman merchants of London, drew younger members 
of the family away from their apprenticeships in the metropole and out into the 
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Company's settlements in Asia where they were advanced through familial patrons in 
senior positions at places such as Madras.110 By the time of John and Joseph Walsh's 
arrival in 1715, their kinship group had been entrenched in Asia for many decades. 
However, with the participation of John and Joseph Walsh at Madras on the 
Coromandel Coast and Bencoolen on the West Coast of Sumatra respectively, their 
kinship group became an expansive network with ambitious private trading interests 
which helped bind the economies of both coasts together. 
Joseph Walsh arrived at Bencoolen in the senior post of factor, thanks to the 
patronage of his uncle John Styleman, previously a councillor at Madras and now a 
director at East India House.111 Joseph joined the West Coast establishment in the final 
months of Joseph Collet’s deputy-governorship, and experienced the turbulent years 
which followed. Wracked by Collet’s northern wars, desolated by famine and embroiled 
in political turmoil, the West Coast presented an eerie spectacle.112 The scarcity of silver 
in the Bencoolen treasury was still making trade difficult. In 1712, Collet had brought 
with him almost 40,000 silver dollars in the hope of jump-starting the economy.113 But 
despite impressive pepper investments in the first eighteen months of his administration, 
much of this specie was then exhausted through Collet’s patriarchal subjugation of 
Anak Sungai in the north.114 To cope with the interruption in the flow of silver to the 
West Coast, the Company was initially forced to rely on copper cash to continue 
purchasing pepper. This policy, however, proved disastrous. Since the beginning of the 
pepper trade, the Malay prized silver above any other European commodity for the 
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exchange of their pepper.115 In particular, Malay women, who were the prime 
cultivators of the pepper vine, spent much of their crop on acquiring silver ornaments, 
jewellery and specie. In the 1670s, Malay children living in the highlands of West 
Sumatra could be found wearing expensive silver chains around their necks.116  
The introduction of copper as the Company’s currency for pepper was thus 
widely resented, from the lowest pepper farmer to the most prominent raja. Pepper 
merchants either refused to accept this coinage, demanded higher prices for their crops 
or stopped sending pepper downriver to the Company’s settlements altogether. 
Company servants resorted to forcefully extracting pepper from merchants, a tactic 
which often met with threats by the Malay to sink their own boats and thus destroy the 
only form of transport which could ship the pepper down from the highlands. More 
practically, they also raised high interest loans from the Malay to sustain pepper 
purchases.117 By 1710, however, such measures could not be sustained, and the 
Company’s traditional markets on the West Coast began to disappear. With the aid of 
his treasure chests of silver, Collet attempted to reverse the Company’s reliance on 
copper, removing it from circulation by purchasing it back with silver. But he was 
repeatedly forced to extend the deadline for the Malay to bring their stockpiles in, and 
was of the opinion that much of it would have to remain in circulation, especially so 
after his own supplies of silver were exhausted.118 As late as 1720, the secretary noted 
that instead of silver plate, the treasure chests at Bencoolen ‘proved to be most of them 
full of nothing but copper cash’.119 
 While the Bencoolen treasury remained devoid of silver, and its warehouses and 
godowns sat empty of pepper, Company servants stepped in to fill the void in a private 
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capacity. From 1709 onwards, those stationed across the West Coast began to turn to 
their kinship networks to supply the shrunken Sumatran markets with the capital and 
goods it demanded.120 In doing so, they not only revived the economy of the West 
Coast, but permanently reshaped it, changing the dynamics of commercial exchange and 
integrating it into a wider colonial trading system based upon the Bay of Bengal.121 
Traditionally, the pattern of the Company’s public trade with the West Coast consisted 
of East India House exporting silver to Bencoolen, who in return shipped pepper 
directly back to London. The intervention of Company kinship networks in the pepper 
trade of the West Coast dramatically changed this. Company servants on the West Coast 
began to pay for pepper in kind with textiles imported from their kin on the Coromandel 
Coast, principally at Madras. They in turn sent pepper back to their kin at Madras, who 
eventually shipped it to family in Britain for sale.122 Even after the flow of silver specie 
from Europe recommenced, this triangular pattern of trade remained the model even for 
the Company’s public trade, turning Madras into the main entrepot for pepper exports 
to Europe, reducing the demand for specie on the West Coast and creating a new market 
for the textiles of the Coromandel Coast.123 
 Joseph Walsh was one of the many Company servants on the West Coast of 
Sumatra who replaced, and then refashioned, the Company’s public trade with his 
kinship network’s own private commercial interests. In 1717, the same year that East 
India House considered abandoning the West Coast, Joseph received his first 
consignment of goods from his brother John, stationed at Madras as a factor. This 
consisted of an assortment of textiles from the Coromandel Coast, including a bale of 
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cheap fine cloth known as sannoes, as well as more luxurious ‘Pullicat’ stockings.124 
Joseph either directly exchanged these textiles for pepper with the Malay merchants, or, 
more lucratively, sold them on to the Company at a higher price, who then bartered 
them for much-needed pepper. Although the cargo fetched a reasonable profit of two-
hundred dollars for the brothers, Joseph wrote to John the following year that he was 
‘sorry not to have got you more for your Sannoes’.125 Nonetheless, their private trade 
between the Coromandel and West Coasts grew rapidly. Joseph widened his investment 
portfolio by sending back to his brother luxurious goods found on the West Coast of 
Sumatra other than pepper. These included elephant’s teeth and ‘benjamin’, otherwise 
known as benzoin resin, a precious tree bark used in incense and particularly prized by 
the Indians of the Coromandel Coast for its importance in religious ceremonies.126 
 As the extent of the Walsh brothers’ trade grew, so did the involvement of their 
kinship network. From 1718 onwards, their uncles John and Anthony Williams, both 
free merchants stationed at Madras, participated in and facilitated the private trade of 
their nephews between the Coromandel and West Coasts. As captains of their own 
ships, they were in a convenient position to transport the network’s goods and capital to 
and fro. Joseph considered his uncle Richard indispensable in their trading activities. He 
wrote to Richard, his ‘most affection[ate] Kinsman’, hoping that his conduct would ‘not 
render me less acceptable to yourself’, and requested his uncle to ‘look on me with a 
gracious Eye, and assist me with your endeavours’.127 By 1719, the kinship network’s 
joint trading account, being the total amount each member invested in goods or 
provided as capital, stood at the substantial sum of 8,000 dollars. The success of his 
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family’s private commercial trade route across the Bay of Bengal in these years 
transformed Joseph’s own situation, describing to his brother John that ‘I am now 
settled in a good handsome way of living’.128 Unfortunately for Joseph, and his whole 
kinship network, disaster loomed on the horizon. 
 On 23 March 1719, great billows of smoke arose in the air five miles from 
Bencoolen. Unknown to the Company servants going about their business in Fort 
Marlborough, ‘a General combination of Malays’ had marched on the town, setting fire 
to the Company’s houses and plantations as they went. Caught by surprise, the Deputy-
Governor Thomas Cooke mustered a small body of the garrison’s Malay soldiers to 
engage the invaders, but much of this army quickly melted away through desertion. The 
next day, as the council decided the best course of action, Fort Marlborough’s magazine 
exploded, most likely through treachery, setting the rest of the settlement ablaze. A 
panic gripped the Company servants, their slaves, and those Malay who remained loyal, 
and soon enough a headlong flight to the shore ensued. The advancing Malay force was 
quick to capitalise on the confusion and pursued the Company’s refugees to the surf, 
killing at least fifty people. Joseph Walsh himself was almost killed when he fell 
behind, but an African slave saved him and carried him to the waiting Masulipatnam 
which had arrived on the Coast just in time to carry off the survivors.  
For six hours Joseph Walsh anchored off shore with his remaining colleagues, 
watching as Fort Marlborough as it burnt to the ground. ‘I am involv’d in so unhappy a 
condition by my losses now’, he lamented to his uncle Richard Williams, once he had 
finally reached Madras in July, ‘being left without one farthing to help myself.’129 It 
appears that much of the network’s joint account was lost in the destruction of 
Bencoolen, being, at that time, predominantly tied up in goods awaiting shipment to 
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Madras.130 ‘Whether I shall retrieve these losses I know not’, he melancholically 
concluded to his uncle.131 To his brother John, Joseph wrote of the ‘inconsistent state of 
Fortune’s Empire’, in which he had been brought ‘from the highest prospect of 
Prosperity and success’ to the ‘lowest ebb of poverty and want’.132 But the destruction 
of Bencoolen was also ruinous to many other Company servants and their networks who 
too had done much to lay the foundation of a new Bay of Bengal trading system based 
upon the Coromandel and West Coasts. Indeed, the urgent need to re-establish the 
private commercial interests of Company kinship networks and retrieve their lost 
fortunes was the primary reason that, barely three months later, an expedition was 
launched by Madras to resettle Bencoolen. 'The Godfrey is now bound to Moco Moco 
and I have rec'd orders to proceed on her with one covenent'd serv't more, an Ensign & 
some military for that place', Joseph wrote to John in August, 'wch if in being I am to 
remain there 2nd [of council]; if not shall trade down the Coast; either of which tis 
hop'd will be to my advantage'.133 In fact, when the Godfrey reached the West Coast of 
Sumatra in 1720, Joseph was made chief of Moco Moco, the temporary capital of the 
West Coast establishment, and charged with resettling Bencoolen and reviving its trade 
and relations with the surrounding Malay.134 
Madras justified the decision to return to the West Coast as one which would 
serve the Company’s public interest. ‘Fearing that we may render ourselves liable to 
Censure from our Honble Masters’, declared the governor and his council in April 1720, 
‘should we not embrace this fair Opportunity of resetling Fort Marlbro & thereby 
prevent the greatest branch of our pepper trade from falling into ye  hands of the 
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Dutch’.135 But the speed with which Madras sought to re-establish the Company’s 
presence on the West Coast of Sumatra betrays the growing importance the Bay of 
Bengal’s private political economy had for servants there, and in which Sumatra had 
played such a pivotal role since the involvement of private kinship networks. Of course, 
an integrated Bay of Bengal trading system had already existed for centuries, one based 
upon intense commercial exchange between India and Sumatra through the activities of 
Muslim traders.136 But the participation of Company kinship networks reshaped trade in 
the Bay in a number of fundamental ways. For instance, previously non-existent 
colonial ports such as Madras rose to dominance, eclipsing traditional Asian ports such 
as Masulipatnam further to the north, causing a physical shift in the geography of 
important trade routes. Certain staple trading commodities gained new value and 
distinction in new markets, such as the importance of pepper re-exports from Madras 
and Sumatra’s value as a new market for textiles. Furthermore, the trade of Company 
kinship networks grew at the expense of Asian traders, and the dhow which had 
ploughed the Bay of Bengal for centuries was forced to compete with larger and heavier 
European shipping.137 More importantly, by deepening the integration of the economies 
and markets of both Coasts, Company kinship networks ensured that neither region 
could become politically independent of one another. Indeed, the court of directors had 
no knowledge of the destruction of Bencoolen until early 1721, by which time Joseph 
Walsh and his colleagues had already presented them with a fait accompli by arriving 
back on the West Coast, thus preventing East India House from taking advantage of the 
situation to withdraw from Sumatra altogether.138 
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The return to Bencoolen by Company servants long before East India House had 
any knowledge of events there, aptly demonstrates the way in which the commercial 
agency of Company servants in Asia determined the shape of emerging colonial 
systems of trade. Such a process provided the Company’s presence with a territorial and 
political cohesion which stood in stark contrast to the fractured and disintegrating public 
interests which had previously bound together the Company’s settlements along the 
littoral of the Bay of Bengal. Under Isaac Pyke, the first deputy-governor of the West 
Coast after Bencoolen’s destruction, the dominance of Company kinship networks in 
Sumatra’s trade was uncontested. For when the Company’s annual ships arrived at 
Bencoolen from London in 1721 expecting to load their hulls with pepper, they 
discovered that Deputy-Governor Pyke had already shipped the entire pepper crop off 
the Coast in his own vessel, the Perry.139 Inevitably, far from perceiving the 
resettlement of Bencoolen as advantageous for the Company, East India House resented 
both the temerity of their servants in acting without their permission, as well as the 
monopolisation of trade which the control of Sumatra provided for their servants in the 
Bay of Bengal.  
East India House responded to the fait accompli by attempting to exert the 
Company’s public interests over the private agency of their servants in Asia. In 1723 
they again declared that they ‘must be forced to quit Settlements which hitherto have 
never answer’d Our Charge’.140 More than that, by maintaining the West Coast, ‘the 
Company have been yearly very great sufferers, and lost a Prodigious Sum of Mony’.141 
However, after ‘frequent discourse’, they opted instead to regain control of Sumatra 
from their servants, as opposed to withdrawing altogether.142 To that end, they 
                                                 





despatched a supervisor from London who possessed ‘Our Power and Authority’ to 
contain the agency of their servants and thus to ‘prevent the like Evils in future’.143 The 
commission given to Supervisor James Macrae was sweeping, and was read out to all 
Company servants once he had arrived at Bencoolen in 1724, directing them ‘to yield 
due obedience’ to Macrae so that he could establish ‘proper Rules and Restrictions for 
the future Regulating the Conduct of the Chief or Deputy Governour and Council and 
all their subordinates.’144 The Company’s public interest was to be established as the 
primary concern of Company servants on the West Coast, and it was clearly defined by 
Macrae as the need to ensure that all servants and subjects concerned themselves only 
with acquiring pepper and ensuring new vines were planted every year.145  
East India House made it clear to Supervisor Macrae that private trade was the 
main malady on the West Coast. 'This gives us occasion to tell you', the directors 
informed him upon his appointment as supervisor, 'That it is very evidence Our People 
at Fort St. George are privately concern'd with those on the West Coast in this sort of 
Trade'.146 The directors intended to deprive Company kinship networks of their ability 
to monopolise trade in the Bay of Bengal by reversing this form of commercial 
exchange in which their servants held the advantage. Upon his arrival at Bencoolen, 
Macrae declared an embargo on private trade between the Coromandel and West 
Coasts. The court of directors confirmed this in a letter to the new deputy-governor, 
Joseph Walsh: 'We have strictly forbid Fort St. George...supplying you with any Goods 
but what shall be solely for our account'.147 East India House had rightly judged ‘that by 
paying away Callicoes and other Indian Goods to the natives,’ their servants on the 
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West Coast had made them ‘sufferers’.148 But Macrae’s departure just six months after 
arriving at Bencoolen deprived the directors with the means of effectively implementing 
this embargo, and in the following year they were forced to lift it.149 
The attempt by metropolitan authorities to overcome the private agency of 
servants operating in Asia had failed. Although Macrae succeeded in firing corrupt 
servants, reducing expenses, promoting the pepper trade and reforming the government, 
his supervision of the West Coast was effective only so long as he himself remained 
present there to oversee affairs.150 The moment he set sail, the entire framework he had 
put in place to ensure adherence to the public interest was pulled down, and the private 
trade of Company kinship networks once again resurged. In 1723, Joseph Walsh was 
appointed deputy-governor through the influence of his wife’s relations at East India 
House.151 When Supervisor Macrae arrived, he curtailed Joseph’s privileges as deputy-
governor, such as the number of slaves he was allowed, and exposed a series of abuses 
he had committed, such as claiming more ‘diet’ allowance than he was entitled to.152 
Macrae’s presence at Bencoolen, as Joseph himself later admitted, prevented him or 
anyone else from undertaking private trade.153 But when the supervisor departed, Joseph 
quickly re-established the monopoly of Company kinship networks over trade between 
the Coromandel and West Coasts, placing his own within a dominant position. Eager to 
recover his losses and that of his own kin from the destruction of Bencoolen, he 
exploited his authority as deputy-governor to gain access to the fort’s treasury, using 
two chests of the Company's own silver to purchase licenses for opium, arrack and salt, 
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the goods of which were all exported by his network for sale at Madras.154 
Understandably, the size of the family’s trade rapidly eclipsed its previous quantity, 
becoming so engrossing that the governor of Madras himself reminded Joseph that 
monopolising all trade was ‘directly contrary to the Establish'd Laws of the 
Company'.155 Despite this warning, the trade of Joseph’s kinship network in the Bay of 
Bengal continued to grow, often in an aggressive and competitive manner.  
Joseph's brother John was now captain of the Company's ship Sarah Galley, 
based in Bengal, and thus in a position to widen the interests of their private trade.156 
And although both their uncles, Richard and Anthony Williams, died in 1725, the 
Walsh kinship network expanded to include the relations of Joseph’s new wife, 
Elizabeth Maskelyne, some of whom he appointed to positions at Fort Marlborough.157 
Shipments to Madras grew in size and value, such as the consignment sent in 1725 on-
board the deputy-governor’s private vessel, the Goshawke, which carried merchandize 
worth 16,000 dollars.158 'I thank God my fortune is really considerably encreas'd since I 
left Madrass,' Joseph wrote to his brother John the following year, 'and I have more 
mony due to me here than I owe there, besides the vast stock of Goods on hand.'159 
Unfortunately for his kinship network, Joseph's embezzlement of Company funds in an 
effort to create a monopoly for the family over private trade in the Bay of Bengal was 
eventually exposed. According to one of his subordinates at Bencoolen, the discovery 
'Ruined Mr. Walsh and his Family'.160  
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Even as the Walsh kinship network suffered another major setback, other 
families stepped in to assume control of the lucrative private trading routes between the 
two Coasts. One of these was the network of James Macrae, who had previously been 
despatched by East India House as supervisor to end the very trade he now openly 
indulged in. His reward for supposedly doing so was the governorship of Madras, in 
which capacity Macrae had uncovered the frauds of Joseph Walsh, dismissing him from 
the Company's service.161 Once this had been accomplished, the governor and his 
brother stepped in to maintain their own monopoly over private trade in the Bay. 'The 
old toad', Joseph Walsh wrote of Macrae in 1729, 'has his Brother for Capital and sole 
Super Cargo’, and no other servant could ‘carry a farthing but by his permission.'162 
Joseph Walsh lacked the political authority to compete with the Macraes.163 Although 
he was eventually accepted back in to the Company’s service, it was only in a 
subordinate capacity. As a result, the Walsh kinship network was gradually forced out 
of the lucrative textile-pepper trade between the Coromandel and West Coasts, and left 
to focus on the more traditional and less profitable sale of silver sent to him by family 
members in Britain.164 Rather, the truth was that far more successful kinship networks 
were able to monopolise and control the political economy of the Bay of Bengal, and 
therefore enjoy its profits. 
By the early eighteenth century, Company kinship networks had succeeded in 
laying the foundations of an increasingly politically and territorially integrated colonial 
space in Asia. East India house had contemplated withdrawing from Sumatra altogether 
due to the weakness of the Company’s public interest there at the beginning of the 
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century. However, the commercial integration of the West Coast with the Coromandel 
Coast through Company kinship networks allowed both regions to pursue and maintain 
political interdependence with one another, providing the Bay of Bengal with a much 
greater scale of political cohesion. 
 
Conclusion 
The first part of this thesis showed how the autonomous agency of Company servants 
served to undermine and decentre the Company’s attempt to build a state in Asia, one 
that aimed to promote the public interest above all else. From this failure, those same 
Company servants were able to empower themselves and create their own highly 
effective – though often impermanent - political regimes. This chapter has revealed how 
integral the family networks established by Company servants were to this process. 
Based upon the exchange and circulation of capital, goods, information and people, 
kinship networks connected Company servants into a wider global community of 
families. In place of the inadequate and limited machinery of public governance as 
projected by East India House, this private community provided Company servants with 
the resources, capabilities and opportunities to consolidate their control over the sort of 
colonial space that would provide the foundations for a significant expansion of 
political power in places such as the Bay of Bengal. 
 While the Company remained far from a hegemonic power in Asia by the early 
eighteenth century, Company kinship networks were nonetheless driving the 
Company’s development in a dynamic and expansive way. Whether penetrating deeper 
into regional economies, opening up new trade routes or integrating political 
jurisdictions, the landscape of Asia was being gradually transformed, a process which 
also transformed the Company itself. Family networks connected Company servants 
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together, but they also forged links with those who existed outside of the Company’s 
official boundaries: wives, children, interlopers, Asian rulers and their subjects, other 
European companies and even households, interests and communities within Britain 
itself. The chartered and public borders of the Company were gradually negated by this 
set of porous, shifting and overlapping series of networks which blurred the national, 
cultural, commercial, social, political and colonial dimensions of the Company in the 




Laying the Foundations of the Colonial State 
 
 
While part one of the thesis revealed a process of political fragmentation within the 
Company by the turn of the eighteenth century, part two has so far shown how 
Company servants adapted to this new landscape through the creation of a global 
community of families connected through an expansive network of kinship. If the 
decentring of the Company led to the failure of state building, then family networks 
provided an alternative social, economic and political foundation through which 
Company servants could author the colonial state. The explanation of this apparent 
dichotomy lies in the opportunities provided by the decentralisation of the Company’s 
political structure for smaller groups and configurations of power beyond the incoherent 
and impermanent regimes constructed by ambitious servants such as Joseph Collet. The 
juxtaposition of Company servants and expansive kinship networks created a new 
political driving force in Asia. As the process of fragmentation accelerated, it provided 
even greater scope for family networks to pursue their private interests across Asia, 
facilitating the emergence of the colonial state as they did so.  
Colonial state formation through the pursuit of private interest has traditionally 
been ascribed to a much later period. Robert Travers argues that only with the arrival in 
India of military forces from Britain and the subsequent ‘political upheavals’ in Bengal 
were Company servants in Asia able to apply substantial political power in an effort to 
achieve their own private agendas.1 In such an argument, Company servants appeared to 
be dependent on the metropolitan fiscal-military state in order to pursue their own forms 
of state building. However, when placed within the context of their wider family 
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networks, it is evident that Company servants were not only capable of exercising 
independent political agency, but on an often considerable scale, too. Although the 
networks themselves were not always at the centre of this process, they nonetheless 
provided Company servants with wider powerbases, increased resources and private 
channels through which they were able to realise their political ambitions. This chapter 
will reveal how kinship networks not only allowed Company servants in Asia at the turn 
of the eighteenth century to prevent the state building efforts of East India House, but 
also to acquire the political institutions capable of facilitating the emergence of the 
colonial state.  
As the preceding chapter revealed, in the first half of the seventeenth century, 
Company servants had formed something akin to a diaspora in Asia, being forced to 
ingratiate themselves into local indigenous networks.2 But the expansion of kinship 
networks across Asia in the later seventeenth century enabled Company servants to re-
orientate themselves away from such regional frameworks and instead connect 
themselves into a global community. This process created new systems of governance 
which shaped the destiny of the Company in Asia.3 In place of the ineffective corporate 
infrastructure of administration and governance created by royal charters and colonial 
institutions, this private governing apparatus was fully utilised. It was the political 
networks discussed in this chapter around which the contours of the early modern 
colonial state took shape. As Michael Braddick has argued for the domestic British 
state, rather than a construct of the metropolitan ‘centre’, the foundations of this 
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colonial polity were based upon ‘something that is extensive.’4 As for the Dutch 
colonial state, its British counterpart would also be ushered in through ‘elite family 
networks’ operating across Asia ‘which actually created regional circuits of authority 
within the empire’.5  
The ability for Company servants to drive forward colonial state formation 
through the agency of their wider kinship networks was revealed by a frustrated Sir 
Josiah Child at the end of the seventeenth century when he charged them with 
‘perverting or misconstruing, procrastinating or neglecting our plain and direct orders to 
you, as if you were not a subordinate but a coordinate power with us’.6 In Asia, 
Company kinship networks were a coordinating power in their own right, and not 
subject to effective regulation or control by the court of directors. It was in the absence 
of the latter that key members of these kinship networks emerged as crucial political 
figures, ‘borrowing’ impermanent and porous sovereign, political and public authority 
from the ‘centre’ to realise their own policies.7 At the turn of the eighteenth century, 
these Company servants and the family networks they established determined the 
Company’s political landscape in Asia. 
 
William Hedges and ‘that wicked confederacy’ 
Company kinship networks played a direct, ambitious and visible role in the acquisition 
of political authority in Asia. In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, a 
small group of influential Company families seized control of the Bengal agency in an 
attempt to shape its political future in a way that would protect and facilitate their 
private interests. Some, like the Vincent and Pitt families, used their wider kinship 
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networks to ensure the Company’s Bengal settlements remained subordinate both to 
Madras and also to regional Mughal authorities. Others, like the Charnocks, formulated 
policies which led to the acquisition of new political rights over areas of Bengal that 
allowed the Company’s political establishment to operate securely and autonomously of 
regional political orders. The result was the growth of Calcutta and the development of 
the Bengal presidency as the Company’s most commercially and politically important 
region by the mid-eighteenth century. In both cases, Company servants were assisted by 
their networks in fundamental ways which helped shape and determine the foundations 
of the colonial state, sometimes in negative ways, sometimes in more positive ones, but 
always in pursuit of their own private interests. 
As a reflection of its growing importance to the Company in terms of trade, but 
also in the hope that independence would lead to a more faithful adherence by servants 
to the public interest, as opposed to their past private indulgences under the authority of 
Madras, Bengal was made a separate agency for the first time in 1681.8 The court of 
committees at East India House appointed one of their own, William Hedges, to be the 
first agent of Bengal.9 Arriving at the port of Balasore in the Bay of Bengal in 1682, 
Hedges was tasked with exerting the East India House’s authority over its settlements to 
ensure that the new agency would not be appropriated by the private interests of its 
servants.10 He aimed to persecute private interests, clear interlopers from Bengal and 
purge the political establishment of ‘corrupt’ servants who neglected the Company’s 
trade in favour of their own pursuits. Evidence of the subversion of the public interest 
was immediate. When Hedges left Balasore the following day to continue to Hugli, he 
sailed past a European who had ‘hired a great house’ and who was busy transporting 
                                                 
8 See chapter 1. 
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‘divers Chests of money ashore, and was very busy in buying of goods.’11 Upon 
enquiring, Hedges discovered that the person was not a Company servant, but in actual 
fact Thomas Pitt, an infamous interloper.12 Hedges himself was on his way to meet the 
Company’s most senior servant in Bengal, the chief of Hugli, Matthias Vincent, who 
also happened to be Pitt’s kinsman and principal business partner.13 
Despite decades of interloper activity in Asia, East India House was only just 
beginning to understand the symbiotic relationship between private interest and 
Company kinship networks, whose roots had sunk deep into Bengal’s political 
establishment. Shortly after Hedges had arrived in Asia in 1682, the court of committees 
had written to Madras, reiterating previous orders to ‘Seise and send home any English 
that you shall but suspect may aide the Interloper[s]’. This time, they also urged 
authorities in Madras to look out for any Company servants who ‘intermarry with any 
women that go over with any Interloper’. The governor was to ‘dismiss forthwith such 
persons so marry’d from our Service and send them home with their Wifes.’14 At the 
heart of Hedges’ attempt to exert East India House’s control over affairs in the new 
Bengal agency, was the need to sever the extensive kinship ties that had already 
developed between Company servants and interlopers. The court of committees was 
fully aware of the most important and influential kinship network in Bengal: that 
established between the Pitt and Vincent families. ‘In the first place wee do require you 
with all possible speed’, the committees instructed Hedges as he departed for Asia, to 
imprison Matthew Vincent ‘to answer to the severall breaches of trust and other 
notorious abuses committed by him.’15  In another letter, the court anxiously urged the 
governor of Madras to assist Hedges with the simultaneous arrest of Pitt, as he was ‘Mr 
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Vincent’s cousin’.16 If Pitt was to appear anywhere within the Madras agency, he was to 
be caught and returned to Europe, ‘whatever the cost’.17 Hedges had arrived from 
Europe with a guard of soldiers specifically to end the power of Vincent’s kinship 
network in Bengal. 
When Hedges anchored offshore at Hugli, Chief Vincent issued out of the fort to 
welcome the new agent, attended by several ships, a retinue and a large armed guard.18 
Vincent held an official reception for Hedges at the Dutch Gardens outside of town, 
‘where he had provided an entertainment for me’, according to Hedges, which lasted 
into the night.19 Vincent’s extravagant display, elaborate trappings and ostentatious 
ceremony confirmed to Hedges the chief’s extensive private interests and intimate 
collaboration with interlopers. Unfortunately for Hedges, his guard of soldiers had been 
travelling in another vessel, one which had been delayed at Balasore due to poor 
weather conditions. Although Vincent had been made aware of Hedges’ intention to 
arrest him, he nonetheless used the opportunity to humiliate the agent by having his own 
soldiers escort Hedges to attend the festivities. Meanwhile, Vincent used the time to 
evacuate his goods, papers and person to the nearby Dutch settlement of Chinsurah. 
There, he levied a force of Portuguese and Asian soldiers, making himself impervious to 
arrest.20 At the same time, Pitt arrived with three ships and landed at Hugli ‘in great 
state’, according to Hedges, ‘with 4 or 5 files of soldiers in red coats, well armed, and 
great attendance of Native Soldiers and Trumpeters’.21 Pitt then joined his cousin at 
Chinsurah, where they built their own warehouse, enticed Bengal’s most prominent 
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19 Ibid. 
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Asian merchants away from Hugli and set up their own trade to Europe.22 When, several 
months later, Hedges attempted to attack and seize Pitt and Vincent, the ex-chief’s 
influence with the Mughal governor of Hugli meant that they were prevented from 
doing so, and was even counter-attacked by Mughal troops.23  
There was little Hedges could do during his governorship to undermine or 
control the kinship networks which shaped the Bengal agency. They transcended the 
public and private, connecting Company servants with interlopers and even operating 
beyond the Company’s own jurisdiction to cross into the factories of other European 
companies as well as the local Mughal order. To have neutralised their grip on the 
political establishment in Bengal would have been to radically deconstruct and rebuild 
the nature of the Company’s presence there altogether, an act beyond the mitigated and 
diluted authority of East India House in Asia. Hedges’ unwillingness to trust any 
Company servant with familial connections to interlopers led to his complete isolation. 
For example, in 1683 he railed against his deputy John Beard for keeping ‘a familiar 
private correspondence with disaffected persons and Interlopers’, referring to his 
interloping brother-in-law James Lowdon.24 On the same day, he also wrote letters to 
every chief of a factory in Bengal accusing them of ‘Conceite’, ‘factious’ and ‘great 
disorder’ in maintaining relations with those who sought to subvert the interests of his 
masters at East India House.25 Their combined opposition to Hedges’ attacks brought 
enough pressure to achieve his replacement as agent by John Beard in the following 
year.26 
Company kinship networks were far too adaptable, expansive and ingrained in 
Bengal commerce and politics for metropolitan regulation and oversight. Agents sent 
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24 WH Diary, Hugli, 10 October 1683, vol. 1, pp. 124-6. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., 17 July 1684, vol. 1, p. 152, 
186 
from East India House were ultimately unable to mitigate the ability for the familial to 
shape the political, or the private to determine the public. Hedges realised this himself 
shortly before his removal. ‘The best of the Company’s servants being thus subject to 
corruption’, declared the agent in 1683, meant that East India House ‘can never be well 
served till…their Agent turne out those that…keepe Company and Feast dayly with ye 
Interlopers, as ye most precise of us doe here frequently’.27 In other words, the intimacy 
between interlopers and Company servants had to be completely severed. The case of 
Matthias Vincent as chief of Hugli is demonstrative of the inability of the metropole and 
their agent to do just that. Although Vincent addressed Pitt as his nephew, the latter had 
in actual fact married his niece, Jane Innes, at Hugli in 1679, after the two men had 
engaged in several joint trading ventures between Bengal and Persia. Vincent used his 
influence as chief of Hugli to protect Pitt’s interloping activities and facilitate his trade 
in horses with Asian merchants and rulers, investing himself in his new kinsman’s 
voyages.28 But Vincent’s family ties in Bengal were even more extensive than this, 
including, amongst others, his cousin Richard Edwards, the chief of Balasore.29 East 
India House’s attempts to reduce the influence of this family over their affairs in Bengal 
was thus liable to failure unless all of these men were seized and imprisoned, which, 
given the weakness of metropolitan control in Asia, was unlikely, if not impossible. 
Indeed, when Hedges was dining on the banks of the Hugli outside of Balasore in 1683, 
he watched helplessly as one of Pitt’s ships sailed pass uninhibitedly, carrying its owner 
and Vincent to Europe.30 
The actions and policies of Vincent and his kinship network scattered 
throughout Bengal had a profound impact upon the development of the fledgling Bengal 
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agency. In resisting arrest by William Hedges and, as a consequence, challenging the 
authority of East India House, Vincent and his extensive kin forced the Company to 
unsuccessfully contest their position within the local Mughal political order, which 
eventually led to their greater subordination to the Mughal governor of Hugli. Although 
several further skirmishes between the Company’s and the governor’s forces ended in 
stalemate, Hedges’ willingness to exercise military force against the governor led to the 
latter granting Vincent and Pitt a firman with special commercial privileges which 
threatened the position of the Company at Hugli.31 As a consequence, Hedges was 
forced to go in person to Dacca, to seek resolution from Shaista Khan, the nawab of 
Bengal, to a political situation which had impeded much of the Company’s trade at 
Hugli. But even leaving the settlement proved challenging, as Hedges’ party was 
attacked by the governor, and two vessels were taken.32 When the agent finally reached 
Dacca, he requested that the nawab order all interlopers to leave Bengal and that he 
might reduce the custom dues on Company goods. After six weeks of negotiations, 
Hedges returned to Hugli convinced that he had finally ensured that the ‘Company shall 
never be troubled with Interlopers’.33 
In actual fact, however, Hedges had achieved very little. Unlike Company 
servants such as Matthias Vincent who had operated in Bengal for more than thirty 
years and who thus had a far more accurate understanding of local conditions and 
realities, Hedges was unaware of the significant autonomy enjoyed by Mughal 
governors.34 The nawab had instructed the governor of Hugli to respect the Company’s 
rights and to lift the heavy customs and dues on their goods, as well as to banish 
interlopers from his jurisdiction, much to Hedges’ satisfaction. However, the governor 
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of Hugli took little notice of imperial decrees issued from Dacca concerning the 
European companies.35 Eventually, Hedges was forced to submit to the governor’s 
authority and even agree to pay the punitive Mughal customs on the Company’s goods 
there.36 The fact that the man who was assigned to weaken the grip of the kinship 
networks in Bengal, ended up alienating almost the entire political establishment there 
and was superseded after just two years, is illustrative of the hold Company kinship 
networks had over Bengal. After being superseded, Hedges was then dismissed from the 
Company’s service, retreating first to the Dutch settlement in Chinsura and then fleeing 
Bengal altogether on an interloping vessel headed for Persia, hounded by the agency’s 
most powerful kinship networks.37 Hedges described the worst of these, Matthias 
Vincent and his kin, as ‘that wicked confederacy’, and thanked god for having given 
him ‘Deliverance’ from them.38 
The social, commercial and political monopoly of Company kinship networks 
over the newly constituted Bengal agency ultimately ensured its short-term weakness in 
relation to the local Mughal political order. As a direct consequence of the efforts of the 
Vincent kinship network, the agency was demolished and Bengal was once again made 
subordinate to Madras in 1685. This allowed Company servants, their family networks 
and their interloping members to continue to operate independent of East India House 
and thus free to pursue interests across a number of jurisdictions, borders and political 
orders. The Budgen network was reflective of this outcome. As chief of Balasore, 
Edmund Budgen furthered the interests of his kinship network in Bengal, most notably 
by establishing lucrative commercial ventures with his interloping brother and father, 
both named John Budgen. Edmund was eventually dismissed in 1679 for this very 
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reason. But in the wake of the agency’s abolition, he was readmitted into the 
Company’s service at Hugli, followed by his three sons in 1691, where the kinship 
network prospered with interests at Hugli, Balasore and Madras.39 But that is not to 
suggest that all Company kinship networks sought only to subvert the emergence of an 
independent political establishment in Bengal for their private gain. In fact, many 
Company servants sought to shape the colonial state in more positive ways through the 
agency of their kinship networks. 
 
The Foundations of the Bengal Presidency 
While Company servants like Matthias Vincent strangled the new Bengal agency, 
others, such as Job Charnock, sought to restart the process of gaining independence 
from Madras. Specifically, he wanted to acquire greater political and sovereign 
authority for the Company’s Bengal establishment which would also provide it with 
security and autonomy from the Mughal political order in which the Vincents had 
forcefully kept it, to the benefit of their own interests. Over the next four decades, in the 
wake of the failures of Agent Hedges, Job Charnock emerged as the proponent of a 
policy which acquired and developed the settlement of Calcutta into a secure and 
independent sovereign space for the Company in Bengal. His kinship network proved 
integral to this development. 
The historiography has traditionally depicted Job Charnock in overtly negative 
terms. Assessments of Charnock have been formed through a Victorian discourse of 
‘difference’ in which the Agent has been described as having ‘spent his life in almost 
isolated positions among natives’, the result of which left him ‘deeply tinged with 
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native habits of thought and action.’40 Charnock was in fact intimately connected to 
local society through his establishment of an interracial family network. As the mariner 
Alexander Hamilton related after visiting Calcutta shortly after Charnock’s death, the 
latter had married an Indian woman. Supposedly, Charnock had observed an instance of 
sati, or widow-burning, only to fall in love with the intended victim whom he had 
ordered rescued from the pyre and brought back to Calcutta. According to Hamilton, 
‘they lived lovingly many Years, and had several Children’.41 
While Hamilton’s account is no doubt embellished and romanticised, Charnock 
had indeed married an Asian woman. Charnock had arrived in Bengal in 1658 as a 
young factor, where he was stationed at Kasimbazar.42 By 1679, when Charnock was 
promoted to chief - in effect the most senior Company servant after the agent at Hugli - 
he was the longest-serving and most experienced servant in Bengal.43 In such a capacity 
he had cultivated extensive commercial, social and political relationships throughout 
Bengal, both with the servants of other European companies as well as the officials of 
the Mughal regime. The latter, in particular, were consolidated through Charnock’s 
integration into the local political elite upon his marriage to a Rajput noblewoman 
whom he renamed ‘Maria’, a relative of Roy Bulchund, the Mughal governor of Hugli 
and Kasimbazar.44 Much like the Powneys at Madras, the Charnocks in Bengal 
established a kinship network which straddled and crossed the boundaries between the 
social, political and commercial worlds of the indigenous political elites and the various 
European Companies in Bengal.  
From the 1680s onwards, the Charnock family transitioned into an expansive 
kinship network, integrating a large group of Company servants into the family through 
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marriage to Charnock’s children, Maria having provided her husband with three 
daughters and a son.45 The eldest mixed-race Charnock child, Mary, was married to 
Charles Eyre, a councillor at Dacca. Eyre, who would eventually succeed his father-in-
law to become the first governor of a newly independent Bengal Presidency, was 
himself from an interracial Company family. Sir John Goldsborough, appointed 
supervisor in 1693, noted Eyre’s multicultural family connections when he visited 
Calcutta, reporting that ‘he is very much for the Country habits and Customes.’46 
Catherine, another of Charnock’s daughters, married Jonathan White, a senior merchant 
who served his father-in-law first as a councillor and then as his secretary.47 The 
youngest of the Charnock daughters, Elizabeth, was similarly married into the Bengal 
establishment, to a senior merchant at Calcutta, William Bowridge.48 Both the White 
and Bowridge families had numerous kin stationed throughout the Bay of Bengal acting 
as free merchants and interlopers, providing the Charnock family with even wider 
interests across Asia.49 
The establishment of the Charnock kinship network allowed Job Charnock to 
consolidate his hold over the Company in Bengal, a process which led to the creation of 
a powerful social, political and commercial faction that supported Charnock’s policies. 
The latter’s influence over this faction can initially be discerned after his marriage to 
‘Maria’, upon which Charnock adopted his wife’s Islamic religion.50 According to one 
Company servant who arrived at Calcutta shortly after Charnock’s death in 1693, many 
of the Company’s servants had followed Charnock’s example, marrying ‘black wives’ 
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and showing little regard ‘for our Religion’, as he reported to East India House.51 In 
fact, there was little room in Bengal for those who either existed outside of the 
Charnock kinship network or resisted Job Charnock’s influence over their affairs. When 
Richard Trenchfield attempted to compete against the family’s commercial concerns at 
Kasimbazar in 1679, for example, he was summarily dismissed.52 The punitive nature of 
his dismissal by Charnock was demonstrated by his acquittal of the charges by Agent 
Matthias Vincent as well as the governor of Madras, Streynsham Master, the latter of 
whom declared that Trenchfield’s only crime was to attempt to prevent Charnock and 
his allies from being ‘factious’.53  
The extent of Job Charnock’s grip over Bengal was illustrated when a string of 
de jure Company authorities based at Hugli, from Streynsham Master himself to 
William Hedges, encroached either accidently or intentionally upon his wide-ranging 
interests. When Master arrived in Bengal on a tour to reform the settlements, he 
discovered that Charnock was at the centre of what he described as a network of 
‘corruption’. At Patna he found the Indian merchants smuggling saltpetre out of the 
Company’s warehouse on the orders of Charnock, to sell to the Dutch at a much higher 
profit.54 At Hugli, Master discovered that the agent, Matthias Vincent, had little control 
over Kasimbazar, which Charnock ruled like a private fiefdom. He seldom sent letters 
to the agent at Hugli, and he dispatched shipments of goods on his own schedule.55 In 
1679 Master wailed in frustration from Hugli that there was ‘no saltpetre come from 
Pattana, and fearing the worst by reason we heard not from Mr. Charnock in many 
days’.56 When Master provided Charnock with a final deadline to appear in person 
                                                 
51 Cited in WH, Diary, vol. 2, p. xciii. 
52 Master, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 284. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid., p. 314. 
56 Master, Diaries, Streynsham Master to Joseph Hynmers, Hugli, 8 December 1679, vol. 2, pp. 323-4. 
193 
before him at Hugli, the latter ignored the warning and arrived a week after Master had 
left that city for Balasore. ‘I call God to wittness I had noe designes of my owne’, 
Charnock wrote to Master, undoubtedly tongue-in-cheek.57  
Charnock used the influence of his network and the power of his faction to 
similarly oppose Master’s successor, William Hedges. When Hedges’ private cargo was 
stopped and seized at Kasimbazar in 1683, Charnock wrote to the agent to explain that 
it was done so on the orders of the Mughal governor, Roy Bulchund.58 Shortly after, 
however, Hedges discovered that Charnock himself had prevailed on the Mughal 
governor to order the seizure, facilitated, no doubt, through their shared kin-
connection.59 ‘I consider Mr Charnock did this on purpose,’ declared Hedges, ‘to lessen 
my esteeme…to show that the Chief of Cassumbazar’s Dustuck [seal] is in greater 
esteeme…than mine.’60 Similarly, Hedges was shocked to find several dismissed or 
disgraced Company servants dining with the Charnocks at Casimbazar and even living 
within their household. When he ordered Charnock to expel James Harding, whom he 
had earlier dismissed for ‘Blashphemy and Athisticall tenetts’, as well as for 
‘fornicating with a slave wench’, Charnock simply ignored him.61 Charnock financially 
and politically assisted these disgraced servants, who in return joined Charnock’s 
faction and supported him at every opportunity.  
Agent Hedges lamented the ‘little regard’ shown by Charnock to his instructions 
on a range of matters.62 The new agent was initially puzzled by Charnock’s 
insubordination, as he asked a fellow servant ‘why Mr Charnock was so cross to me, & 
thwarting every thing I proposed or did for ye Honble Compy’s service?’ When Hedges 
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had first arrived in Bengal, Charnock had requested that he dismiss a particular enemy 
of his. When Hedges refused, Charnock ‘was thereupon resolved to blast and frustrate 
all your actions & proceedings as much as he could,’ Hedges was informed, ‘and never 
to councell or assist you more as long as he lived.’63 This explanation reveals that 
Charnock had become accustomed to wielding de facto authority in Bengal. From 1684 
onwards, the Charnock faction had virtually usurped the government of Bengal from 
Hedges, carrying on a correspondence with all of the other Company chiefs of factories 
in Bengal to the exclusion of Hugli, ‘as if I and this Councill of Hugly were such 
traytors to ye Company, as not fit to know what was transacted betwixt them in that 
grand affair of ye Company’s concerns,’ Hedges complained.64 Having established a 
virtual monopoly over power and authority within Bengal, Job Charnock sought to lay 
the foundations of a presidency with himself at its head, independent of both Madras 
and the Mughal authorities in Bengal. Over the next fifteen years, he achieved exactly 
this. 
The policy for an independent Bengal became critical after the Charnock 
network’s commercial interests came under severe pressure from the Mughal 
authorities. In the wake of Hedges’ failure to exert the Company’s authority over the 
governor of Hugli, the Mughal Empire placed intolerable fiscal and commercial 
demands upon the Company’s settlements in Bengal, such as demanding, in 1684, 
arrears on taxes from which the Company had previously been made exempt.65 This 
was also part of a wider squeezing of intermediary and marginal groups by regional 
nawabs within the Mughal Empire to meet the fiscal demands of imperial expansion in 
                                                 
63 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 102-103. 
64 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 150. 
65 RFSG, LTFSG, Hugli to Madras, Hugli, 15 December 1684, pp. 35-36. 
195 
the Deccan and elsewhere.66 When these were not met, the major Bengal factories were 
attacked and placed under siege, including Dacca, Hugli and, most damaging for the Job 
Charnock and his kinship network, Kasimbazar itself.67 Hedges’ successor, John Beard, 
pursued a conciliatory and submissive policy, sending presents to the nawab to placate 
him, while suggesting to Madras in early 1685 that the factories at Patna and Dacca 
should be abandoned, and even urged evacuating the entire establishment to Balasore 
and withdrawing from Bengal altogether.68 Beard believed that the Company’s place 
within Bengal’s political order was one of a local merchant whose legitimacy and right 
to trade depended solely on Mughal concessions.  
Beard’s submissive policy was thoroughly opposed by Charnock and other 
prominent members of the network, including Charles Eyre at Dacca, whose private 
interests were considerably damaged by the ongoing crisis. Charnock and Eyre 
criticised the chief’s management of the crisis in a stream of private letters sent to Sir 
Josiah Child, chairman of the court of directors.69 In mid-1685, as the situation in the 
besieged settlements became desperate, Beard was ready to admit total defeat and allow 
the loss of all of the Company’s servants, goods and property in Bengal, rather than 
responding ‘in a Hostile way [which] cannot be done without fighting and 
killing…which will make an Irreparable breach, and be proclaimed an Open Warr’.70 
While decrying this course of action in letters to East India House, Charnock wrote of 
the need to make a show of force against the nawab of Bengal which would lead to a 
negotiated peace, one that could very well procure a treaty for greater political and 
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territorial rights for servants in Bengal and thus allow them to operate independent of 
regional Asian states, much like they did at Bombay, Madras and Bencoolen.71 
To East India House, Charnock described the ‘grand designe’ of making the 
Company a territorial power in Bengal. In response, the court of directors admonished 
Chief Beard’s policy of submission, observing ‘how sheepish you are in submitting to 
such unreasonable affronts’.72 They informed him of ‘Mr Charnock[s] wisely observed’ 
policy to create a ‘breach’ with the Mughals in order to ‘resettle’ Bengal on better 
terms, namely through the expansion of its political authority.73 It would be wrong to 
attribute this policy solely to Charnock and members of his network alone, however, 
although they were certainly its chief driving force. In fact, the majority of Company 
servants in Bengal at the time opposed continued submission to the nawab, especially in 
the wake of Hedges’ humiliating treatment at the hands of the governor of Hugli. The 
support of Charnock’s network and his influence over a powerful faction of Company 
servants within Bengal ensured that, once Beard died two months later, the council at 
Hugli immediately wrote to Charnock, urging him to make his way there and assume 
the office of chief of Bengal. Fortunately, as Charnock did so in early 1686, ships 
arrived from Europe with several companies of English troops. With these, Charnock 
lifted the siege of the Company’s factory at Hugli and then sacked the Mughal town 
itself. The new chief of Bengal then set about implementing ‘the grand designe’ for 
acquiring a fortified and independent Company settlement, moving downriver to select 
the site of this new colonial stronghold. 
 The way in which the ‘grand designe’ was to be pursued attracted considerable 
opposition from East India House. Charnock’s strategy consisted of a short, contained 
and largely token military campaign against the nawab of Bengal in order to gain a 
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negotiated settlement that would result in the acquisition of territory for a new 
settlement. However, fully converted by a stream of persuasive letters from members of 
the Charnock family, Sir Josiah Child hoped to achieve even more than this. He 
succeeded in pressuring the court of directors to agree for the need to challenge the 
existing political order in Bengal, but he believed that this should be done through an 
extended campaign which would form part of a wider assault on the Mughal Empire 
and include the capture of Chittagong and even Dacca itself, the nawab’s capital in 
Bengal.74 Thus when Charnock opened up negotiations after he defeated a small 
Mughal army at Hijili and sacked both Hugli and Balasore in 1687, the court of 
directors wrote to admonish him for not using his resources to make ‘all possible 
reprisals you can’ and ordered him to drive inland and take Dacca.75  
Charnock, primarily concerned with protecting the family’s interests, discarded 
the court’s policy and continued to negotiate with the nawab. In response, the directors 
wrote again the following year to notify him that they ‘do rationally conclude against 
the opinion of our Agent Charnock’.76 When the negotiations failed to produce results, 
the directors were scathing in their assessment. They declared themselves ‘grieved to 
see how you trifled away time upon frivolous pretences’, a policy which had led to the 
‘irreparable dishonour of our Nation, and the ruin of our Trade in Bengall.’77 It was 
their conclusion that Charnock was simply ‘disobeying or neglecting our orders.’78 In 
1689 the directors sent Captain William Heath to Bengal to enforce metropolitan 
oversight of the war by providing him with powers to overrule Charnock and capture 
Chittagong. However, the agent and his faction first opposed, then ignored and 
eventually isolated Heath altogether. Finding that he could do very little without 
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Charnock’s support, Heath gave up before the end of the year and sailed to Madras in 
frustration.79 Charnock successfully strangled any metropolitan intrusion into the 
Company’s affairs in Bengal, freeing himself up to determine the development of the 
future Bengal presidency.  
 Initially, Heath had derailed the negotiations with the nawab by attempting to 
attack Chittagong, thereby forcing Charnock and the remainder of the Bengal 
establishment to temporarily retreat to Madras. But in 1690 Charnock returned to 
Bengal, and selected the small village of Sutanati on the bend of the Hugli as the site 
over which he would attempt to make the Company a sovereign ruler. Sutanati, the 
future site of Calcutta, was hazardous to the health, strategically vulnerable and just as 
inaccessible to shipping from the Bay as the rest of the Company’s settlements in 
Bengal had been. Knowing this, East India House urged Charnock to move elsewhere, 
but he favoured the location for being distant enough from the main Mughal centres of 
power to acquire autonomy and avoid interference, but remaining in close proximity to 
Bengal’s main trading routes.80 Writing to Madras of Charnock’s refusal to adhere to 
their war strategy, the directors explained that, ‘since he likes Chuttnauttee [Sutanati] so 
well’, they had conceded to allow him to establish a factory there.81 Thus, instead of 
attempting to capture Dacca, Charnock settled down at the future Calcutta and opened 
negotiations with the nawab to acquire a firman for the possession of Sutanati and, 
ultimately, for an expansion of the Company’s political authority in Bengal. 
Settled in Sutanati, Charnock utilised his kinship network in furtherance of his 
designs to expand the Company’s political authority in Bengal. Despite East India 
House’s opposition to Charnock’s policies after he returned to Bengal in 1690, the 
unsettled and fluid situation nonetheless forced them to grant him unprecedented 
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‘Power and Authority that he may with or without the Advice or Consent of his 
Councill, place or displace any of his Councill of Bengall, or any of our Servants there, 
at his Discresion’.82 With his new powers, Charnock promoted a number of family 
members to key positions within Bengal, the most important of these being his son-in-
law Charles Eyre, who was appointed the new chief of Dacca. In this capacity, Eyre 
conducted negotiations with the nawab to concede to the Company’s possession of 
Calcutta.83 At Dacca, Eyre zealously furthered his father-in-law’s ‘grand designe’, 
requesting an imperial grant for the possession of Sutanati. He informed Charnock of 
the nawab’s ‘great courtesy’ as well as his ‘passionate desire for our [permanent] return 
and settlement’ in Bengal.84 In 1693, Eyre succeeded in gaining new trading rights for 
the Company in Bengal, allowing their goods to once again be custom free.85 Although 
an imperial firman for Sutanati remained elusive, Eyre remained at Dacca to support the 
family’s interests by pursuing the grant. Indeed, when Charnock died later than year, 
Eyre succeeded him as chief, despite the opposition of East India House who sought to 
appoint someone else.86 The network’s monopoly of the political establishment in 
Bengal by the 1690s, however, ensured his continuance in that post. 
Eyre continued to pursue the expansion of the Company’s political authority in 
Bengal, particularly by consolidating the network’s control of Calcutta’s council. For 
example, Catherine Charnock’s husband, Jonathan White, was promoted to the Calcutta 
council.87 Over the next few years, Eyre also appointed his own son-in-law, John 
Russell, to the council. The intimacy of the Charnock kinship network at this time is 
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demonstrated in the will of Jonathan White in 1704, in which many of the network’s 
members featured prominently.88 Indeed, the symbiotic relationship between familial 
intimacy and the formation of political policy in Bengal was revealed in White’s will, 
where he asked to be interred in the Charnock family mausoleum which Eyre built 
ostentatiously in the centre of the protean town of Calcutta.89 At the heart of the 
council’s policy was the completion of the family’s vision by finally gaining 
recognition of the Company’s possession of Calcutta and in making it a secure base for 
the network’s private interests. They succeeded on both accounts. Under Eyre, the 
insignificant villages on the banks of the Hugli would be transformed into the city of 
Calcutta: a colonial stronghold from which the Company would establish its rule over 
much of Bengal over the proceeding century.90 
When Charnock died in 1693, the nawab of Bengal continued to withhold the 
firman legitimising the transfer of political control over Sutanati to the Company. Thus 
the pursuit of a firman for the town became the foremost concern of Eyre’s 
chieftainship. In 1694, the court of directors ordered him to establish a court of 
judicature in the new settlement.91 But Eyre replied that until a firman was obtained 
from the nawab, the foundation of a legal framework for the Company in Bengal would 
not in itself be legal or legitimate.92 As the governor of Madras noted that without the 
firman, those at Calcutta could ‘neither Settle, build or trade upon any Sollid foundation 
or Security’.93 Nontheless, Eyre did proceed to establish a stream of revenue by taxing 
the small Asian population of Sutanati, but refused to take any further action ‘till wee 
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can procure a Grant for our firm Settlement.’94 Both Madras and East India House had 
argued against the occupation of Sutanati, but by 1695 the court of directors wrote that, 
as their servants ‘are in a great measure already settled’ there, then they had no choice 
but to designate it as the official seat of the Bengal establishment.95  
In the following year, an opportunity to finally acquire a firman presented itself 
when a local zamindar96 rebelled against his suzerain, the nawab of Bengal, and 
captured Hugli.97 With the council firmly under his control, Eyre was able to exploit the 
confusion of the situation to fortify the Company’s settlement, justifying it as an act of 
self-defence against the rebel raja. Both the Dutch and French Companies followed suit, 
raising fortifications at their towns of Chinsura and Chandanagore respectively.98 In 
fortifying Sutanati, the first European defensive works to be built in Bengal, Eyre had 
carved out a de facto sovereign authority for the Company in Bengal, physically 
separating the settlement from the surrounding Mughal province. He then diffused this 
potentially controversial measure by providing timely military assistance to the nawab 
against the rebels. Eyre raised additional units of native troops and, in late 1696, ordered 
several ships to block the rebel advance across the Hugli, which forced them to halt 
their invasion of eastern Bengal.99 In assisting the nawab, Eyre ensured that the 
Company’s new fortifications avoided demolition, while also receiving a letter of 
thanks from the nawab himself for the Company’s part in ending the rebellion.100 As a 
sign both of respect and of its growing importance, the governor of Hugli visited 
Sutanati in early 1697 to meet with Eyre.101 The latter followed up these positive 
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developments by once again applying for an imperial firman recognising the 
Company’s rule, not just over Sutanati, but of the neighbouring villages of Govindpur 
and Kalikata. In April 1698, the negotiations with the new nawab, the Mughal Prince 
Azim-us-Shan, finally produced the hoped for result, and the three villages were 
conceded to the Company.102 Servants at Bengal quickly referred to these collectively as 
Calcutta. 
The nature of the firman is itself revealing of the way in which private agency 
directly determined the foundations of the emerging colonial state in Asia. The grant 
came in the form of a zamindar, a Persian term meaning ‘landowner’.103 Bengal, as in 
many other Mughal provinces, consisted of thousands of zamindar of differing size, 
influence and power, from those who governed several square miles of territory to those 
who ruled over vast regions of the province. The zamindari at once granted a 
proprietary right to rule the land as sovereign, at the same time as being a political 
office with duties and privileges.104 However, it was also an intensely personal office, 
one that was conferred on individuals, not groups, corporations or cities. Thus once the 
firman had been issued, it was Charles Eyre himself who was invested by Nawab Azim-
us-Shan with the zamindari of Sutanati, Govindpur and Kalikata on the banks of the 
Hugli. And as zamindar, Eyre personally exercised sovereign rule over the territory, in 
which, amongst other things, he was to ‘collect the rents and keep the three native towns 
in order’.105 The Company’s political and sovereign authority in Bengal was thus 
embodied in its individual servants. This, however, was in direct opposition to the 
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orders of East India House, always anxious to retain authority over their servants and 
thus over the formation of the colonial state. After Eyre informed them of his decision 
to pursue political rights over the villages, they declared in 1697 that ‘we utterly forbid 
all Jemmidarring [i.e. acting as the zamidari] by any of our Servants or any English 
whatsoever, it being only the Companeys prerogative to hire Lands of the 
Government’.106 They further warned that they expected ‘Conformity from your Selves 
and all other English’ in this matter.107 Despite this, political authority continued to be 
invested in individual Company servants, and not the Company as a whole. 
Furthermore, much like their Mughal counterparts, for whom appointment as a 
zamindar was usually through hereditary succession, so the zamindari of Calcutta was 
often held by members of the same kinship network, for instance Eyre’s kinsman Henry 
Frankland and his son Charles Eyre, who assumed the zamindar of Calcutta in 1716 and 
1721 respectively.108 
Under Charnock, Company servants at Calcutta had lived in what was described 
as ‘a wild unsettled Condition’, in which they built ‘neither fortifyed houses nor 
Goedowns, only Tents, Hutts and boats’. Criticising the entire settlement and 
Charnock’s policies, the governor of Madras concluded that Calcutta was ‘a doubtfull 
foundation wholy depending on the good Nabobs stay and favour…the Kings promist 
Phyrmaund, being not yet sent them’.109 However, after Eyre’s accession as zamindar, 
the court of directors wrote to Calcutta to recognise his achievement. ‘Being now 
possessed of a strong ffortification and a large tract of land,’ they observed in 1699, 
‘hath inclined us to declare Bengall a Presidency, and we have constituted our Agent 
(Sir Chas. Eyre) to be our Presidency there and Governor of our ffort, etc., which we 
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call ffort William.’110 Calcutta represented a significant and transformative expansion of 
the Company’s political authority in Bengal. When a force under the command of a 
neighbouring zamindar ‘came into the Neighbourhood of our Towns’ in a threatening 
manner, Eyre ‘sett up the English fflags at the utmost extents of our Libertyes and 
forbid the [Z]emidars People coming within our Bounds’.111 The policy of Charnock, 
Eyre and their kin to expand the Company’s political rights in Bengal created a 
sovereign jurisdiction in which the colonial state could emerge and develop largely free 
from external interference. Thus in 1701, when the nawab was ordered by the Mughal 
Emperor to seize all Company servants and goods as a result of European piracy in the 
Arabian Sea, he could do little against the strength of Calcutta, and after three months 
the attack was called off and an agreement reached.112 In light of this, the governor of 
Bengal informed the directors that Calcutta was finally ‘strong enough to Secure Your 
estates and Servants…in the Kingdome of Bengall’.113 
 Both Charnock, Eyre and their kin who succeeded them as governors of Bengal 
worked to ensure that their policies for political expansion were legitimate and 
recognised by the Mughal Empire. Eyre ensured that the Company did not have to 
depend so arbitrarily on the local political order, but he also made sure that in doing so 
the Company did not subvert or weaken that very order. His brother-in-law and 
successor, John Russell, continued this policy during his own governorship. This was 
acknowledged by the court of directors themselves, after Russell had made several 
diplomatic gestures to improve relations with various Mughal authorities, including the 
nawab of Bengal and his overlord in Delhi, the emperor. The court wrote to commend 
him for being ‘always ready to do them [the Mughals] service when in your power’. 
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This, they observed, was the policy of his brother-in-law Charles Eyre, ‘who did his 
business by good words and good correspondence’ with the Mughal authorities in order 
to further Calcutta’s interests. If Charnock had acquired Calcutta and Eyre had 
legitimised its acquisition, it was Russell who cemented its position within Bengal by 
preserving its independence from surrounding powers.114 Although military force was 
often deployed against the Mughal Empire, ultimately all three kinship members had 
facilitated the formation of the Bengal presidency through diplomatic engagement. The 
Charnocks, Eyres, Russells and Franklands, each family intimately bound into a wider 
kinship network, pursued their policies against the often active opposition of East India 
House. But in the end, it was they, and not the directors, who laid the political 
foundations of the Company’s Bengal Presidency.115 
 The hereditary nature of service with the English East India Company has often 
been noted by historians, but always fleetingly and with little analytical consideration – 
remarkable for its quirkiness but never its political significance. However, as this part of 
the chapter has demonstrated, the political monopoly established by Company kinship 
networks in Asia was a transformative dynamic. Chairmen and directors in East India 
House occupied their positions temporarily, and were thus rarely able to pursue long-
term policies. In Asia, on the other hand, families and their wider kinship networks 
allowed Company servants to form, implement and develop particular colonial policies 
over an inter-generational period which shaped the political environment around them 
in a consistent and coordinated manner. Between 1681 and 1728, nine out of the 
fourteen agents and governors of Bengal came from just three Company families. In 
fact, from the formation of Job Charnock’s ‘grand designe’ in 1684, until the 
appointment as governor in 1726 of his great-granddaughter’s husband, Henry 
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Frankland, five members of the kinship network ruled the Bengal establishment and 
facilitated its emergence from a subordinate agency dependent upon the Mughal 
political order, to an independent presidency which was the Company’s most 
commercially and politically valuable possession in Asia.116 As the directors conceded 
to Charles Eyre in 1699, the zamindari of Calcutta had ‘in a short time render[ed] the 
Territory within your late Grant the most fflourishing Spott of Ground in Bengall.’117 
 
Company Kinship Networks and Colonial Governance 
 At the same time as one Company kinship network sought to consolidate the 
foundations of a new political landscape in Bengal, another worked to prevent a more 
established one at Madras from disintegrating altogether. While the issue of interlopers 
had largely been resolved in Bengal by the time of Eyre’s governorship in 1699 – due in 
part to the increased powers Company servants now enjoyed there - a renewed threat at 
Madras emerged in the 1690s as a result of metropolitan challenges to the Company’s 
monopoly. Since the 1680s, the Company’s monopoly over the Asian trade had come 
under increasing legal and constitutional attack, and in 1698 a consortium of merchants 
and politicians succeeded in creating a rival 'New' Company to participate in the 
trade.118 In many respects, this was a product of interlopers in Asia utilising sources of 
metropolitan authority in competition against the Company. Throughout Asia, contested 
areas of jurisdiction were formed where both companies competed. But whereas rivalry 
between the Companies at Bombay and Surat was characterised by conflict and 
violence, on the Coromandel Coast Company servants used their kinship networks to 
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create cross-corporate connections which transcended spaces of conflict and ultimately 
tied the 'Old' and 'New' Companies together.119  
  The most senior representatives of the two Companies on the Coast were 
cousins: Thomas Pitt as the Old Company’s governor of Madras and John Pitt as the 
New Company’s consul. When the latter left Europe to take up his appointment as 
consul, he was part of the Pitt kinship network which, since the 1680s, had included a 
dozen members and stretched between the Persian Gulf and the Bay of Bengal. Some 
members of this network had been in the service of the Company, like the consul, but 
some had not, like the governor who, as related above, had in fact been one of the most 
successful interlopers of the seventeenth century prior to his appointment at Madras.120 
Kinship ties connected Pitts serving the Company with their illegal kin counterparts 
operating as interlopers, and a network spread between them across Asia, circulating 
capital, knowledge and opportunity amongst its members.121 After Thomas Pitt’s 
marriage to Matthias Vincent’s niece in 1678, the family was provided with powerful 
allies and patrons in the Bengal establishment, which both facilitated greater trade and 
provided protection for those Pitts acting as interlopers.122 After his accession as 
governor of Madras in 1697, Thomas Pitt sought to bring as many kin members into the 
Company’s legitimate fold as possible. One such was his brother-in-law, Thomas 
Curgenven, who the new governor appointed as a factor in Bengal.123  
Thomas Pitt had been the driving force behind the network’s expansion in Asia 
in the later seventeenth century, and the relationship between himself and his cousin 
John Pitt was an important part of this. As young men in Britain, Thomas found John 
‘in a deplorable condition’, disowned by his uncle George Pitt who ‘had Supported him 
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from his infancy’. Thomas advised his cousin to travel with him to India, where he 
‘Supply’d him with money for his outset, whereby he appeared handsomely abroad, and 
from that time Supply’d him in such a manner as I may say without vanity I was, under 
God, his only Support’, as he recalled to a friend after his cousin’s death in 1704.124 As 
well as acting as John Pitt’s main creditor and trading partner, Thomas Pitt was also 
responsible for his cousin's nomination for the post of chief of Persia.125 More 
personally, John Pitt was the godfather of his cousin's son, Robert Pitt, a supercargo on 
ships trading to China, and also beneficiary of his godfather's will, whilst Thomas Pitt 
had made him executor of his.126 Although relations between John Pitt and his cousin 
were strained by the time of his death, to the extent that wills had been changed and 
insults traded, their membership of the same kinship network shaped their public 
relationship and, in turn, shaped the interaction of the two Companies on the 
Coromandel Coast. 
 As Consul Pitt's ship neared the Indian Coast, he wrote several letters to inform 
his cousin Governor Pitt of the situation, invoking kin ties and familial bonds. Having 
informed him of his appointment as consul and the sensitive matter of his orders to 
supersede him on the Coast, he wrote of 'the great obligations I have to you and from 
whose converse I propose myself very great advantage in carrying on my Masters 
Interest.' The new consul hoped to deal with the transfer of the government of Madras 
quietly in his cousin's garden beyond the walls of the city 'for I would not injure my 
kinsman as much as to propose [meeting in] the Fort.' He concluded anxiously that 'I 
have wrote to my Kinsman the President, but can't tell how he'l relish it before I have 
his answer...your young Ladys are well'.'127 Although their exchanges were heated once 
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the consul arrived at Madras in 1699, especially as they attempted to force one another 
to recognise their respective commissions, correspondence was nonetheless couched in 
familial terms and appealed to the private nature of their connection, always ending 
'Your affectionate Kinsman'. Their private correspondence allowed them to transcend 
corporate loyalties, reinforced through the typical exchange dynamic which maintained 
kinship networks – in this case a shipment of wine which Consul Pitt had brought out 
from Europe for his cousin.128 
When public relations between the two cousins became strained, their inclusion 
in a wider kinship network which spanned Asia and Europe, maintained a private 
connection which provided them with a means of navigating the politically sensitive 
nature of their public differences. After a lengthy letter disparaging the consul's position 
on the Coromandel Coast, Governor Pitt wrote that he supposed the letter would ‘be as 
tiresome to you to read as 't is to me to write’. He then went on to discuss an exchange 
of horses between the two and a further gift of ten chests of wine from Persia.129 
Another letter followed this up in which Governor Pitt informed his cousin of his son's 
appointment as supercargo to China, his own health, and asked about their wider 
kinship network. 'If your more weighty business will permitt I should be glad to hear 
what is become of our Relations...Is George Pitt marryed or about itt?'130 Their network 
was constantly drawn upon to connect the divided Companies on the Coromandel 
Coast. For example, both consul and governor corresponded frequently with the same 
family members. Both had written individually to their cousin, another John Pitt, at 
Gravesend, offering his son employment with their respective Companies.131 While that 
particular cousin ended up sending his son to serve his name-sake with the New 
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Company, the son of another cousin, Edward Ettrick, went out to serve with Governor 
Pitt at Madras.132  
 The exchange of gifts, information and people between the two supposed rivals, 
bound as they were into the same kinship network, led to Sir William Norris, the newly 
arrived ambassador for the New Company, reporting to its directors that Consul Pitt 
'acted more for the Old Companeys Interest then ours, and I doubted not had been 
sufficiently brirb'd to doe soe.'133 In fact, the consul had made such little headway in 
establishing his jurisdiction and authority over the Coromandel Coast that the New 
Company was absorbed by its rival in 1702 and John Pitt was given the post as deputy-
governor of Fort St. David, becoming his cousin's second-in-command on the Coast.134 
Coincidentally, it was the New Company who originally recognised the need to work 
through the Pitt kinship network on the Coast to achieve its ends. As the Old Company 
reported to Governor Pitt, the New Company had sent his cousin to the Coromandel 
Coast in the expectation that it would ‘influence Affairs in their favour.’135 With their 
ability to cross public and private boundaries, transcend spaces of jurisdictional conflict 
and create alternate formats of political dialogue, kinship networks ensured the political 
and sovereign integrity of the Company at the turn of the eighteenth century. 
  As well as crossing and binding together contested spaces of Company 
jurisdiction and authority, kinship networks also counteracted the significant limitations 
posed by official channels of communication within the Company by utilizing and 
sharing their own informational networks. Theoretically, the court of directors in 
Europe sought to increase and maximise their receipt of information by maintaining an 
efficient bureaucracy through insistence on organised record keeping and ordered 
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correspondence by their servants.136 In Asia, communication was hierarchically and 
lineally arranged. The numerous subordinate stations and their agents were at the 
bottom of the ladder, communicating only through their presidency towns, of which the 
latter’s governors and councils possessed a monopoly over channels of communication 
to the directors in London. Subordinate stations could not directly cross-communicate 
with each other, nor with presidency towns to whom they were not subordinate, and 
most especially not directly with London. Likewise, presidency towns could not directly 
communicate with stations subordinate to other presidency towns.137 The rigidity of this 
system was made worse by the infrequency of communication, which was limited to 
one annual letter from London to the main presidency towns, replied to by one from 
each presidency town with the return of the ships, a process that could take up to two 
years.138 
The asymmetrical information flow produced by the Company’s hierarchical 
monopolisation of communication served to create a culture of long-term 
accountability.139 What it did not serve to create, however, was a comprehensive and 
up-to-date knowledge of Company affairs, either for governors and their councils in 
Asia, or for the directors in London.140 Sir Josiah Child acknowledged these limitations 
in 1681. Observing the greater control exerted by the Levant Company over its servants 
and affairs in Turkey, Child pointed out that 'India is at a far greater distance: no certain 
return of a Letter to be had once in Twelve moneths: and the Princes and Ports there, are 
at a wider distance one from another, than it is from England to Turkey'.141 Thus, 
                                                 
136 Ogborn, Indian Ink, pp. 67-103. 
137 Ibid., p. 80 and pp. 92-3. 
138 H. V. Bowen, The Business of Empire: the East India Company and Imperial Britain, 1756-1833 
(Cambridge, 2008), p. 154. 
139 For example, see Bhavani Raman, Document Raj: Writing and Scribes in Early Colonial South India 
(London, 2012). 
140 Bowen, Business of Empire, p. 151. 
141 Philopatris, A Treatise, p. 37. 
212 
temporal, spatial and, most importantly, administrative obstacles limited the speed, 
frequency and accuracy of information flow and placed official authorities at a distinct 
disadvantage in in their decision-making processes, and thus in governing the Company 
itself. 
These limitations had been exposed as early as the 1680s, when Asia was 
opened up to a swarm of interlopers, trading directly from England in defiance of the 
Company’s monopoly. Before the arrival of the New Company in 1698, the Bay of 
Bengal had already emerged as a contested space of jurisdiction as European interlopers 
attempted to carry on a trade with merchants of the Mughal Empire up and down the 
Coromandel Coast and across Bengal. The ports of Balasore and Hugli in particular had, 
by the 1690s, become active interloper bases, with potentially ruinous consequences, 
not just for the Company’s trade, but its political authority in Asia. The problem lay in 
the fact that Company servants stationed at these ports collaborated with, and protected, 
interlopers in order to profit from their illicit trade. For example, the future governor of 
Madras, Thomas Pitt, was an active interloper at Hugli who married the daughter of the 
Company’s chief agent there and undertook joint commercial ventures with him.142 
While both East India House and Madras were aware of the problem, they had little idea 
of the extent of such collaboration, which reached the highest levels in Bengal. Only 
when the Company’s chaplain at Madras, John Evans, suddenly absconded from his 
duties in 1693 and joined a ship heading to Balasore, was the scale of the conspiracy 
between interlopers and Company servants revealed, with the governor of Madras 
summoning his brother-in-law, Richard Trenchfield, to account for his actions.143 
Before the inclusion of the Scattergoods, as related in the previous chapter, the 
Trenchfield family had established a kinship network which stretched across the Bay of 
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Bengal. Since 1684 members had been stationed in the Company’s main settlements in 
Bengal, including Dacca, Balasore and Hugli, as well as down the coast at Madras. At 
Balasore, for example, Richard Trenchfield, John Evans and their cousin Thomas 
Pointall had engaged in trade with interlopers. Indeed, the Chief of Bengal William 
Hedges had described Richard at that time as 'a great favorer of ye Interlopers', while 
his chaplain brother-in-law was reported by Hedges as 'too much in trade and 
merchandize, for a man of his Coat: being certainly one of ye greatest traders in 
Hugly.'144 Evans had absconded from Madras in 1693 to manage the network’s trading 
interests with the interlopers at Balasore when Richard Trenchfield had returned from 
there with his new Scattergood family. However, when Richard was summoned by the 
governor to account for his brother-in-law’s actions, he made his network’s 
correspondence available for the governor and his council to read.  
The correspondence revealed the breadth of collaboration between interlopers 
and Company servants as well as providing Madras with a detailed account of the 
situation in the Bay of Bengal and even the wider political and constitutional situation 
in Europe regarding the Company's monopoly.145 Governor Nathaniel Higginson 
admitted to having little knowledge about such developments, and had received 'no 
advice' from the court of directors as to what measures they should take.146 The council 
was surprised to discover that English merchants were 'being sent out by the Kings 
Parliament to overhall all the affairs of India and make report in England in order to the 
settlement of a new Company...and have allso struck in with the Countrey [i.e. Mughal] 
Government to drive a trade separate from and in Competition with the Companys'.147 
By mobilizing the channels of information provided by the correspondence of the 
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Trenchfield kinship network, the Company was able to understand the true extent of 
collaboration between Company servants and interlopers, and confront the challenge to 
their commerce and authority in Bengal.148 As Governor Higginson declared in council 
following these revelations, 'wee doe thinke ourselves obliged to doe all that in us lyes 
to prevent such a publick mischief', a statement which was followed up with tougher 
sanctions and policies against the growth of interlopers.149  
Kinship networks proved adept at facilitating non-linear information flow 
around the Company by crossing official hierarchies and subverting communication 
monopolies. 'This short letter only serves to introduce you to my brother Trenchfield', 
John Scattergood wrote to Sir Robert Nightingale, chairman of the court of directors, 
from the Chinese port of Canton in 1719. '[He] can inform you fully how all India 
matters attend on all sides’.150 At Canton, the Chinese authorities forbade European 
companies from establishing permanent factories until 1751.151 Thus in the early 
eighteenth century, the Company was forced to rely on lengthy relays of information 
between the supercargoes of ships visiting Canton and the presidency towns to which 
they returned with their goods who then, eventually, passed information on to the 
directors in London regarding the Chinese coast. 
Elihu Trenchfield’s arrival at the Company’s headquarters in Leadenhall Street, 
London, provided the chairman and court of directors with a crucial connection to 
Canton and the Company’s affairs there. As supercargo of the Company’s ship Bonita 
trading to Canton, with his uncle Thomas Harris as captain, John Scattergood was able 
to feed Chairman Nightingale with detailed accounts of the trade and politics of the 
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Chinese coast through letters carried and received by his brother Elihu.152 In doing so, 
Scattergood’s kinship network circumvented official hierarchies and monopolies of 
communication, writing directly to London through his kinship network. That private 
correspondence reached London quicker and more regularly than the official despatches 
of the presidency towns was constantly lamented by the directors.153  The letters sent by 
John Scattergood and disseminated by his brother, built up a detailed picture of 
commodity prices, foreign competition and political rivalry at Canton, information 
which was crucial to the Company’s success in this new commerce. 'The China trade 
now is going to decay by the reason of so many ships coming here', John wrote to his 
brother, for Sir Robert’s benefit, in November 1719, ‘which is making everything 
prodigious dear, especially gold'.154 The advantages in relying on kinship networks to 
provide accurate and comprehensive flows of information was argued by John 
Scattergood himself who informed Chairman Nightingale that his brother was the most 
suitable provider of information from Asia as he had ‘been in all parts and being thoroly 
acquainted with all persons and affairs.'155 This stood in stark contrast to the 
asymmetrical and rigid channels of communication which limited the Company’s 
ability to ascertain relevant information and knowledge of its affairs in Asia.  
To some extent, the Pitt, Trenchfield and Scattergood networks facilitated East 
India House’s control over affairs in Asia, whether by integrating servants from rival 
companies or by creating efficient channels of communication between East India 
House and its servants. While this might appear to represent the institutionalisation of 
what had previously been antagonistic and aggressively independent networks, the 
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contrary was in fact true. Kinship networks were occasionally willing to facilitate 
greater central control over Asia as long as it served to benefit the private interests of its 
members. For example, Thomas Pitt appeared to contemporaries to have utterly 
reformed from his interloping days when he had physically opposed the authority of the 
Company in Bengal in conjunction with his cousin, Matthias Vincent. According to one 
Company servant at Madras when discussing Pitt’s loyalty to East India House, the 
governor was ‘very zealous to the Interest he espouses.’156 
However, after the two rival companies merged to form the United East India 
Company in 1704, East India House was increasingly dominated by the Heathcote 
family, whose head, Sir George Heathcote, was chairman of the court of directors. The 
Heathcotes were determined to remove Governor Pitt from Madras for his part in 
opposing the New Company, in which they had held substantial shares.157 Urging Pitt to 
act in a more submissive manner towards Sir George in 1705, John DuBois, secretary of 
the Company, warned that ‘he and his family have a very large stock…and one brother 
or other of them will always be of the Managers [of the Company].’158 When East India 
House sent out a supervisor to investigate Pitt’s private interests, particularly his use of 
60,000 Company pagodas in his own trading ventures, they chose Robert Braddyll, one 
of the governor’s greatest enemies.159 The reason behind this aggressive move against 
Pitt by the Heathcote family was obvious. As a friend of Pitt’s informed him in 1707, 
‘Sir Gilbert is the Sovereign of the New [United] Company…The snake in the grass is 
jealous of power.’ As a result, the chairman of the directors had become Pitt’s ‘mortal 
enemy, and will omit no opportunity to affront you.’160  As Thomas Pitt’s interests 
came under attack, he responded by abandoning the relationship with East India House 
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and turned instead to obstructing their designs at Madras. In 1707, for example, Thomas 
Pitt wrote to the court of directors in an attempt to persuade those of the Old Company 
to dissolve their union with the New Company.161 He also dismissed and imprisoned 
William Frasier from the council, a man handpicked by East India House to eventually 
replace Pitt at Madras.162 ‘I think there is not such a Wretch in the world for Mischeife 
and Compassing Confusion’, Pitt wrote of Frasier to friends in Britain, ‘and this is a 
Saint of the New Company’s.’163 Pitt was willing to facilitate East India House’s 
authority in Asia only so long as his network’s interests had been served. As soon as 
this beneficial arrangement broke down, the governor was quick to reassert his 
independence and subvert the public interest of his masters at Madras. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has revealed how the agency of Company servants and their wider kinship 
networks between 1680 and 1730 facilitated the emergence of the colonial state in Asia, 
a polity that was developed predominantly through private interests. By transcending 
public and private boundaries, as in the case of the Pitts at Madras, or monopolising 
political establishments, as the Charnocks did in Bengal, Company servants and their 
kinship networks created private systems of governance and expanded political rights 
and authority in Asia. As processes of state formation, they were sometimes 
unconscious, often incidental and even, in some cases, unintended, as was the case for 
the Vincents in Bengal. But they could also be coherent, planned and rigidly pursued 
over long periods of time, as they certainly were at Calcutta. Whether purposeful or not, 
such agency transformed the political position of the Company in Asia between 1680 
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and 1730. The result was the formation of a politically amorphous colonial polity, 
comprised ‘not so much [of] bounded entities, but rather specific juxtapositions of 
multiple trajectories’.164 
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Metropolitan Networks in the Later Eighteenth Century 
 
 
The battle of Plassey in 1757 and the subsequent conquest of Bengal has fascinated both 
contemporary and modern historians. They have seen it as a prism through which the 
Company’s engagement with South Asia is to be understood.1 It has also been 
represented as the catalyst for private interests in India.2 Most significantly, it has been 
seen as the point when the Company transitioned from ‘merchant to sovereign’.3 Even 
the most recent scholarship continues to use the battle of Plassey as the focal point for 
the study of the Company’s development in Asia.4 David Armitage summarised this 
trend when he concluded that the British Empire’s ‘ascent began with British victory at 
the battle of Plassey in 1757’, from which it continued unabated until after the Second 
World War.5 Despite the various analytical contexts of Plassey, a consensus has 
emerged amongst historians that the conquest of Bengal represented a fundamental shift 
in the history of the Company in Asia, and the British Empire more widely.6 However, 
as this study has so far revealed, much of what historians believe Plassey represents, 
including the contest between public and private interests, the beginning of imperial 
expansion and even the formation of the colonial state, had been underway for more 
than a century. When placed within the context of Company kinship networks, the battle 
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of Plassey and the subsequent conquest of Bengal do not seem to signify as 
revolutionary a break in the Company’s development as has been suggested. It rather 
appears as a continuity with the longer history of private agency in which Company 
servants shaped and transformed the political environment in Asia in conjunction with 
their family networks. 
 For instance, the successful efforts of Job Charnock and his kinship network in 
transforming the Bengal establishment from a string of dependent factories into an 
independent territorial power, as discussed in the previous chapter, provided the 
political conditions for the subsequent conquest of much of Bengal by the Company 
from the mid-eighteenth century onwards. After Charnock’s acquisition of the village of 
Sutanati and the assumption by his son-in-law Charles Eyre of the zamindari of Calcutta 
in 1698, a fundamental shift in the political development of the Bengal establishment 
took place. In the 1680s, the nawab of Bengal and his local governors had squeezed 
Company servants at their various factories for taxes, loans and bribes, seizing goods, 
expelling servants and laying siege to factories when opposed. The weakness of the 
Bengal establishment, as revealed by Agent Hedges’ humiliation at the hands of the 
governor of Hugli in 1683, facilitated such exploitation.7 But when another governor of 
Hugli attempted to extort a large sum from the Company at Calcutta twenty years later, 
the latter declared to the court of directors that they were ‘resolved to part with nothing 
choosing rather to spend your Honours money in powder and Shott then to be always 
giving to every little Rascall’.8 As a result of the agency of kinship networks, Company 
servants at Calcutta were secure in their European fortifications and in their exercise of 
                                                 
7 See chapter 4. 
8 Wilson, OFW, Bengal to Court of Directors, Calcutta, 15 August 1702, vol. 1, p. 51. 
221 
political independence and thus willing to both deploy and project military force against 
regional Mughal authorities.9 
 The Company’s metropolitan authorities at East India House were unable to 
adequately project their policies in Asia in the face of the political agency of their 
servants and the networks they established and utilised. Furthermore, as this final 
chapter in part two argues, the Company’s metropolitan authorities were themselves 
gradually prone to being reshaped by these networks. For example, the role of East 
India House in acquiring royal charters for expanding the Company’s constitutional and 
legal authority, as discussed in chapter one, is often cited as proof of its ability to 
determine the political environment of Asia. However, new charters merely reflected or 
ratified rights and actions already acquired and committed by Company servants and 
their networks in Asia. The acquisition of a charter from James II in 1686 authorised the 
Company to wage war and claim territory in its own right, independent of parliamentary 
or royal oversight. But far from empowering servants in Asia with new military powers, 
the charter rather sought to legitimise a process already underway. Indeed, Company 
servants had waged war before 1686, as evidenced by the campaigns of Agent William 
Hedges and his successor Job Charnock at Bengal against the Mughal authorities. 
In fact, Sir Josiah Child pursued the charter in reaction to these campaigns. In 
1680, the court of directors, including Child, had declared that they were ‘averse to all 
kinds of war in India’, emphasising the ‘very great imprudence’ to be met with in 
fighting ‘those great and mighty princes which might seem to obstruct our trade and 
ruin us.’10 Barely six years later, however, after the failed conflict between Hedges and 
the governor of Hugli, and during the early stages of Charnock’s subsequent war against 
the nawab of Bengal, Child applied to James II for the charter. Indeed, his policies as 
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the Company’s new chairman were shaped by his correspondence with Charnock, who, 
then in the midst of sacking and burning the Mughal town of Balasore, advised the 
chairman that ‘peace is best made with the Sword in hand, ffor a Mogull’s 
perfidiousness is too Subtill [subtle] for any other pollicy’.11 Too weak to implement its 
own designs in Asia, policy formation in East India House was becoming 
predominantly reactionary to the actions of its servants and their kinship networks. King 
James II confirmed this when he declared that the reason for granting the Company the 
right to wage war and claim territory in 1686 was because he was ‘given to understand 
that many of the Native princes and Gov[e]r[nor]s of India…taking opportunity from ye 
Divisions, distractions or rebellions, amongst the English, occasioned by the late 
licentious trading of Interlopers, have of late…besieged their factories invaded their 
Libertyes [and] endammaged and abused their Chiefs and ffactors’.12 
Rather than representing the beginning of the colonial state in Asia, or a sudden 
shift from trade to rule, the conquest of Bengal was actually the process through which 
Company servants and their kinship networks deconstructed metropolitan authority at 
East India House and reshaped it according to their own interests. Many historians have 
argued that the later eighteenth century was the period in which the British state began 
to intervene and oversee the Company’s affairs in Asia, transforming it into a colonial 
arm of the domestic state.13 As this chapter will demonstrate, the reverse was in fact 
true. From the 1750s onwards, as their private interests spread across Asia on an 
unprecedented scale, Company kinship networks intervened in the metropole to secure 
support and protection for their gains and successes. While thinking about the 
application of new imperial history methodologies, Catherine Hall has identified that 
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this process represented ‘a return to the centre, but now from the margins, a process not 
of affirmation, but of deconstruction’.14 This process of counter-colonialism - of 
political realities in Asia informing and determining the policies and designs of the 
metropole – was particularly evident in the Clive kinship network’s involvement in the 
conquest of Bengal from the mid-eighteenth century.15 
 
The Clive Family and the Political Settlement of Bengal 
Much like the foundation of the Bengal Presidency at the turn of the eighteenth century, 
the subsequent subjugation of the province was driven by the agency of Company 
servants and their family networks. As deputy-governor of Fort St. David and 
commander and chief of the Company’s forces in India, Robert Clive and his 
subordinates, many of whom were also members of his family, sought to capitalise and 
expand the policies of the Charnocks a generation before. But far from just preserving 
the Company’s political independence in Bengal, they sought to expand its authority 
and rights over the entire regions, predominantly by expanding the military capabilities 
and resources of the Bengal establishment.  
However, the scale of the project required the application of force beyond what 
local resources could offer Company families in Bengal. While the Charnocks created 
an independent colonial stronghold at Calcutta with no more than 300 troops, the Clives 
would require several thousand, along with the materiel and capital which would be 
necessary to maintain such a war machine. Thus, after the battle of Plassey, in which 
Robert Clive installed a puppet nawab on the throne, the Clive family reshaped the aims 
of their kinship group which had spread across Asia by 1757. Responding to the needs 
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of the Clives, what had been an extensively Asian-wide network became a 
predominantly metropolitan network, tasked with managing the reception and reaction 
of East India House to the new conquests carried out by the Robert Clive and his kin. 
This metropolitan network shaped the court of directors’ political response, ensuring 
that the settlement of the new conquest, one engineered by Robert Clive and, as such, 
particularly advantageous to the Clive kinship network, would endure through the 
metropole’s continued financial and military assistance. Furthermore, recognising the 
decentred nature of the metropole itself, the Clive network looked beyond East India 
House, canvassing and influencing other metropolitan authorities, including parliament, 
the aristocracy and the Crown. 
On the eve of his departure from Calcutta in August 1757, at the head of the 
Company’s army to march on the French settlement of Chandernagore further north up 
the Hugli, Robert Clive sat down to compose a detailed letter to his father, Richard 
Clive, in London. 'A Revolution has been effected…scarcely to be paralleled in 
History', he declared in somewhat dramatic fashion.16 Robert was speaking, of course, 
about the infamous battle of Plassey between the Company's forces and those of Siraj-
ud-daula, nawab of Bengal. Robert then proceeded in some detail about the campaign 
and the battle from which the Company emerged victorious, hinting at the vast gifts 
now bequeathed to him by a grateful Mir Jafar, whom Robert had just installed in 
Murshidabad as the new nawab: 'If I can get into Parliament I shall be very glad', Robert 
concluded to his father.17 A flurry of correspondence to Britain followed, with Robert 
relaying the campaign and its consequences to various family members, including his 
cousin Sir Edward Clive, or 'the Judge' to his family. Apologising for not having the 
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time to write a longer letter, Robert reassured his cousin that 'My Father will receive a 
journal of our military proceeds and I have desired him to show it to you.'18  
 Robert Clive described his victory at Plassey to his father as having been 
achieved 'by means of the Military only'.19 In doing so, he fashioned a particular 
representation of events for consumption by the directors at East India House. Indeed, 
Robert and his Clive relations were proponents of an expansion of political rights for 
Company servants in Bengal and elsewhere in Asia, a result which could be achieved 
only through the projection of military force over regional rulers. This policy was partly 
formed through a common political ambition of Company servants in Asia at that time, 
as seen in the previous chapter, but also, as a Lieutenant Colonel himself, Robert and 
his wider kin had much to gain through an expansion of the Company’s military 
resources and capabilities. It was therefore essential that East India House believed that 
the expansion of the Company’s political power in Bengal following the battle of 
Plassey was due entirely to the Company's army and particularly Robert’s strategic 
brilliance, rather than the extensive negotiations and intrigues between the resident at 
Murshidabad, William Watts, and disaffected members of the nawab's regime, including 
Mir Jafar.20  
The French Wars in the Carnatic since the 1740s had led to a considerable 
militarisation of the Company's settlements, including the arrival of regiments from the 
regular British Army as well as the augmentation of the Company's own military 
establishment.21 Indeed, whilst the entire Madras Presidency maintained only 350 
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European soldiers in 1751,22 Robert Clive commanded 1,000 Europeans at Plassey a 
mere six years later.23 Although this growth was set to continue, especially as the 
conflict with the French and their Indian allies intensified, new responsibilities 
following the victory at Plassey required a far greater increase in military resources. At 
first glance, the treaty signed between Mir Jafar and Robert Clive seemed conservative 
in its demands: confirmation of Mir Jafar as the new nawab in exchange for recognition 
of the Company’s firman rights and the payment of reparations for the Company’s war 
effort.24 In reality, a considerable expansion of the Company’s political and territorial 
power in Bengal had been achieved, including the acquisition of a much larger 
zemindari south of Calcutta and an alliance with the nawab.25 The military resources 
required to uphold this settlement, in manpower alone, proved to be enormous. Robert 
Clive’s main priority following the battle of Plassey was thus to secure the settlement’s 
future, principally through an expansion of the Company’s military capabilities. 
Much like the battle which had made it possible, Robert Clive described his new 
settlement of Bengal as a ‘revolution’. Although it is unlikely that he thought of it in 
terms of the beginning of a great empire in Asia, he certainly believed it to have 
dramatically tipped the balance of power within Bengal in the Company's favour, with a 
Company-backed nawab providing special rights and privileges to Company servants 
there.26 Such an advantageous situation could only survive, believed Robert, if the 
Company was willing to provide the necessary manpower: 'I persuade myself the 
importance of your possessions now in Bengal', Robert wrote to the court of directors a 
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month after Plassey, 'will determine you to send out...a large and early supply of troops 
and good officers.'27 It was a plea that he made constantly to the directors as he struck 
out across Bengal in the wake of his victory at Plassey, enforcing the new political 
settlement with what he viewed to be an insufficient number of men, as when he wrote 
to convince the Director William Mabbot to send out more officers, 'for be assured there 
are very few in your service at present.'28 
 The settlement with Mir Jafar and the belief that the new advantages gained for 
the Company from the 'revolution' could only be maintained with an expansion of the 
military and its use to protect the Company's interests, was Robert’s own policy. As the 
main instigator and executor of such a policy, Robert’s standing within the Company 
and his reputation at home stood to gain or decline according to its success. Indeed 
when he wrote to the newly enthroned Mir Jafar in 1757 that 'The fate of the English is 
twisted with yours like two threads', he was well aware that he had the most to lose 
should such threads become unravelled.29 For while the decision to retake the 
Company's settlement of Calcutta after it had been sacked by Siraj-ud-daula in 1756 
was virtually unanimous at Madras and London, the loss of which cost the Company an 
estimated £2m and sent its stock plummeting,30 Robert was fully aware that using the 
force now under his command to enact a regime change by attacking and dethroning the 
nawab would have exceeded his mandate.31 Since Robert’s victory over Siraj-ud-daula 
in February 1757 had secured Calcutta and forced the nawab to conclude peace with the 
Company, he had been placed under intense pressure by Fort St George to return to 
Madras where the struggle against the French had become acute. 'I make no doubt but 
the forces are impatiently expected at Madras', Robert wrote to the governor, George 
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Pigot, 'It is a very great blow which has detained them - no less than the attack and 
taking of Chandernagore'.32 But every new campaign Robert launched in Bengal after 
the battle of Plassey had to be justified in the face of increasing opposition. Indeed, the 
biggest threat against the Company was materialising in the south of India, where the 
French were closing in on Madras and Fort St David. Despite this, Robert claimed to 
Pigot that the conquest of Chandernagore was 'of more consequence to the Company, in 
my opinion, than the taking of Pondicherry itself'.33  
 Aware of his critics and their opposition to further expansion in Bengal, Robert 
announced to the congregation at Mir Jafar's installation ceremony following his victory 
at Plassey that the Company would now 'attend solely to commerce' which was their 
'proper sphere'.34 He did so in the hope of reassuring not just his audience of anxious 
Bengalis, but also his peers in India and East India House in London. The cost to the 
Company of the loss of Calcutta had been put at some £2m, while the Plassey campaign 
had placed an almost unbearable burden on the Company's treasury.35 The new 
chairman, Laurence Sulivan, lamented that £1m in goods and stores were dispatched to 
India in 1757 alone.36 Robert’s incessant campaigning in the wake of Plassey only 
confirmed the court of directors’ worries that the Company's new obligations in Bengal 
would drain its finances and absorb all of its military resources. But for Robert, any 
reduction in the Company's military effort would not only have undermined his 
'revolutionary' new political settlement in Bengal, but also his own personal authority 
and private gains as head of the military establishment. Robert was incessant in 
conveying just how dependent the new regime would be on force of arms, as he 
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informed his cousin Sir Edward, barely a month after placing the new nawab on his 
munsud, that Mir Jafar 'by his misconduct hath occasioned no less than 3 Rebellions in 
his Dominions which are now [finally] at an End by our taking the Field'.37  
Such demands on his army reduced Robert’s forces to 500 Europeans and 3,500 
Indian sepoys at the end of 1757. This was further reduced in the following May after 
increasing criticism from the council at Calcutta forced Robert to send 2,000 sepoys 
back to garrison the city.38 Anxious that his dwindling resources might prevent him 
from securing his settlement of Bengal, Robert wrote to Calcutta that before he returned 
to Britain he hoped the settlement with the nawab ‘will be fulfilled’ and that ‘such a 
force arrived from England as may secure to the Company their valuable acquisitions’. 
These objectives, he concluded, ‘are what I have always had much at heart.'39 Robert’s 
settlement, which consisted of upholding the nawab’s authority in Bengal with 
Company troops while using the revenues of his province to increase the Company’s 
commercial profits and political authority, was referred to by contemporaries as the 
'dual system' and acted as the foundation of Robert’s policy for India.40 He believed that 
his political settlement for Bengal was utterly incapable of surviving without the 
Company's force of arms, and Mir Jafar's authority was only enforceable 'under the 
Wings of the English reputation', as he noted to Chairman Sulivan at the end of 1758. 'I 
am persuaded You will believe I do not want to aggrandize the Company,' his letter 
concluded, but only a substantial amount of force 'can enable us to secure our present 
Acquisitions'.41 
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 By detaining the Company's largest army on the sub-continent in Bengal for so 
long, Robert left the Madras Presidency dangerously exposed to French attack. He was 
aware of the risk, as he wrote to his cousin, John Walsh, in early 1759. 'There are many 
in Calcutta who think strongly of my marching to the north with our whole Force at a 
time when we are fighting for our All at Madrass.'42 As his attempt to consolidate and 
expand his own authority in Bengal following Plassey attracted increasing opposition 
from Company servants in India and criticism from East India House, Robert sought to 
utilise his kinship network to ensure the survival of his 'dual system' of power, one in 
which the nawab was to act as the de jure ruler of Bengal while the Company would act 
as its de facto ruler. By not only representing the Plassey campaign in a positive light, 
but one that both emphasised the importance of the military and himself as its 
commander, Robert Clive hoped to gain support for his policies and private gain for 
himself and family. The metropolitan connections of the Clive kinship network were to 
gain new significance in shaping the early modern colonial state in Asia. 
 
Metropolitan Networks and the Reshaping of Company Policy 
The metropolitan members of the Clive kinship network had been instrumental in 
promoting the family’s wider colonial ambitions long before the battle of Plassey in 
1757. Indeed Robert Clive had relied on family and kin in Britain to influence the 
policies and perceptions of East India House as early as 1751. As Robert converged on 
the French-controlled settlement of Arcot at the head of a small Company force in 
southern India in 1751, his father Richard Clive was simultaneously converging on 
London where he had moved the Clive family to live in a large house in Swithin's Lane. 
He did so to be closer to the official centres of metropolitan authority: East India House 
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and Parliament. From the practical proximity of Swithin’s Lane, Richard lobbied 
politicians and other influential groups on his son's behalf.43 As the most zealous and 
active member of the metropolitan circuit of the Clive kinship network, Richard took 
his role so seriously that in a letter from Robert’s mother Rebecca, she stated that they 
moved purposefully close to the post office to receive Robert’s correspondence from 
Asia as quickly as possible.44 Richard saw every advantage in his son’s interpretation of 
events in India being the first East India House and the political community in London 
consumed, a view shared by Robert. For example, when actively campaigning and 
unable to write, Robert made sure that his wife Margaret took over the role, 'to write 
you all the particulars', as he had informed his father before leaving Madras for Bengal 
in 1756.45 
Robert Clive’s letters to his father were not just personal correspondences, but 
were consciously written for a wider audience, being carefully composed to describe a 
particular representation of events or to emphasise a certain opinion or policy. Richard 
too reacted appropriately. Upon receiving these letters, journals and correspondence, he 
personally delivered them to important political figures both within and without East 
India House. He frequently waited on the chairman of the court of directors or the 
foreign secretary, recounting his son’s campaigns and canvassing support for his 
policies. This strategy quickly bore fruit, for both father and son. In 1752, Richard 
disseminated the news and details of his son’s victories in the Carnatic against the 
French-backed nawab, Chanda Saheb, to London society at various dinners and parties. 
The effectiveness in using the metropolitan circuit of his kinship network to distribute 
news is evident upon Richard’s visit to East India House at the end of 1752. When he 
arrived to provide the court of directors with an account of Robert’s success in the 
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Carnatic, Richard discovered that he had taken the directors by complete surprise as 
they had yet to receive any news themselves through official channels from India.46 
Richard then proceeded to wait on three of the most influential directors, 'to find out if I 
could what they proposd for you...they are very desirous to do you any Service in their 
power', as he informed his son immediately after.47 Having made an intimate 
acquaintance of one of these directors, Richard urged his son to stay at Madras to await 
his reward from the Company.  
 Richard's visit to East India House had the desired effect. Shortly afterwards, the 
court of directors wrote to the governor of Fort St. David 'of the great regard they had 
for the merit of Captain Clive, to whose courage and conduct the late turn in our affairs 
has been mainly due; he may be assured of our having a just sense of his services.'48 
However, Robert had already departed for Europe. When he reached Britain in October 
1753, the court presented him with a diamond-encrusted sword worth £500. More 
importantly, however, they declared their willingness to defer to 'his Opinion on Affairs 
in those parts' of Asia.49 When Robert made his case for an expansion of the Company’s 
military establishment in India, the directors appointed him as the new deputy-governor 
of Fort St. David, the second most important post on the Coromandel Coast, as well as 
promoting him to Lieutenant Colonel. When he sailed in 1755, Robert was 
accompanied by a Royal Navy fleet with enough forces to contest the supremacy of 
southern India with the French.50 He was also able to appoint a number of his kin to 
important positions that would provide them with lucrative private gains. For example, 
Robert ‘had made’ his cousin George Clive judge advocate of the expedition, 
responsible for distributing any prize money, from which he could also claim a 
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commission.51 By using his kinship network to disseminate accounts of his exploits in 
India and gain support for his policies within the metropole, Robert had successfully 
undermined the official channels of communication by at once being the first to convey 
knowledge of events there, and, more importantly, doing so in a way favourable to his 
own, and his family’s, advancement. 
 Robert Clive continued to depend on his metropolitan kinship network to further 
the interests of the family in Asia. When the expedition which he commanded arrived at 
Bombay in 1755, it was decided that the pirate base of Gheria which had, for many 
decades, preyed on the Company’s shipping at Bombay, would be attacked. Robert was 
aware that such a campaign would enhance his own reputation in Britain. He relayed to 
his father in the following January that 'The Strength we carry against [Gheria] by Sea 
& land gives us hope of Success; the news of which may serve to make a Paragraph in 
the news Papers'.52 Unfortunately for Robert, as he soon discovered, Gheria's 
disposition made it almost unassailable from land, which meant that Admiral Watson, 
commander of the fleet which Robert had sailed to Asia with, was more likely to 
capture the pirate-base. After two days of bombardment by Watson's fleet, Gheria in 
fact capitulated. Robert was then quick to play down the victory, writing to his father, 
for transmission to the directors, that news of Watson’s victory might now ‘swell’ the 
papers with a ‘Pompous account of the taking of the place’ which, he concluded, 
actually ‘proved a very easy conquest’.53 Having belittled Watson's achievement, 
Robert nonetheless sent a journal to the directors detailing his own role in the 
expedition, which included an account of his marching the army inland to block an 
advancing Maratha force from acquiring a share of the spoils.54 
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 Perhaps the most ambitious use of his metropolitan kinship network before his 
victory at Plassey in 1757, however, came when Robert landed in Bengal earlier in the 
year to retake the Company's settlement of Calcutta, which had been captured by 
Nawab Siraj-au-Daula in 1756. When he accomplished this with relative ease, Robert 
seized the opportunity to attack the nawab's entrenched army not far from Calcutta, 
which was quickly driven off. He recounted the military action in considerable detail in 
a letter to his father Richard and informed him that his victory had most likely saved the 
Company, and as such it was now 'a proper time to push my interest'.55 Robert informed 
his father that he wished to be appointed ‘Governor General’ of all Company 
settlements in India, and tasked Richard with the responsibility of realising this 
ambition. 'I would have you manage this affair’, he wrote to his father. ‘I shall send you 
a journal of our military proceedings, and I enclose you the letters to Great Men under 
flying seals for your perusal and for your delivery.'56 Robert enclosed more copies of his 
military journal for Richard to present to various politicians, including the secretary of 
state, Henry Fox, and Lord Barrington, secretary at war.57  
Although within a few months Robert’s actions at Calcutta were to be eclipsed 
by his victory at Plassey, Richard nonetheless fervently set about the task of canvassing 
support for his son’s appointment as governor-general of India. He visited directors, 
shareholders, ministers and peers, delivering Robert’s journals and letters, discussing 
his victories and generally seeking support for his policies amongst the metropole’s 
political elite. 'I took care to let the Great men have your Letters’, Richard replied to his 
son. ‘Every body I meet say why is not the Colonel sent for home that we may have 
success in England which were to be wished for indeed'.58 Meetings with, amongst 
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others, the Duke of Newcastle, Lord Hardwicke, Henry Fox and Lord Barrington led to 
the beginning of important political alliances for Robert Clive, each of whom furnished 
Richard with letters for his son of congratulations and expressions of support for his 
victories and subsequent designs for the Company in Bengal. As Richard noted, they 
'desire their willingness to serve you and [do] anything in their Power'.59 
 The importance of the metropolitan ties of the Clive kinship network reached 
new levels of significance following Robert’s victory at the battle of Plassey on 23 June 
1757, in which he defeated the nawab of Bengal and placed his own candidate on the 
throne. When news of Plassey arrived in Britain in late 1757 and early 1758, Richard 
redoubled his efforts in promoting his son's achievements and in furthering the family’s 
interests at East India House and in Parliament. He did so specifically with the aim of 
increasing the Company’s military establishment, the result of which would protect 
Robert’s new settlement in Bengal and thus the substantial gains made by many 
members of the network who had travelled with him. Richard’s tireless efforts soon 
earned the notice of societal gossip Horace Walpole who, observing Richard bustling 
between the anterooms of the rich and powerful, presenting letters and journals from his 
son, nicknamed him the 'old rustic' on account of its seeming absurdity.60 Similarly, 
despite building a strong political relationship with the Duke of Devonshire on Robert’s 
behalf, Richard's constant canvassing of his son's achievements led to the Duke's friend, 
Lord Kinnoull, writing to him of Richard in 1758 that 'I believe he is an honest, hearty 
friend to you; but really the extraordinary success of his family seems almost to have 
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overset his mind. It appeared so to people at Buxton this summer where he passed two 
or three days.'61  
Robert was himself conscious of the need for the metropolitan members of his 
kinship network to operate more subtly in pursuit of his ambitions and policies. For 
example, several months before Plassey, in the same letter to his father in which Robert 
had announced his desire to be made governor-general of India, he also cautioned his 
father Richard to manage the design 'with great prudence and discretion', requesting that 
he not mention the title 'Governor General' outright unless someone brought it up first, 
while also urging him to keep the very contents of the letter a secret.62 After the victory 
at Plassey, however, Robert worried that 'this good news may set my Father upon 
exerting himself too much' and would thus cause him to pay too many visits to East 
India House and Whitehall. 'I know my Fathers Disposition leads this way,' he wrote to 
a friend from Calcutta, 'which proceeds from his affection for me.'63 He therefore wrote 
again to Richard and urged him to consult his cousins, Sir Edward Clive and William 
Smyth King, the latter having recently returned from the Company's service at Madras, 
on how best to further his interests and policies.64 
 Indeed, Richard did not operate in isolation in the metropole. Robert was able to 
draw upon the most competent and influential members of the network in Britain to 
assist his father, maintaining a regular correspondence with each in which he 
disseminated news of events in India and his own part in them. Robert then urged them 
to work closely with his father on how best to proceed and gain the maximum 
advantage for the Clive family from such developments. This is best illustrated on the 
topic of the post of governor-general, so coveted for a time by Robert. William believed 
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Robert’s father was beginning to push the subject too far with various directors, and 
when he began negotiating with one shareholder to put forward a motion in court to 
have Robert made governor-general, William wrote to Robert to suggest that the whole 
plan should be dropped as it was only serving to antagonise people.65 Nonetheless, 
regular gatherings brought metropolitan members of the network together to discuss 
such decisions, plans, and strategies, for example after Richard had dined with Sir 
Edward Clive and William Smyth King in May 1757, he then paid a visit to East India 
House to wait upon the directors.66 Again in November 1759, Robert’s cousins Henry 
Clive and William Smyth King, and his brother-in-law Edmund Maskelyne, dined at Sir 
Edward Clive's house, at which they drank Robert’s health and discussed his 'Success 
against the Moguls son', the Shahzdah, who was repeatedly invading the Bengal frontier 
province of Bihar.67 
 Sir Edward Clive was perhaps the most influential of the metropolitan network 
before Robert’s success in India in the 1750s. Sir Edward had been called to the bar in 
1725 and stood for the borough of Mitchell in parliament from 1741 until he was 
appointed to the bench in 1745 where, as a friend and ally of Lord Hardwicke, the Lord 
Chancellor, he was made a Baron of the Exchequer.68 From this position of influence, 
Sir Edward provided Robert and his family with connections to powerful metropolitan 
figures. 'Sister Judith hath been with the Judge and his Lady', Richard commented to his 
son in 1756, '& bring her so much into the Company of Great Folks'.69 Through the 
good offices of Hardwicke, Robert was provided with an avenue to some of the 
metropole’s most powerful politicians, such as Lord Sandwich, leader of the House of 
Lords and a man consummately interested in the affairs of India and the Company. 
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Sandwich was only too happy to put Robert forward for the borough of Mitchell, which 
lay within his interest, after Sir Edward lobbied on Robert’s behalf when the latter 
returned to Britain after his celebratory campaigns in the Carnatic, to which he was duly 
elected in 1754.70 When Robert informed his cousin 'of the Grand Revolution affected 
in this part of the world by the Forces under my Command' shortly after the battle of 
Plassey in 1757, his intended audience was his political allies, including Lord Sandwich 
and Henry Fox, the latter of which Robert Clive considered to be the patron of the East 
India Company, and to whom he asked his father to visit and present a copy of his 
military journal.71 'I have seen your Father', Fox wrote to Robert soon after Richard’s 
visit in which he conveyed the news of Plassey, '& He is to tell me when it may be 
proper for me to [write]...He thinks nothing more necessary than that I assure you, as I 
most sincerely do, of the high Esteem & very great Regard, with which I have [for 
you]'.72 Through the combined and coordinated efforts of metropolitan members of the 
Clive kinship network, Robert Clive was provided with important channels and 
connections to some of the country's most powerful men: 'I have now access to L[or]d 
Hardwick...whenever I wait on [him]', Richard told his son in 1757, who, along with 
other prominent politicians, now had 'the most Sincere friendship for you'.73 
 Expressions of friendship were not enough to realise Robert’s ambition to 
become governor-general after his cousin William Smyth King suggested abandoning it. 
However, the careful cultivation of both political and public support for Robert during 
and immediately after the Plassey campaign by his family network nonetheless 
considerably shaped his image as a great military hero during these years. This 
consequence ensured the predominance of Robert’s 'dual system' of government in 
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Bengal and its adoption by the Company's directors. Delivering Robert’s first-hand 
accounts of his battles and campaigns in India to certain cabinet ministers helped shape 
the notion of India as a military theatre of importance in the Government's mind as 
global war with France occupied the country's attention and resources. For example, 
after forming a coalition with the Duke of Newcastle, William Pitt spoke at length in 
Parliament of India, where 'There he was pleased to say was a Heaven born General 
who...[was] not afraid to attack a very numerous army with a handful of Soldiers'. 
Richard wrote to his son that Pitt had given him 'the highest character such as I have not 
words to express...I have since left your journal [and] a Letter I copyed from several of 
yours...for his inspection'.74 Similarly much had been done to cement Robert’s 
reputation and interests within royal circles as well. As his father reported to Robert in 
December 1757, when the Commander-in-Chief of the British army had asked the King 
at court if a particular aristocrat could be sent as a volunteer to the Prussian army to gain 
valuable military experience, George II replied that 'if he has a mind to learn the art of 
War let him go to Clive'.75  
The political capital and popular support which Robert’s metropolitan network 
succeeded in acquiring in the years before and after Plassey, were in turn deployed by 
its members in support of Robert’s interests and policies in Bengal. For example, before 
Plassey, despite his success in retaking Calcutta, defeating the nawab and expelling the 
French from their principal settlement at Chandernagore in early 1757, factions existed 
within East India House which opposed Robert’s policies of further expanding the 
Company's military operations and political interests, refusing to acknowledge his gains 
and reward him accordingly. At the head of this faction was the chairman, John Payne, 
who, in a general court of shareholders at East India House, accused Robert of placing 




his private interests about the public by excessively profiting from the expedition to 
Gheria. Robert Clive, Payne declared, was indebted to the Company, not the other way 
round.76 At this, the Clive kinship network mobilised the political capital they had 
worked hard to build and called upon the assistance of certain Government ministers, 
such as Lord Barrington and the Duke of Newcastle, both of whom spoke individually 
with the directors in favour of Robert Clive to such an extent that the directors 
complained that they were being virtually dictated to.77  
 In combination with such ministerial intervention, Robert instructed his network 
to put their support behind the deputy-chairman, Laurence Sulivan, a man who was 
openly contesting Payne's chairmanship. Though they were to become the bitterest of 
enemies later, after 1757 both Robert Clive and Laurence Sulivan agreed to the need for 
a strong military establishment in Bengal to secure the Company's new acquisitions and 
revenues.78 'You will make use of all your Interest & that of your Friends, in support of 
Mr Sullivan', Robert wrote to his father in 1758.79 He also urged his cousin William 
Smyth King to put his support behind Sulivan, 'because I am persuaded his endeavours 
are used for the good of the service.'80 Such endeavours included overturning the 
previous chairman's system of rotational governors for the Bengal Presidency, which as 
the name suggests rotated the office between four individuals, a system designed by 
Payne to intentionally exclude Robert Clive.81 Once elected, however, Sulivan 
confirmed Robert’s support for him by abolishing the rotational system and replacing 
John Holwell with Robert as governor of Bengal, with Robert’s close friend and ally 
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William Watts as his successor.82 With his authority reinforced in Bengal and the 
support of Whitehall and East India House behind him, the Clive kinship network had 
succeeded in creating a dominant position for Robert within the Company in the wake 
of his victory at Plassey, a fact which subsequently enabled him to enforce his new 
political settlement across Bengal. His private interests in Bengal shaped the 
development of the colonial state there for decades to come. 
 The metropolitan circuit of the wider Clive kinship network proved significantly 
effective in supporting the private interests of the family in Asia. This was partly as a 
result of the significant emotional bonds existing between family members within the 
network. For example, in a letter to Robert’s wife Margaret Clive in 1758, the former’s 
cousin Sarah Clive had described how Richard Clive had 'dined with us yesterday and 
tried to read one of the Colonel's letters, but his joy made him continuously burst into 
tears.'83 However, members of the network stationed within the metropole were also 
driven by the substantial gains they stood to make from the exploits of their kin in Asia. 
Of old Shropshire gentry, the Clives owned the rather impoverished estate of Styche 
which had been in the family for centuries, and by the time it was handed down to 
Robert’s father, produced rents of barely £500 a year. As well as being badly indebted, 
Styche Hall itself was in a poor state and in desperate need of repair.84 To service the 
crippling mortgage on his property, Richard had by the 1750s practised in London at the 
court of Chancery for almost thirty years.85 For the Clives in Britain, then, tangible 
benefits deriving from Robert Clive’s interests in Asia were certainly welcome. 
Robert’s growing reputation in Britain presented an opportunity for raising themselves 
out of pecuniary difficulty and Shropshire obscurity. After repeated visits to the Duke of 
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Newcastle, for example, Richard told his son that the peer 'promises to do for me and 
last time I saw him he told me it must be something in my own way’.86 Shortly 
thereafter, Richard was appointed to the lucrative office of commissionership of 
bankrupts in 1756.87 A more glittering prize came after Plassey, in 1759, when Lord 
Powis had Richard returned to Parliament for his seat of Montgomery.88 Access to the 
great and powerful could bring even more immediate benefits. When a business partner 
of Richard's died suddenly in 1759, he was left to pay almost £9,000 worth of taxes on a 
joint-debt. However, after Richard appealed to the Duke of Newcastle, the latter 
'postponed the payment to a future date'.89  
 
John Walsh and the Survival of the ‘Dual System’ in Bengal 
In making full use of his metropolitan network, Robert Clive was able to deconstruct 
and then reshape the Company’s public interests regarding his expansion of the Bengal 
establishment. The careful management by his family of his success in the Carnatic 
from 1751 had forced the court of directors to defer to Robert’s opinion 'on Affairs in 
those parts', a situation which led to a substantial increase in the military capabilities of 
the Company's settlements with augmentation from the regular armed forces. Similarly, 
as the new governor of Bengal, Robert again mobilised his kinship network to ensure 
his political settlement of Bengal was supported by East India House. Though his father 
and cousins all continued their roles within this network, from 1759 John Walsh 
emerged as its principal member. As young men in 1743, Robert and Walsh had met at 
East India House, along with Robert’s cousin William Smyth King, where they had 
gone to be admitted into the Company as writers and to receive their orders to sail for 
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Madras.90 During their time in India, Robert and Walsh remained the closest of friends 
and when Robert married Walsh's cousin Margaret Maskelyne, they also became kin. 
But whereas on the capture of Madras in 1746 Robert transferred to the military, Walsh 
remained in civil employ and by 1749 had risen to join the Madras council.91  
When Robert set sail from Madras to retake Calcutta from the nawab of Bengal 
in 1756, he was accompanied by a number of family members who would form his 
inner circle in his campaign in Bengal. Walsh was one of these, whom Robert had 
appointed to the lucrative offices of secretary and paymaster. Walsh’s eventual 
prominence within the metropolitan circuit of the Clive kinship network arose directly 
from his involvement in the Plassey campaign, during which Robert immersed him in 
the intricate complexities of Bengali politics. For example, after the retaking of 
Calcutta, Walsh was sent to the camp of Nawab Siraj-ud-daula to discuss proposals for 
a treaty, but was forced to flee in the middle of the night when he learned that the nawab 
meant to take him prisoner, convinced that he was actually an assassin.92 After the battle 
of Plassey, Walsh raced towards the nawab's capital of Murshidabad in order to 
'quiet[en] the metropolis' and secure the state treasury.93 In control of the capital, Walsh 
acted as its temporary governor and supplied crucial intelligence to Robert. Upon the 
latter’s arrival, Walsh advised him on the political situation and was the architect of the 
Company’s official take-over. In this capacity, he informed Robert that 'It will be 
necessary for you to make some parade, music, drums and colours...two pieces of 
cannon would add to the pomp and I am persuaded give no kind of umbrage'.94 For the 
noticeable part he had played in placing Mir Jafar on the musnud [throne] as the new 
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nawab of Bengal, Walsh was awarded five lakhs rupees, or approximately £56,000, a 
considerable fortune in the later eighteenth century.95 As a chief actor in the conquest of 
Bengal, as well as one of its chief beneficiaries, Walsh emerged as the senior member of 
the Clive kinship network in the following years. 
 Towards the end of 1758, Robert Clive wrote once again to his father to acquaint 
him in detail of developments in India. In doing so he related his position as dominant, 
competent and secure, especially in Bengal where there were no French forces 'within 
600 miles of us', while his colleagues in Madras were being 'scandalously' incompetent, 
having been driven out of Fort St. David and being saved from the French only by 
Robert’s own efforts from Calcutta.96 To Robert, it was clear that the wisdom of his 
'revolution' in Bengal now spoke for itself. Again, as usual, he urged his father to 
transmit news about his situation to influential people in London and to 'make use of all 
your Interest ' on his behalf. At the end of the letter, however, Robert informed his 
father that Walsh was returning from Asia and would 'often call upon you...from him 
you may have all the detail of all our India transactions.'97 Whether obvious to Richard 
or not at the time, from the point of Walsh's return in 1759 he would form the centre of 
the metropolitan network, being the first to receive the most sensitive information from 
Robert, by whom he was charged with the most important tasks and trusted explicitly 
with managing Robert’s reputation and policies politically, socially and financially.  
As more of Robert’s kin returned from India in the years following Plassey, 
including his cousin George Clive and his brothers-in-law Edmund Maskelyne and 
Thomas Kelsall, his kinship network became increasingly more metropolitan. It was 
John Walsh who assumed the role as leader of this transformation. Indeed, in 1765, 
during Robert's third term in India as governor of Bengal, he wrote to Walsh to thank 
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him for all his services over the years: 'Our Friendship & Connection have been of so 
many Years standing, & I have always observed in you so much real Warmth of Heart, 
and Zeal for my Interest, & Honor, that I think of these marks of your affection in this 
distant part of the Globe, with great satisfaction.'98 Robert’s father was competent 
enough to manage his son’s interests when he was a Lieutenant Colonel fighting the 
French in the Carnatic. But as governor of Bengal, Robert needed a member of the 
network like Walsh, both a veteran of the Plassey campaign and an authority on the 
Company's affairs in India, to manage the perception and reception of Robert’s actions 
and ensure the support and adoption of his policies in the metropole. 
 Once Robert was secure as governor and his new ally Sulivan as chairman, 
Walsh arrived at East India House in late 1758 with strict instructions from Robert to 
lay his entire Bengal policy before Sulivan, as well as his plans for the long-term 
establishment of the Company’s position in India. Walsh handed the chairman a letter in 
which Robert introduced to Sulivan the man who had delivered it: 'Mr. John Walsh; his 
abilities & the knowledge he has acquired by acting in the quality of my Secretary 
during the Bengal Expedition make him by much the fittest Person to lay before You 
the whole extent of my designs.'99 With a concise and ambitious mandate from Robert, 
Walsh laid out the latter’s policies, not just for the political settlement of Bengal in the 
wake of Plassey, but for the future of the Company in Asia. Walsh explained that 
henceforth the revenues from the Company's new territorial acquisitions - not bullion 
exported from Europe - were to underwrite the annual investment in trade. He showed 
Sulivan copies of accounts he had brought with him from India of the net revenues of 
the three provinces of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, totalling some £2m annually.100 
Furthermore, Walsh explained how the political authority of the Company in India 
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needed to be further militarised with a larger standing army, and described how Robert 
believed the costs of this expanded establishment could be met by the Indian princes for 
whom Robert would provide protection.101  
Ultimately, Walsh’s short-term success was limited. The enormous bill for the 
Plassey campaign, ongoing expenses with Robert’s pacification of Bengal, and the 
struggle against the French in the Carnatic, prevented Sulivan from fully supporting 
these ambitions policies. On the contrary, Sulivan ordered Company servants in Asia to 
confine themselves as much as possible to 'mercantile tracts' without parade or military 
forces.102 Time and again Robert Clive’s demands for an increase in the Company's 
European forces in the wake of Plassey fell on reluctant ears, as when he warned the 
court in December 1758 that the only way to enforce the cooperation of the Indian 
princes was by 'keeping up such a force as will render it unsafe for them to break with 
us'.103 However, Walsh was clearly able to convince Sulivan of the financial aspects of 
Robert’s ‘dual system’. Some years later, as Sulivan reflected on the disastrous finances 
of the Company, he recalled that he had formulated his own policies as chairman 'upon 
the veracity of his [Clive’s] statement of the revenues...which Mr. Walsh brought home, 
and by Clive's order, delivered to me privately.'104 Similarly, despite Robert’s repeated 
complaints of not receiving the reinforcements of European troops necessary to uphold 
his settlement of Bengal, something which arose principally from Sulivan's attempts to 
limit the Company's military expenditure, nonetheless the chairman went to 
considerable lengths to raise and pay for the upkeep of a number of royal regiments for 
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the Company's use in Asia, while most of the £8.5m spent on the Company's military 
effort between 1756 and 1761 was raised under his direction.105 
 Anticipating the short-term challenges Walsh might face in attempting to shape 
East India House policy along lines determined by himself, Robert also formulated a 
long-term design that he hoped would secure his hard-won gains in Bengal, gains which 
were by early 1759 under intense pressure. ‘It seems having fought with Nabobs, 
Rajahs, & Subahs', Robert lamented to Walsh in March, 'we must now try our hand with 
the Royal Family for the Mogul's eldest Son...was arrived at the banks of the 
Caramnasser'.106 The last threat was a full-scale Mughal invasion of Bengal in an 
attempt to reclaim the province for the Empire. Thus, even as Walsh met privately with 
Sulivan and spoke about the need for an increase in the fledgling Bengal Presidency's 
military capabilities, Robert had already composed a letter for Walsh to deliver to the 
Secretary at War, William Pitt, which he did in November. Appealing to metropolitan 
authorities outside of East India House to intervene in Company politics was an 
unprecedented step, but one Robert justified through the directors’ reluctance to secure 
or defend his settlement of Bengal. The letter Walsh laid out in front of Pitt detailed 
Robert’s 'dual system'. In the introduction, Robert wrote that Walsh was 'a thorough 
master of the subject, and will be able to explain to you the whole design, and the 
facility with which it may be executed, much more to your satisfaction and with greater 
perspicuity than can possible be done in a letter.'107  
Accordingly, Walsh attempted to persuade Pitt of the need to defend Robert’s 
newly acquired territories in India. He did so by offering to transfer the sovereignty of 
the new colonial conquests from the Company to the British Government, along with 
the annual revenue of £2m for the cash-strapped Exchequer, in return for 2,000 British 
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troops to secure Robert’s position there. 'I have represented to them [the court of 
directors] in the strongest terms the expediency of sending out and keeping up 
constantly such a force', Robert wrote in his letter to Pitt. 'But so large a sovereignty 
may possibly be an object too extensive for a mercantile company.'108 Walsh's part in 
articulating Robert’s designs and policies was considerable, and his subsequent letters 
to Robert betray the contribution his own knowledge and experience of Indian affairs 
made to the meeting with Pitt. The meeting itself lasted for an hour and a quarter, 
during which time Walsh challenged Pitt's sincerity in his positive reception to Robert’s 
policies, speculated about the latter’s own intentions as governor, gave his views on the 
position of the French in the Deccan, discussed the strategy of taking Mauritius, and 
spoke about his own ideas on the inevitable extension of the Company's territorial 
dominion in India.109  
In relaying the meeting back to Robert, Walsh believed that Pitt would not 
seriously contemplate seizing the Company’s territories in India for the Crown. ‘As far 
as I could judge by what passed then’, he concluded, ‘it will be left to the Company to 
do what they please.'110 Nonetheless, Walsh’s canvassing of metropolitan authorities 
outside of East India House had serious long-term consequences. On the one hand, it 
assisted in reconfiguring Asia’s position within Britain’s wider imperial concerns, 
bringing the Indian theatre from the margins to the centre of Britain’s war aims, a fact 
which led to increasing British reinforcements to India. In fact, when the French were 
finally defeated on the subcontinent at the battle of Wandiwash in 1760, Pitt had 
committed some £4.5m of military and naval assistance to the Company there.111 On the 
other hand, Walsh’s appeal for British forces to secure Robert’s settlement of Bengal in 
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return for its transfer to the Crown, led to a gradual process of intervention by the 
nation-state in the affairs of the Company. This process manifested itself through a 
series of India Acts which sought to oversee and regulate the Company in Asia, 
attempting to subject much of its political, commercial, judicial and financial decision-
making to Parliamentary control. 
 Though the results of operating through his metropolitan network during 
Robert’s governorship of Bengal were more nuanced than those achieved during the 
Plassey campaign and its immediate aftermath, they were nonetheless just as decisive 
and pervasive in shaping the Company's colonial acquisitions in Bengal. For example, 
despite his reluctance, Sulivan committed the Company to upholding Robert’s political 
settlement in the years following Plassey and, by his own omission, arranged the 
Company's future finances according to Robert’s new strategy of using Indian revenues 
to balance the Company’s commercial investment. Furthermore, the appeal to 
metropolitan authorities outside of East India House, such as the British Government, 
led to an increase in military assistance which ultimately secured Robert’s vulnerable 
territorial and political gains in Bengal, but, perhaps less sought after, also attracted the 
closer attention of ministers to the Company's affairs, who from that point onwards 
increasingly scrutinised the behaviour of Company servants in Asia, including that of 
Robert Clive himself when he was called before the House of Commons in 1772.112 
Unable to immediately appreciate or benefit from Walsh’s efforts, however, 
Robert returned to Britain on 9 July 1760 to ensure that 'proper measures may be taken 
at home for the better security of this [Bengal] valuable settlement'.113 Nonetheless, 
when Robert returned to India in 1765 as governor of Bengal for the second time, 
Walsh once again proved invaluable within the kinship network, indeed now more than 
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ever, as Robert sought to reform what was perceived as the rampant corruption of the 
Bengal establishment. 'To you and you only,' he wrote to Walsh shortly after arriving at 
Calcutta, 'I shall communicate every transaction of Consequence which has passed since 
our arrival...I have referred many of my Friends to you for Information, but you will 
communicate to them what you think proper.'114  
Over the next three years, as Robert attempted to cleanse the 'Augean Stable', as 
the court of directors described the control private interests exerted over their new 
province of Bengal, Walsh was tasked with conveying the success of his efforts once 
more to influential men at East India House and Westminster.115 These included George 
Grenville, the Prime Minister, to whom he presented a copy of an advantageous peace 
treaty Robert had concluded following victory at the battle of Buxar over the combined 
forces of the nawabs of Bengal and Awadh and the Mughal Emperor in 1764. Walsh 
also presented Grenville with a 'Map of Bengal with some Marginal Explanations'.116 
This was followed by a similar visit to the deputy-chairman of the court of directors, Sir 
George Dudley, from whom Walsh attempted to gain support for Robert’s dismissal of 
William Sumner as his successor as governor of Bengal, in favour of his close friend 
Henry Verelst.117 As well as determining his own succession, Robert also tasked Walsh 
with meddling in the affairs of Madras, where he hoped to have another friend installed 
as governor. 'If a Successor to Mr Palk [governor of Madras] is not absolutely fixed 
upon,' Robert wrote to Walsh during a stop at Madras on his journey to Bengal in 1765, 
'I beg you will exert your whole Influence with Mr. Rous [the chairman] in favour of 
Mr. Call...by far the most proper Person in this Settlement to succeed to the 
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Government'.118 As well as being personal friends, both Verelst and Call also acted as 
Robert’s trustees and business agents in Bengal and Madras respectively, and would 
thus maintain his private interests even when Robert was absent or had returned to 
Europe. 
 As with Richard Clive in previous years, John Walsh was similarly assisted by a 
number of other metropolitan network members in carrying out his responsibilities. 
Walsh held regular meetings with Robert’s cousins Henry and George Clive and 
William Smyth King, at which they would discuss, according to Robert’s wife Margaret 
in a letter to her husband, 'what your affairs shall be'.119 Sir Edward Clive also 
continued to act as an influential member of the network. Now as Justice of the 
Common Pleas, ‘the Judge’ repeatedly expressed his intention to 'lend his assistance to 
forward your interest', as Margaret commented to Robert, and regularly visited her to 
obtain the latest news relating to her husband’s affairs in India.120 Similarly, Robert’s 
father Richard kept up his own role within the network. As Margaret noted in a letter to 
her husband, 'As soon as I received your letter I went to town to tell them [his parents] 
of it'.121 Originally the centre of the metropolitan network, Richard was now a second-
hand consumer of news relating to his son, usually delivered by either Margaret or one 
of Robert’s cousins. 'Your Father...was here yesterday & read your letters & heard every 
thing,' Margaret wrote to him in 1765. 'He has received none from you, & fears you 
have not written to him...it is impossible to conceive his impatient desire of letters from 
you, nor how your writing, or your silence affects him.'122  
From Robert’s second governorship of Bengal onwards, Richard was 
increasingly relieved of his responsibilities within the network and moved to its 
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margins. He finally found himself the victim of exclusion when Robert’s cousin 
Thomas Kelsall, one of his trustees in Britain, halted the refurbishment of Styche Hall, 
the ancestral Clive family home in Shropshire and Richard’s main residence. Richard 
took grave exception to this, and complained that it demonstrated the 'Opinion the 
Trustees have of Lord Clive's Father that he should never be consulted'.123 Richard's age 
- he was seventy one in 1764 - and almost constant afflictions of health, including a 
severe eye injury, impaired his ability to act efficiently within the network. This fact 
was keenly felt by his son Robert, who wrote to his father wishing that his constitution 
would carry him 'to an Age nearly equal to that of your Aunt Judy'.124 Indeed, Robert’s 
cousin and namesake, Robert Clive, wrote to him in 1765 that his father’s afflictions 
were so serious 'that I doubt there is but little probability of his ever meeting you again 
in this world.'125 Richard's decline consolidated Walsh's position as the prominent 
member of the metropolitan network, one he fulfilled until Robert’s death in 1774. 'I 
pursue my Plan', Robert wrote to Walsh from Calcutta in 1766, 'of making you alone a 
thorough Master of all our Transactions in these parts, that you may act in my Behalf 
for the Good of the Company'.126 
 
The Matriarchy of 45 Berkeley Square 
The agency of Richard Clive and John Walsh within the metropolitan circuit of the 
Clive kinship network was considerable, meeting with directors, petitioning politicians 
and attending the king’s court in furtherance of the family’s wider colonial interests. 
However, this was not just a circle of influential and patriarchal men. The agency of 
women and matriarchs within metropolitan networks was similarly significant. Indeed, 
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the study of family networks throws into relief the prominent role of the less prominent 
actors within the early modern British Empire. The role of women in the early colonial 
state, for example, has traditionally been an invisible one. Historians considered 
European women in Asia before the nineteenth century as marginal or absent actors, 
predominantly due to their limited numbers.127 In relation to the Company, women are 
often portrayed in one-dimensional terms as potential wives for Company servants, and 
Asia has been cast as a marital space for European women.128  
Indeed, although a vibrant scholarship on gender colonialism has emerged in the 
past two decades, British women in Asia in the period before the later eighteenth 
century have yet to be given serious consideration, nor has their relation to, or impact 
upon, the Company been adequately explored.129 This stands in stark contrast to their 
dynamic and transformative role in others parts of the early modern British Empire, 
where European women undertook the process of creating cultural constructs that laid 
the foundations of a gender frontier, stretching from British Columbia to New South 
Wales.130 More importantly, with the emergence of a cult of domesticity and sensibility 
in Britain, European women on the frontiers of empire were sanctified as symbols of 
civilised society, representing virtue and domesticity.131 In doing so, they were 
contrasted with their colonial counterparts, a process which emphasised the degradation 
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and backwardness of native women, feeding into a discourse of ‘difference’ which 
helped to reinforce the emerging colonial order.132 
 European women were also able to engage with empire in more direct ways. In 
the later eighteenth century, Elizabeth Marsh, a British woman who wrote pioneering 
travel accounts, engaged with trade, piracy, slavery and exploration, and ultimately 
created a Company family of her own, repeatedly crossed national, cultural, imperial 
and geographic boundaries, creating and disseminating colonial knowledge.133 
Similarly, in the metropole itself, women directly confronted and contested imperial 
institutions to shape and transform colonial policy, as had the wives of captured Royal 
Navy servicemen in the late seventeenth century, when they staged a protest outside of 
the Navy Office in the hopes of receiving the pay of their husbands languishing in 
Dutch gaols.134 It is evident, then, that European women in the later eighteenth century 
engaged directly and profoundly with processes of empire and colonial state formation. 
Very frequently, women in Asia in the eighteenth century operated as multiplex actors, 
in that they engaged with and connected people, places and spaces together ‘through 
more than one role, position or context’.135 In doing so, they also facilitated the 
expansion of their respective kinship networks, both in Asia and within the metropole. 
That women assumed such critical roles within their kinship networks, 
especially in engaging with the Company’s metropolitan authorities, was nowhere more 
evident than in the Clive metropolitan network. As Robert Clive consolidated his 
personal hegemony over Bengal in the 1760s, so his wife Margaret Clive 
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simultaneously consolidated her own hegemony over their kinship network in the 
metropole. By constructing a powerful matriarchy, Margaret was able to mobilize her 
expansive family to support her own engagement with the Company, one in which she 
sought both to promote the colonial policies of her husband as governor of Bengal, but 
also to secure advantages for herself and her wider family. That she was able to do so 
was intimately bound up with the private benefits metropolitan members of Company 
kinship networks gained from the colonial expansion they precipitated in Asia. Indeed, 
before the battle of Plassey in 1757, Margaret Clive had been a marginal figure within 
the Clive kinship network. In fact, it was the opinion of her cousin Sarah Mathisson that 
Margaret was ruled by her younger cousin Jenny Kelsall.136 But this dynamic quickly 
changed following Robert’s victory at Plassey in the following year, whereupon the 
social prestige and material wealth available to Margaret transformed her position 
within the network, as Robert Clive's cousin Sarah Clive made clear. 'I don't know what 
title I must give you now', she wrote to Margaret in 1758 after hearing of Plassey, 'but I 
am sure I may say "To the agreeable Mrs. Clive"...with your bags of money, and 
bushels of diamonds'.137 Margaret's elevated position changed the way her kin perceived 
her, allowing the newly endowed Lady Clive to establish a matriarchy over her 
expansive yet predominantly impoverished metropolitan kinship network. 
As Margaret provided the members of her network with pensions, annuities, 
gifts, employment and patronage, they in turn became her social and familial 
subordinates. 'I am providing abundance of fine things for You', Robert Clive wrote to 
Margaret in 1766, 'indeed the finest Muslins Dimmitys Diappers Long Cloth &c making 
for the use of our Family.'138 As a principal recipient of the luxury goods of Asia, 
Margaret was in turn able to redistribute these goods across the network as gifts, 
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binding its members to her through the ties of obligation, duty and loyalty.139 Margaret 
was also regularly supplied by her husband with a stream of precious stones. Indeed, 
diamonds were the primary gift of diplomatic exchange in northern India, and thus the 
governor of Bengal was often a great beneficiary.140 'It would amaze you', Robert wrote 
to Margaret from Benares in 1765, 'to hear what Diamonds Rubies & Gold...have been 
offered to Lady Clive'.141 Many of these were duly acquired and sent back to Margaret, 
who in turn gifted them to her sisters-in-law, cousins and whomever else she chose to 
favour. For example, in 1765 Margaret received a parcel of rough and smooth topaz and 
amethyst diamonds from her husband worth £300. Margaret proceeded to have them cut 
and then set as necklaces, earrings and buckles which she then presented to her 
husband’s ‘Sisters & Friends’.142  
Pecuniary gifts were also an important source of Margaret’s matriarchal 
authority, consolidating her hold over less affluent or socially prestigious network 
members. Annuities and dowries were generously conferred on them by Margaret,  
transforming her sisters, cousins and wider kin into clients and dependents.143 When 
Margaret originally intended to accompany her husband to India in 1765, the latter 
settled £200 a year on his cousin, Harry Clive, to assist him in their absence. But when 
pregnancy forced Margaret to stay behind, she told her husband that 'I do not wish him 
to be deprived of it' and continued to pay the annual settlement to him.144 Robert was 
aware of his wife’s generosity, and when he executed a bond Harry had sent him in 
India, he sent it specifically to Margaret so that she would 'present it with your own 
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Hands & receive that [satisfaction] which you always enjoy upon doing a good and 
generous action'.145 Similarly, Margaret asked her husband to visit and assist her 
distressed cousin Thomas Kelsall, a writer at Madras. When Robert set him up with 
£4,000 of trading capital and recommended him to the court of directors for a seat on 
the Madras council, he allowed Margaret to inform her cousin’s family of the good 
news.146 
As well as material gifts and pecuniary largesse, Margaret’s matriarchy was also 
exercised and maintained through her powers of patronage. Family members on the 
metropolitan periphery of the Clive kinship network were particularly prone to 
petitioning Margaret for favours. Thus in 1765 Margaret's cousin William Cox 
approached her to request that her husband use his influence with the Bombay council 
on behalf of his son Robert Cox, a writer at that place.147 The following year a more 
distant cousin of Margaret's, Captain Hodgson, asked her to recommend a friend of his, 
an ensign in the Company’s Bengal army, to Robert’s favour.148 More immediate 
metropolitan family members also applied for Margaret’s patronage. Her brother Nevil 
Maskelyne, for instance, approached Margaret to enlist her help in lobbying for his 
candidateship as Royal Astronomer, a position he attained partly thanks to Robert 
Clive’s interest with the Prime Minister, George Grenville.149 Margaret was often 
perceived as the gateway to her husband’s vast resources and favour, but she also 
commanded her own patronage network. This was recognised by Margaret's brother 
Edmund Maskelyne, who wished to put forward another one of their Cox cousins, this 
time as a writer in Bengal: 'in case you should learn...that he is not appointed I am 
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persuaded your Interest will be sufficient to get it effected', Edmund wrote to his sister 
in 1764.150  
Gift-giving and patronage were the cornerstones of Margaret Clive’s matriarchy, 
placing her at the centre of the metropolitan network, alongside the likes of John Walsh. 
As matriarch, Margaret was able to draw on her wider network in support of her 
family’s private interests in Bengal. This was particularly evident at 45 Berkeley 
Square, the London residence of the Clives after their return to Britain in 1760 which 
they leased, and then later purchased for £10,000.151 Although not a grand London 
mansion along the lines of Devonshire House, nonetheless Berkeley Square was ‘a 
gentleman’s town house writ large…with its Palladian façade of stone, its grand 
staircase and its spacious rooms’.152 Domestic spaces held great significance for 
metropolitan networks. As the historian Kate Smith has recently argued, Company 
families ‘placed great importance on houses as sites that located ideas of familial 
belonging and identity so important to imperial endeavours.’153 It was from 45 Berkeley 
Square that Margaret managed and orchestrated the family’s vast metropolitan interests, 
mostly in relation to the Company, but also including the day-to-day financial, political 
and social concerns of the family and its private interests. 
Indeed, Margaret described to her husband how she was 'constantly employed in 
opening & reading notes & letters…which was so great a fatigue in my spirits.'154 As 
well as correspondence, Margaret was also constantly making executive decisions, 
whether in meetings with various directors from East India House, in deciding to extend 
or withhold patronage, when politically canvassing or even in managing the family’s 
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investments as one of five family trustees. Some of these concerns proved so delicate 
that Margaret could become uncharacteristically anxious. 'My fears of doing something 
wrong when I have been obliged to act on my own judgement and to give opinions and 
orders about any affairs relative to you or your house', she told her husband in 1765, 
'have more than once disturbed my peace. I shall be happy if you judge what I have 
done to be right.'155 Nonetheless, as matriarch Margaret persevered with her workload 
and provided her husband and other members of the kinship network in Asia with an 
organised and efficient domestic administrative headquarters able to deal with all 
aspects of their interests in the metropole. 'I hope you will be supplied with every 
necessary, & ever intelligence you desire from us', Margaret concluded to her husband, 
although she could not help but add with some relief that she also hoped he would 'soon 
put us out of your office, & take the administration again on yourself.'156 
 As part of her matriarchy over the kinship network, Margaret called upon 
various metropolitan family members to assist with her various responsibilities. One 
such drafted member was John Kelsall, who had been a captain in the Bengal marine 
service where he had married Margaret’s aunt, Alice Maskelyne, in Calcutta in 1729.157 
John assisted Margaret in answering the constant flow of correspondence pouring into 
Berkeley Square, wrote duplicates of her letters, managed the accounts and acted as a 
steward, running the domestic and financial affairs of the household establishment.158 
Margaret came to depend on John's assistance a great deal and in 1766 informed her 
husband that 'I have a sincere regard for him & my aunt who has been extremely 
attentive to our family, and very useful', adding that they were both 'attached to our 
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interest'.159 In return John and Kelsall were handsomely accommodated in Berkeley 
Square, living alongside a plethora of other kin who were similarly obliged to Margaret 
and fulfilled a variety of tasks to support her. These included Margaret’s cousin Jenny 
Latham and her two children, and Robert Clive’s cousin William Smyth King, amongst 
others.160  
Robert’s cousin Harry Clive had been the first member of their metropolitan 
network to live and work at Berkeley Square, joining the Clives there shortly after they 
moved in, in 1760. Although unconnected with the Company, Harry was regarded by 
the whole family as an integral member of their kinship network, and Edmund 
Maskelyne wrote to his sister Margaret of the obligation he was under due to Harry's 
friendship. 'China, Persia & India shall be ransacked & pour out their Stores to return 
this Goodness', he wrote in 1764 as he accompanied Robert Clive to India.161 Harry 
regularly canvassed on the family’s behalf, visiting the various parliamentary seats of 
his kinsman across the country, as when he travelled to Robert’s seat of Shrewsbury to 
ensure his ‘interest is as high as ever’.162 Harry was also a trustee of Robert’s estate, 
sitting alongside Margaret and a select few family members to make executive decisions 
regarding Robert’s financial assets, as well as managing investments, stocks, and 
properties.163 Harry kept his cousin and patron constantly informed of the trustees’ 
decisions, writing in 1764 that 'everything with the Trustees is friendly and 
agreeable'.164 Margaret commented frequently to her husband of Harry's sincerity and 
devotion to her and the family, noting that despite his being outspoken about certain 
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members of the family, 'it is my command that he shall refrain' from doing so, at which 
he did.165 Indeed, Margaret offered her kin accommodation, employment and security, 
and they obliged by assuming socially and emotionally subservient roles within her 
matriarchy. As she wrote to her husband on his departure for India: 'I love them all very 
well, & believe I am beloved by them'.166 
Margaret’s matriarchy did not exist solely for her benefit, however. Rather, she 
used her commanding position within the Clive kinship network to engage directly with 
the Company’s metropolitan authorities, specifically East India House, in support of her 
husband’s interests and policies as governor of Bengal. As the historian Kate Smith has 
recently argued, ‘Women were important actors in the spaces that exist between and 
within private and public, personal and political.’167 This was particularly true for 
Margaret’s role in shaping the politics of East India House. In March 1765, Margaret 
wrote to her husband in Bengal that 'Tomorrow I shall have a great deal of company 
indeed all the people of quality &c.'168 She had organised a concert and paid the Italian 
soprano Giovanni Manzuoli £80 to sing at 45 Berkeley Square, with the young Mozarts, 
Wolfgang and his sister Maria, playing the harpsichord.169 Margaret combined her 
appreciation of culture with the magnificence of her home to impress upon her audience 
the prestige of the Clive family, amongst whom were a large portion of her own kinship 
network, as well as Company directors, shareholders and officials. The concert and the 
soprano's singing, she told her husband, 'exceed everything I had a mind to...be seen by 
the company.'170  
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Margaret's attempt to overawe the principal policymakers of East India House in 
March 1765 was strategically timed. From 1763 onward, barely two years after 
returning from India, Robert Clive had intervened directly within the leadership of the 
court of directors, launching a campaign to challenge the incumbent chairman, 
Lawrence Sulivan, for supremacy over the headquarters of the Company’s public 
interest.171 Although Robert lost in that year's election - Sulivan being returned as 
chairman - he was victorious in 1764 when he and his allies succeeded in having their 
own candidate, Thomas Rous, elected to the chair.172 However, despite securing short-
term metropolitan support for his political settlement of Bengal, Robert was aware that 
the next election in 1765 would be the most hotly contested in the Company's history, 
with Sulivan deploying all of his wealth, influence, and support to regain his lost 
position. As every year the election was held in April, Margaret's grand concert in the 
magnificence of 45 Berkeley Square in the preceding month was timed to consolidate 
her husband’s supporters and to recruit any Company shareholders and directors still on 
the fence, or indeed voting with the opposition. 
Amongst those of the opposition were the Ducarel family, who in previous 
elections had voted for Sulivan and whom Margaret had invited to the concert 
specifically to convert to her husband’s cause.173 In the previous month, Margaret 
entertained James Ducarel at Berkeley Square before his departure for India.174 At this 
meeting she utilised her patronage, promising to recommend James to her husband 
when he arrived in Bengal.175 Following their meeting, James wrote to his mother, 
admonishing her for not travelling down to London to meet Lady Clive which might, he 
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said, have offended her, something he and his brothers, all in the service of the 
Company, could not afford as her husband 'could make our fortunes or ruin us in 
Bengal'.176 After Margaret's concert at Berkeley Square, James wrote to his sister Maria 
that 'if you had gone to London you might and would most easily have renewed your 
intimacy with Lady Clive...with the most happy consequences to your Brothers...by the 
means of Musick in which you are so much improved since you saw her'.177 That 
Margaret's efforts had born fruit was confirmed when James wrote to his mother shortly 
after the election in April 1765, congratulating her on the Clive victory and expressing 
his gladness that they no longer had to rely on Sulivan for their patronage.178 Margaret 
considered the entire event a complete success, observing to her husband that 'every 
body seems to have their eyes open...& will most of them vote properly; at least this is 
our [the family's] opinion.'179 The success of Margaret's campaign on behalf of her 
husband and the impressionable statement of the entire family at Berkeley Square was 
evidenced in 'the total Overthrow of Sulivan & his Party', preserving control of the 
Company’s metropolitan authorities at East India House to the Clive family.180 
 
Conclusion 
Rather than heralding the emergence of the colonial state in Asia, then, the battle of 
Plassey was significant in allowing Company kinship networks to reengage with the 
metropole and eventually to even reshape and subordinate the public interest to the 
private interests of servants at the very core of the Company. Where once East India 
House had attempted to contain their servants within hierarchies and supress their 
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private ambitions and gains, the court of directors itself was now overrun by private 
interest, each contesting for control of the Company’s future. Indeed, the unprecedented 
resources available to Company families after 1757 allowed them to mobilise the 
metropolitan circuits of their kinship networks on a scale and in a way which had not 
proved possible beforehand.  
Following Robert Clive’s victory at the battle of Plassey, his family and kin in 
Britain were capitalised on his reputation as Pitt’s ‘heaven-born general’ to reshape the 
policies of East India House in support of his settlement of Bengal. This proved highly 
beneficial to the Clive family in terms of wealth, power and prestige. The network 
lobbied the support and resources of other metropolitan authorities, such as parliament, 
to gain support for Robert Clive’s designs for the Company in Asia. In this respect, the 
female members of metropolitan networks proved crucial in engaging with East India 
House. Robert’s wife Margaret Clive was able to use the profits of empire to transform 
her position within the network, a dynamic which allowed her to apply the concentrated 
efforts and resources of the wider family in securing her husband’s hegemony over the 






The Making of the Early Modern Colonial State 
 
 
This thesis so far has examined the complex and amorphous origins of the early modern 
colonial state in Asia. In order to conclude this study, however, it is also necessary to 
identify the end of that process of early modern colonial state formation. There are 
several obvious epochs that can be cited here. The lapsing of the Company’s charter in 
1833 and the subsequent loss of its monopoly over the Asian trade in 1833 is a potential 
contender.1 Perhaps even more definitive is the institution of Crown rule over the 
Company’s territories in 1858, which legally signalled the end of the Company as a 
sovereign power in Asia.2 While these dates clearly act as watershed moments in the 
history of the English East India Company, as they present a definitive ending point, 
they are less useful in detecting the end of the early modern colonial state itself. Despite 
what the historiography might suggest, the emergence of the ‘modern’ colonial state in 
Asia from the ashes of its early modern forebear cannot be so easily pinpointed.  
Historians have argued that many points in the later eighteenth century were all 
transformative developments which abruptly replaced the ‘private’ government of a 
commercial corporation with a ‘modern’, ‘public’ and centralised bureaucratic British 
colonial state. Lord North’s Regulating Act of 1773, which introduced the supreme 
office of governor-general over all of the Company’s disparate territories, is one of 
these.3 Another is William Pitt’s India Act of 1784, which created a board of control to 
regulate the Company’s court of directors at East India House, and thus provided 
                                                 
1 K. N. Chaudhuri, ‘India’s Foreign Trade and the Cessation of the East India Company’s Trading 
Activities, 1828-40’, Economic History Review, new series, vol. 19, no. 2 (1966), pp. 345-363.  
2 Robin J. Moore, ‘Imperial India, 1858-1914’, in Andrew Porter, The Oxford History of the British 
Empire: the Nineteenth Century (Oxford, 1999), pp. 423-46.  
3 Murray, ‘Company Rules’, p. 56. 
266 
 
parliamentary oversight to affairs in Asia – spectacularly so, in the case of Warren 
Hastings.4 And finally, the reforms of Lord Cornwallis in 1792 created a racially 
segregated, bureaucratic system of governance as well as a permanent revenue 
assessment.5 There is little doubt that each of these creeping interventions by the nation-
state in the affairs of the Company succeeded in systematically establishing a 
centralising force over the Company’s servants and their family networks across Asia, 
reducing their ability to exercise the political agency to which they had become 
accustomed. Indeed, comparing the swampy backwater of Charnock’s Calcutta, with its 
mud-walls, makeshift warehouses and tiny Eurasian community, to the mighty 
metropolis of the ‘City of White Palaces’ in the early nineteenth century, complete with 
British judiciary, European theatres and steam-ship mail service, it becomes all too 
apparent that the early modern colonial state had at some point been swallowed up and 
replaced by the expanding reach of the nation-state.6  
 
The Unmaking of the Early Modern Colonial State 
There was no precise moment at which the early modern colonial state was ‘swallowed 
up’, however. No grand act of parliament or violent rebellion permanently swept it 
away. Yet there were signs that the polity which had begun to emerge in the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries was under significant pressure to conform to 
the encroaching modernity of the nation-state by the later eighteenth century. To return 
to the beginning of this thesis, the impeachment trial of Warren Hastings as governor-
general of India may serve as a symbolic moment in which the early modern regime 
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gave way to a more modern successor. Edmund Burke’s prosecution of Hastings was 
brought about in part through the combined efforts of the governor-general’s political 
enemies. Many of these belonged to powerful Company kinship networks who had been 
disenfranchised in India as a result of Hastings’s army of ‘sophisters, economies, and 
calculators’, according to Burke.7  
Philip Francis was one such political enemy. He was a loyal supporter of Robert 
Clive’s ‘dual policy’, and had used his connections with Pitt’s Government to gain 
parliamentary support for the political settlement of Bengal in the 1760s. In return, 
Clive gave his ‘assent’ to Francis’s appointment as one of the new supreme councillors 
for Bengal, a position which came with a salary of £10,000 and increased powers to 
overrule Governor-General Warren Hastings after the passing of Lord North’s 
Regulating Act of 1773.8 Before his departure, Francis stayed with the Clives for two 
weeks in July 1773. During this time, Robert Clive indoctrinated Francis with his 
policies in regards to the governance of India, which included a critique of Warren 
Hastings, whom Clive believed had been dismantling his ‘dual policy’ since 1772.9 
Francis, who left for India shortly after with a memorandum in his pocket from Clive on 
how India should be governed, later described the Clives as ‘my best Friends’.10 
The political contest between Philip Francis and Warren Hastings is too well 
known to be recounted here.11 Suffice to say, between 1774 and 1780 the two battled for 
control of political authority in Bengal, Francis mostly succeeding in vetoing Hastings’s 
policies through a majority in council. As the latter took further steps to ‘dismantle’ 
Clive’s political settlement, Francis counteracted by buttressing it in key areas, such as 
                                                 
7 Burke, Works, vol. 3, p. 240. See also the introduction of this thesis. 
8 BL, APAC, MSS Eur G37/9/1, Philip Francis to ? [most likely Henry Strachey, a former clerk of the 
War Office and now private secretary to Robert Clive], London, 5 January 1769. 
9 Bence-Jones, Clive of India, p. 292. 
10 BL, APAC, MSS Eur G37/9/1, Philip Francis to Robert Clive, Calcutta, 30 November 1774. 
11 For the most recent account, see Travers, Ideology and Empire, pp. 141-289. 
268 
 
revenue, diplomacy and law. But they were also waging a larger symbolic war for the 
future of the colonial polity. Francis sought to maintain the prominence of individual 
Company servants and their family networks in the processes of colonial state 
formation, while Hastings attempted to squeeze such agency out and centralise political 
authority through a hierarchical bureaucracy. This struggle culminated in the conflict for 
control over the Benares residency in the 1780s, a key institution in shaping the 
Company’s future expansion across northern India.12 
As Francis departed for India, Clive had asked him to ‘promote the Interest’ of 
his cousin’s nephew, Francis Fowke, who had left for Bengal as a writer earlier in the 
year.13 The Fowke family had a long history of serving in Asia, stretching back to the 
later seventeenth century. More recently, the Fowke siblings Francis and Margaret, had 
been raised by their uncle John Walsh, spending a considerable time in the Clive 
household.14 Philip Francis obliged Clive by rapidly promoting his young relative 
through the Company’s establishment in Bengal.15 In return, Francis Fowke, along with 
his father Joseph Fowke, a free merchant based at Calcutta, supported Philip Francis in 
his disputes with Hastings. The result was that, in 1775, against the opposition of 
Hastings, Francis secured a majority vote to appoint Francis Fowke as the new resident 
of Benares, ‘an office of great importance & emolument’ with control over affairs in 
northern India.16  
In 1776, Hastings managed to regain power over the Bengal council with the 
death of one of Philip Francis’s allies, which led to the loss of the majority vote against 
Hastings. The governor-general’s first official act was to replace Francis Fowke as 
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resident of Benares with a more experienced and senior Company servant.17 When 
Margaret Fowke arrived at Calcutta from Madras in 1776, she discovered that Hastings 
had used his new advantage to relentlessly pursue Philip Francis and the Fowkes. In 
fact, Joseph and his son, who was still without a position, were forced to remove 
themselves from Calcutta and live in the Dutch settlement of Chinsurah, further down 
the Hugli river.18 Although the efforts of the metropolitan circuit of the Fowke network 
– particularly John Walsh - had succeeded in having an order dispatched from the court 
of directors demanding that Hastings reinstate Francis Fowke as resident of Benares, the 
governor-general simply ignored it.19 The Fowkes finally returned from exile in 
Chinsurah when Philip Francis brokered a temporary truce with Hastings on the 
condition that Francis Fowke be reinstated as resident of Benares, a deal which also 
included a substantial annual pension for his father, Joseph Fowke.20  
The residency at Benares became a powerbase for the Fowke family. Francis 
oversaw an expansion of the resident’s authority in the region which allowed him to 
rival the raja of Benares in power and gain a fortune of over £80,000 in the process.21 
The Fowkes were able to consolidate their hold over the political establishment through 
an expansion of the kinship network. Their greatly enlarged ‘family circle’ included the 
marriage of Margaret Fowke to John Benn, the assistant resident.22 Furthermore, much 
of the pecuniary gain experienced by the family went into aggrandising a new 
residency, named Sickroul. Larger than the raja’s own palace, the residency became an 
                                                 
17 Extracts from the Records at the East India House, of Proceedings relative to Mr. Francis Fowke, 
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18 BL, APAC, MSS Photo Eur 32, ‘Memoir’, vol. 1, p. 69. 
19 Extracts, pp. 8-9. 
20 BL, APAC, MSS Photo Eur 32, ‘Memoir’, vol. 1, p. 69. 
21 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 91. 
22 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 85. 
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expression of the family’s power and ambition.23 Company servants and their families 
crossed northern India to attend balls and concerts there, including the Orientalist Sir 
William Jones, as well as the Mughal Crown Prince, the Shahzdah.24 Yet the situation 
proved temporary. No sooner had Philip Francis returned to Britain in 1780, then 
Hastings had again dismissed Francis Fowke as resident of Benares, only to reinstate 
him in 1783 after John Walsh ‘once again set all of his powers to work’ on the court of 
directors.25  
Warren Hastings had been quite clear about why he persistently contested 
Francis Fowke’s appointment as resident of Benares. In a consultation at Calcutta in 
1781, he declared that the process of centralising political authority was a ‘right which 
under any other system of government would be conferred on it as an indispensable 
obligation’. Hastings argued that the government, of which he was the head, could not 
allow such an important position as resident of Benares to be held ‘by an authority 
independent of theirs’.26 In the case of Francis Fowke, independent authority included 
the influence of his family, whom Hastings and his allies believed were really in control 
of policy at Benares and, by extension, in northern India.27 ‘I consider the present 
appointment as the appointment not of Mr. Francis Fowke’, declared Hastings in 1775 
at the beginning of the contest, ‘but of Mr Joseph Fowke, whose influence over his son 
will reduce the authority of the latter to a mere shadow.’28 The message was clear: no 
authority besides the constitutionally empowered government of the Company was to 
reign in Asia. The decentred early modern colonial state of Charnock, Pitt and Clive 
was being dismantled in favour of a modern, centralised bureaucracy accountable to the 
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governor-general and East India House alone. The Company’s development in Asia 
would no longer be the preserve of independent Company servants who maintained 
power through the agency of their kinship networks.  
Modernising the colonial state through the disenfranchisement of the 
‘confederacy of little platoons’ in Asia was Hastings’s main priority as governor-
general. Attacking the influence of the family over colonial governance was a key aim 
of this strategy, one that would reduce the independent agency of Company servants. 
Hastings had been correct to identify Francis Fowke’s father as the power behind the 
residency. Joseph Fowke had accompanied his son to Benares ‘in a private capacity’.29 
Once there, he used his position of influence to help ‘prompt and direct’ Philip Francis 
and his allies on the Bengal council in their contest with the governor-general. 30 His 
daughter, Margaret Fowke, recalled how Joseph had become intimately involved in 
‘fierce quarrels’ with Hastings, creating ‘strife and intrigue’ between Calcutta and 
Benares. Her father, she declared, supplied Philip Francis’s faction with ‘information, 
incited them against Hastings, & was the lie, & soul of the violent opposition which 
they carried on against every act of his Government.’31 Joseph’s ‘great object appears to 
have been the overthrow of Hastings’, a design he impressed upon his son at Benares 
and his allies in Calcutta.32 Hastings responded by indicting Joseph Fowke on charges 
of treason and conspiracy in 1775, arguing that he had joined with Raja Nandakuma 
Bahadur in producing false evidence against Hastings which supposedly revealed him to 
have engaged in various illicit activities.33 Although he was eventually acquitted of 
these charges, Joseph Fowke was nonetheless fined heavily and eventually expelled 
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from the Company’s service.34 For Hastings, these victories brought the modern 
colonial state into being, an accomplishment which he believed had been his ‘public 
duty’.35 
Warren Hastings had won the contest in Asia for the future modernity of the 
colonial state. However, when he returned to Britain in 1785, he found himself 
embroiled in a fresh round of conflict, instigated by Edmund Burke through the 
encouragement of, amongst others, Philip Francis and Joseph Fowke. The latter’s 
grandson, in recalling the opinion of his mother Margaret some years later, stated that 
she believed ‘the whole subsequent trial [impeachment] of Hastings’ originated in the 
opposition of Joseph Fowke at Benares.36 Both Francis and Fowke had certainly found a 
sympathetic ear in Edmund Burke when they returned to Britain. The famous orator 
repeatedly put Fowke’s case of unfair dismissal from the Company before the House of 
Commons; while Francis, on the advice of Clive’s secretary Henry Strachey, had been 
criticising Hastings to Burke in a stream of letters since at least 1777.37 Burke had led 
the Rockingham Whig opposition to greater Government control over the Company, 
most notably as part of a parliamentary committee in January 1781. But when Francis 
arrived in Britain at the end of the year, he succeeded in converting Burke into a radical 
critic of Hastings, and the two began immediate plans to have Hastings recalled in 
disgrace.38 In 1782 parliament did censure Hastings’s government and his conduct, but 
it had to wait until 1785 until he was recalled. In the following year, Burke was able to 
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recruit enough support for parliament to officially impeach the former governor-general 
of India.39 
The impeachment proceedings against Warren Hastings dragged on for more 
than seven years, in what is the most infamous parliamentary trial in British history. 
Every facet of Hastings’s government was exposed to the incriminating eye of 
parliament, court and the public. Nonetheless, Burke, Francis, Fowke and Hastings’s 
other political enemies were unsuccessful in their charges against him, Hastings being 
acquitted in 1795. Despite Burke’s hyperbolic oratory and the confederacy of scorned 
Company servants and their networks ranged against him, Hastings’s exoneration was 
less the product of his own virtue as it was a reflection of the changing nature and needs 
of the nation-state. Beginning in the 1780s, new forces of global change, including 
revolution, total-warfare and fiscal crises, demanded durable polities with centralised, 
bureaucratic and resourceful systems of governance capable of facing these challenges. 
This changing dynamic placed untold pressure on the ‘networks that structured 
eighteenth-century political societies’ which, as a result, ‘broke down in a relatively 
short space of time.’40 According to C. A. Bayly, by 1820 the ‘relationship between the 
individual, the family and political society’ that had underpinned the early modern 
colonial state, had largely unravelled.41  
In the same year that Warren Hastings was acquitted, Britain was engaged in a 
global war against Revolutionary France, while contesting control of southern India 
with Mysore and northern India with the Marathas. The fiscal-military demands placed 
upon the domestic British state forced it to centralise and exploit all possible resources, 
including those available to the Company in Asia. Such circumstances demanded more 
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than the private government of a network of families. Even in the 1770s Philip Francis 
had foreseen the vulnerable future of the early modern colonial regime in Asia, even as 
he fought so desperately to prolong it. ‘We have no separate Interests’, he wrote to 
Clive in regards to Company servants in India and the encroaching reach of Hastings’s 
army of bureaucrats. For Company servants, Asia ‘was Paradise before the Fall’, 
Francis claimed, but now, under Hastings, ‘the Foundation is Shaken’.42 
 
The Persistence of Private Agency and Family Networks 
Yet, well into this later period, historians have suggested that ‘the Company-State in 
India remained in any number of ways an early modern regime.’43 Despite the 
centralisation of fiscal-military power evident in the vast territories and resources 
underpinning British expansion on the Indian subcontinent and elsewhere in Asia by the 
early nineteenth century, its political development and colonial governance was, in 
many respects, still determined by the political agency exercised by individual 
Company servants and the family networks that they had established in Asia. The 
administration of Madras under the governorship of Robert Clive’s son, Edward Clive, 
provides a window into the enduring and persistent family relationships which shaped 
the colonial state in southern India as late as the turn of the nineteenth century. Almost 
half a century after his father’s era, Edward, Baron Clive of Walcot, governed according 
to his family’s private interests. Arriving in Madras in 1798 with his wife and their two 
children to take up the post of governor, Edward’s first official act was to visit the 
Company’s principal ally and dependent in south India, the nawab of Arcot, Umdat-Ul-
Umra. The nawab’s own family had been drawn in to the Clive family network through 
a complex and intermeshing web of interests and alliances which Robert Clive had first 
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established in the 1750s. Describing their meeting, Edward wrote to his mother, a 
significantly aged Margaret Clive, that 'I find he is not as agreeable as his father was'.44 
Edward had grown up with the recollections and stories of his own father's campaigns 
in the Carnatic in support of Muhammad Ali Khan, the current nawab's father, and his 
claim to rule the Carnatic. Robert forged a strong political and personal relationship 
with the nawab after he had helped defeat his rival claimant, Chanda Sahib.45 It was 
Muhammad Ali who had in turn helped propel Robert onto his career as a military hero 
to whom East India House constantly turned to in time of need, granting him the title 
Sabit Jang, 'steady in war', and awarding him Rs 40,000.46  
The relationship of Muhammad and Robert’s sons was thus from the outset 
conditioned by the mutual interests established between their two families: 'He spoke 
much of the friendship that had subsisted between [our] fathers', Edward informed his 
mother of Umdat-Ul-Umra.47 Shortly after this initial meeting, the nawab paid a return 
visit to the governor. Carried in to Fort St. George in a gilt framed palanquin and 
accompanied by a personal band playing the 'country musick', the nawab met Edward at 
the Governor's House. Constructing a political and personal dialogue through their 
shared family heritage, the governor and his Indian subordinate continued to shape their 
discourse according to their respective families. 'He remembers you', Edward wrote 
again to his mother of this further meeting, '& described you as not being to tall as 
myself which is having a good memory you will allow, as it was not yesterday that you 
were here'.48 There was more than mere sentiment behind these exchanges. By 
appealing to their family’s connections and shared interests, Edward was reminding the 
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young nawab of Robert Clive’s role in helping to preserve the Carnatic and thus its 
dependence on the new governor's lineage. The nawab, in turn, sought to reiterate the 
benefits gained by the Clives when working closely and in alliance with his own family, 
at a time when the independence of the debt-ridden Carnatic was under pressure from its 
main creditors, a collection of Company servants stationed at Madras.49  
The persistent role of families in wider state formation processes even beyond 
the later eighteenth century betrays the continued importance of smaller, private 
configurations of social, cultural, economic and political power in the British Empire. 
For every official policy telegraphed to India from Whitehall and with every new 
Company servant trained at Haliburton College who stepped ashore to take up his post, 
there were a dozen instances of early modern practices and attitudes shaping affairs 
throughout Asia. When Joanna Rumbold accompanied her husband, Thomas Rumbold, 
to Madras in 1778, she joined no less than five brothers stationed in the Company’s 
service throughout India. Adding to this existing kinship network her own considerable 
family who had accompanied her to India, Joanna described the role the family played 
in her husband’s governorship of Madras. For example, when she gave birth to her third 
child, despite wanting to name him Edward, she was obliged to change it to Anwen 
after a request by the nawab of Arcot, with whom the Rumbolds had grown particularly 
close.50 Governor Rumbold used his wife’s relations to consolidate his authority in 
India, appointing one brother to Sir Eyre Coote’s military staff, another to the council at 
Patna, a third to the revenue board of Calcutta and a fourth who carried to Britain the 
news of Rumbold’s capture of the French settlement of Pondicherry. ‘This with the 
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other transactions of my Government I flatter myself will be highly approved at home’, 
Rumbold declared to his own brother in 1778.51  
Public meetings between the governor of Madras and the nawab of Arcot were 
similarly family affairs. In 1779 the two families met at Arcot, where the Rumbolds 
were covered in flowers and baptised with rose water. At a reciprocal meeting in 
Madras, the governor’s youngest son Tommy ‘gave the Nabob some good hits when he 
first saw him.’ Afterwards, the nawab’s eldest son and successor gave the governor ‘two 
beautiful Horses’.52 At a period when the highest rungs of the centralised bureaucracy 
was in the hands of Richard Wellesley, a governor-general who ruled India by 
appointing his brothers Arthur and George to senior military and political positions, the 
family networks of Company servants were still serving to significantly decentre 




The unmaking of the early modern colonial state was as gradual, ambiguous and 
complex a process as its making had been two centuries before. Beginning with the 
breakdown of trust and fictive kin ties amongst members of an increasingly global 
Company by the mid-seventeenth century, as outlined in chapter 1, the Company’s 
transformation from a social community to the ‘dreadful totality of the corporate body’ 
pitted the public interests of East India House in London with the private interests of 
their servants in Asia. After the breakdown in public governance and authority at 
Madras in the 1660s, the governor and committees in London responded by composing 
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a discourse of state building which called for obedience to the public interest through 
hierarchy and order. However, as chapter 2 revealed, the practice of such state building 
was subverted by the pursuit of private interests by those servants who had been 
empowered by East India House to realise their centralisation of political authority in 
Asia. Rather, Company servants significantly decentred the development of the 
Company in regions such as the West Coast of Sumatra, by drawing on alternative 
metropolitan sources of authority to establish private colonial regimes which served 
their own holistic range of interests. Instrumental in such a process were the networks 
which connected Company servants to the metropole and, from the later seventeenth 
century, to other Company servants across Asia through the ties of family and kin.  
As examined in chapter 3, such networks shaped the interests and actions of 
Company servants through the exchange, circulation and movement of goods, capital, 
information and people between members. The expansion of kinship networks across 
Asia by the early eighteenth century allowed Company servants to pursue what chapter 
4 argued was an incoherent and often incidental process of state formation, but one that 
nonetheless powerfully determined the decentred and private nature of the Company’s 
political expansion in places such as Bengal following the foundation of the settlement 
of Calcutta. Finally, the conquest of Bengal in the later eighteenth century as explored 
in chapter 5, prompted the metropolitan networks of Company servants to reshape the 
policy of East India House, securing their gains in Asia at the same time as they 
established the hegemony of private interest in the heart of the public hierarchy of their 
masters in London. What had thus emerged through the development of the English 
East India Company in Asia by the later eighteenth century was not a monolithic, 
centralised, public institution, effectively managing the political or commercial 
concerns of a group of shareholders in London. Rather, it was an amorphous, porous, 
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shifting and contested set of commercial, political, social, cultural and territorial 
boundaries: an early modern colonial state formed through the conflict between the 
public and the private, driven by a ‘confederacy of little platoons’ that had laid the 
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